{"id":20355,"date":"2015-08-22T22:39:05","date_gmt":"2015-08-23T02:39:05","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/theredphoenixapl.org\/?p=20355"},"modified":"2015-08-22T22:39:05","modified_gmt":"2015-08-23T02:39:05","slug":"the-greek-debt-crisis-a-misnomer-for-the-european-imperialist-crisis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/2015\/08\/the-greek-debt-crisis-a-misnomer-for-the-european-imperialist-crisis\/","title":{"rendered":"The Greek Debt Crisis: A Misnomer for the European Imperialist Crisis"},"content":{"rendered":"<figure id=\"attachment_20358\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-20358\" style=\"width: 600px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece1.jpg?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"size-full wp-image-20358\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece1.jpg?resize=600%2C450&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Anti-austerity demonstration before the Greek Parliament, July 3, 2015\" width=\"600\" height=\"450\" \/><\/a><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-20358\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Anti-austerity demonstration before the Greek Parliament, July 3, 2015<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>August 2015<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Hari Kumar<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>1. An Introduction to Greece<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2. The Truman Doctrine \u2013 Greece becomes dependent upon the USA after the Second World War<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>3. The Greek Junta \u2013 Greece by now fully a client state of the USA<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>4. Capitalist Class of Greece Moves to \u201cDemocracy\u201d and Europe<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>5. The USA Makes Its Move to Become the World Imperialist Leader &#8211; The Character of the European Union \u2013 from pro-USA states to anti-USA coalition<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>6. The Greek Economic Crisis 2009-2015<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>7. The Marxist View of &#8220;National Debt&#8221; under capitalism<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>8. The Debt Crisis leads to increasing struggle of the growing Greek working class and gives rise to The United Front of Syriza \u2013 the political parties of the left<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>9. What was the elected programme of Syriza?<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>10. Elections of 2015 and Negotiations with the Troika<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>11. Conclusion<br \/>\nAPPENDIX: Select Chronology 1975 to 2015<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Synopsis:<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">After the Second World War, Greece was a client state in the Mediterranean of the USA. The revisionist collapse of the Yugoslav communists in the neighbouring state of Yugoslavia was key in this development. Tito\u2019s degeneration into revisionism deprived the minority of the Marxist-Leninist forces in the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) of crucial support. We describe this in a subsequent more detailed article.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This article is restricted to the post Second World War development of Greece, up to the present-day debt crisis. It argues that the entire post-war history of Greece was effectively that of a neo-colonial state serving initially the interests of USA imperialism and British imperialism. The Greek people did not have a non-revisionist proletarian leadership that could develop an independent democratic path. The Junta and the imperialist machinations in Cyprus of the island further retarded the people of Greece. Both Greece and Cyprus \u2013 endured military oligarchic dictatorships sponsored by the USA.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The later history of Greece became inextricably entwined with the slow but sure evolution of the European imperialist bloc. This bloc took multiple only slowly coalesced, and eventually it later became the European Community. However during its coming into being, it took several class forms. The post-Marshall Plan in Europe had ushered in a dominant USA which fostered the first steps towards a federal Europe. In its hopes to control the European content as a market, the USA was at first successful. During this period the elements of a united Europe adopted a pro-USA comprador position.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This is also characterised the initial European Economic Union (EEC). But the Euronationlists finally, and haltingly, moved to release Europe to some extent, from the USA embrace. Following the fall of the former Comecon countries, Germany was able to move into a new market itself. This began a new phase. Now the rising German imperialists used their industrial superiority and new market share to re-vitalise their hegemonic ambitions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Such events were milestones on the road to today\u2019s debacle in Greece. They were the pre-history of the chronic indebtedness of the Greek state.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">After the Junta \u201cdemocratised\u201d itself, Greece swopped the USA master for that of the EU. The EU progressed to be firmly dominated by the unified single unitary state of Germany, where German capitalists became the dominant faction. German capital exported both capital and industrial exports, including\u2026 to Greece. Over-riding the total market share of Greece accruing to Germany, are the huge debts of Italy and France to Germany \u2013 both at risk of potential default. This underlies the harshness of the German ruling class towards the Greek capitalist representatives in Greece today. Finally, current differences between the International Monetary Fund leader Christine Lagard (representing the USA interests) and the German leaders Angela Merkel and Schauble, show the continuing inter-imperial contradictions. This has engulfed Greece today.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>1. An Introduction to Greece<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece is set in the Eastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea and surrounded by the Aegean Sea:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece has more than 2,000 islands, of which about 170 are inhabited; some of the easternmost Aegean islands lie just a few miles off the Turkish coast. The country\u2019s capital is Athens, which expanded rapidly in the second half of the 20th century. Attik\u00ed (ancient Greek: Attica), the area around the capital, is now home to about one-third of the country\u2019s entire population.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.britannica.com\/place\/Greece\">http:\/\/www.britannica.com\/place\/Greece<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In the modern era industrialisation has been slow, leaving Greece dependent upon agriculture, fishing and tourism. The only segment of industry that could be considered substantial is shipbuilding and related industries:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe manufacturing sector in Greece is weak. \u2026. In the 1960s and \u201970s Greek shipowners took advantage of an investment regime that benefited from foreign capital by investing in such sectors as oil refining and shipbuilding. Shipping continues to be a key industrial sector\u2014the merchant fleet being one of the largest in the world\u2014(but) are extremely vulnerable to downturns in international economic activity, as they are principally engaged in carrying cargoes between developing countries.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.britannica.com\/place\/Greece\/Demographic-trends#toc26455\">http:\/\/www.britannica.com\/place\/Greece\/Demographic-trends#toc26455<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As far as agriculture is concerned, produce is hampered by small peasant holdings, resulting from an early restriction on large land holdings:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201clarge landowners appeared relatively late (with the annexation of Thessaly in 1881) and only lasted till the agrarian reforms of 1917, which abolished big landed property in Greece irreversibly.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. \u2018Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece\u201d; New Left Review; I\/96, March-April 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In addition dry conditions and poor soil make agriculture at times tenuous.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">In recent years the European Community has helped with various grant subsidies. Overfishing has hampered that other resource:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece\u2019s agricultural potential is hampered by poor soil, inadequate levels of \u201cprecipitation, a landholding system that has served to increase the number of unproductive smallholdings, and population migration from the countryside to cities and towns. Less than one-third of the land area is cultivable, with the remainder consisting of pasture, scrub, and forest. Only in the plains of Thessal\u00eda, Makedon\u00eda, and Thr\u00e1ki is cultivation possible on a reasonably large scale. There corn (maize), wheat, barley, sugar beets, peaches, tomatoes, cotton (of which Greece is the only EU producer), and tobacco are grown. Other crops grown in considerable quantities are olives (for olive oil), grapes, melons, potatoes, and oranges, all of which are exported to other EU countries. \u2026 Although inefficient, Greek agriculture has benefited substantially from EU subsidies&#8230; In general, however, the importance of the agricultural sector to the economy is diminishing\u2026<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece\u2019s extensive coastline and numerous islands have always supported intensive fishing activity. However, overfishing and the failure to conserve fish stocks properly, a problem throughout the Mediterranean, have reduced the contribution of fishing to the economy.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece has few natural resources. Its only substantial mineral deposits are of nonferrous metals, notably bauxite.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p>(<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.britannica.com\/place\/Greece\/Demographic-trends#toc26455\">http:\/\/www.britannica.com\/place\/Greece\/Demographic-trends#toc26455<\/a><\/span>) (<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.britannica.com\/place\/Greece\/Agriculture-forestry-and-fishing\">http:\/\/www.britannica.com\/place\/Greece\/Agriculture-forestry-and-fishing<\/a><\/span>)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The early development of modern-day Greek capitalism was that of a merchant capital that weaved itself into the matrix of the Ottoman Empire. Both these traders and arising shipping magnates, were based outside of Greece. Being non-resident they could not transfer easily all their capital resources for later industrialisation needed to keep pace with the rest of the European eco<\/span>nomies:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe development of the Greek bourgeoisie must be traced back to the sixteenth century when Greece was under Ottoman rule\u2026. Greek merchants\u2026 accumulated vast fortunes and control (over) Balkan trade and most of the Ottoman empire\u2019s commercial transactions with the industrialising West. \u2026..<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">With the decline of the Ottoman empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Greek bourgeoisie\u2026.contributed to the development of Balkan nationalism. It thus played a crucial role in the Greek war of independence against the Turks (1821). For while the Greek peasantry constituted the main revolutionary force in the war, the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals managed to direct this force towards nationalist goals. \u2026.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The first Greek constitutions, for instance, were inspired by the French experience; and although Capo d\u2019Istria and later King Otto tried to implement an absolutist model of government, their efforts were ultimately frustrated.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Of course, it is true that in the nineteenth century the autochthonous merchant class was rather weak. But its counterpart living abroad, the Greek diaspora merchants and ship-owners, with their formidable financial power, greatly influenced the shaping of most institutions in nineteenth-century Greece itself\u2026 .. these (Greek) merchant communities.. were flourishing both in colonial centres (Alexandria, Cairo, Khartoum, etc.), in the major capitals of ninteenth- century Europe and in Constantinople and Asia Minor.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. \u2018Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece\u201d; New Left Review; I\/96, March-April 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This large overseas Greek bourgeoisie was already prone to comprador positions. Although it helped transfer some capital to Greece itself, this was largely in the mercantile and finance sectors:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cAlthough relatively small by international standards, the Greek diaspora bourgeoisie, by exploiting inter-imperialist rivalries and playing the role of intermediary between metropolitan and colonial centres, managed to master formidable financial resources, some of which were channelled into mainland Greece. However, given its cosmopolitan and mercantile character, as well as the weakness of the indigenous bourgeoisie, these resources contributed to the development of a top-heavy state and a parasitic tertiary sector, geared to support a mercantile and finance capital, rather than to the development of industry and agriculture.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. \u2018Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece\u201d; New Left Review; I\/96, March-April 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By the end of the Second World War, the population of Greece can be characterised in the following break-down:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">A very small working class, of whom the most militant were in the tobacco industry; also some in shipping (often overseas for long periods) and fishing;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">A substantial number of small to medium petit-bourgeoisie in the urban areas (artisans, small businesses) and an even larger number of small peasants in the rural areas<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">A small but dominant comprador bourgeoisie with significant financial overseas capital \u2013 based in the shipping industry and in bank capital \u2013 with many connections to foreign traders<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">A much smaller but ambitious section of industrial capital anxious to develop their \u2018home\u2019 base of Greek production.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The first two sections of society in particular, had suffered enormous losses and hardships under the Italian-German fascist occupation; and then in the ravages of the Civil War. A good summary of the position of the Greek people following the Second World War can be taken from <strong>Enver Hoxha<\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cWhen our people are rebuilding their country which was devastated during the war, when our country is working with all its might to strengthen the people&#8217;s democracy and advance on its peaceful and progressive course, Greek monarcho-fascism is employing a thousand and one of the basest methods to inflict harm on our people. You know what a terrible tragedy is occurring in Greece. The unfortunate but heroic Greek people are fighting against monarcho- fascists and the foreign intervention. The progressive and democratic world is profoundly indignant when it sees the great tragedy of that people who deserve to live free and sovereign, but who, unfortunately, are being mercilessly oppressed and killed by collaborators of Italo-German fascism who are now under the direct orders of Anglo-American reaction.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Hoxha, Enver; \u201cWe Sympathize With the Efforts of the Greek People for Freedom and Democracy.\u201d Speech 3 October 1947; In: \u201cTwo Friendly Peoples<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"> Excerpts from the political diary and other documents on Albanian\u2014Greek relations<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"> 1941 \u2014 1984\u201d. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin Institute Toronto, 1985; pp. 47-48.<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.enverhoxha.ru\/Archive_of_books\/English\/enver_hoxha_two_friendly_peoples_eng.pdf\">http:\/\/www.enverhoxha.ru\/Archive_of_books\/English\/enver_hoxha_two_friendly_peoples_eng.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2. The Truman Doctrine &#8211; Greece becomes dependent upon the USA after the Second World War<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The USA implemented an overall strategy known as \u2018The Truman Doctrine\u2019 \u2013 to counter the ideological threat of the USSR after the victories led by the Marxist-Leninists had inspired the world proletariat. In the Aegean the Truman Doctrine aimed to:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cPrevent Greece and Turkey from passing under Soviet Control.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Woodhouse C.M. \u201cModern Greece, A Short History\u201d; London 3rd Edition<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1984; p. 258).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Both the USA Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO, were tactical instruments of the Truman Doctrine. They were used in Greece to build and develop a modern capitalist state structure. But before they were deployed, first the potential proletarian victory of the Greek Civil War had to be stopped.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">While the British General Scopus and his forces had defeated the combined forces of the <strong>Greek Communist Party (KKE)<\/strong> and their military wing (<strong>ELAS<\/strong>), significant distrust remained in the population against British imperialism. So, after the battle of Athens (Dec 3rd 1949) was won by the British, a democratic fa\u00e7ade was placed onto the imperialist proceedings. By this stage all leftist opposition had been essentially neutralized and no longer posed any threat to the Greek capitalist class.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">When the British imperial chief <strong>Winston Churchill<\/strong> understood the degree of Greek popular distrust \u2013 he reversed his prior opposition to a plebiscite. The plebiscite following the defeat of left forces enabled the return. The ensuing Plebiscite supported the return of <strong>King George II<\/strong> to Greece. (Woodhouse C.M. \u201cModern Greece\u201d Ibid; p. 254).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Americans also dropped their previous support of the King, and become \u201costentatiously neutral\u201d (Woodhouse C.M Ibid; p. 254) \u2013 they tacitly supported the British crushing of the communist forces. Archibishop <strong>Damaskinos<\/strong> was appointed a Regent in the King\u2019s stead and General <strong>Plasitiras<\/strong> (head of EDS) was appointed Prime Minister and head of government in lieu of <strong>George Papandreuou<\/strong>. Papandreuou had previously \u201capproved\u201d the British suppression of the mutiny of 1944 (Woodhouse C.M Ibid; p. 252).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Both the American covert support, and the British repudiation of the King\u2019s intent \u2013 enabled the predominantly capitulationist ELAS some pretext to accede to British overlordship. Accordingly ELAS now agreed to the infamous <strong>Varizka Agreement<\/strong> of February 1945. Only <strong>Aris Veloukhiotis<\/strong> and the <strong>Political Committee of National Liberation<\/strong> (PEEA) had resisted Varizka \u2013 and these forces were simply hunted down and eliminated.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">A succession of shaky governments was capped by the first post-war General Election of March 1946. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) abstained and the Populist party of <strong>Constantine Taldaris<\/strong>, formed a government. This election:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cMarked a watershed in Greece\u2019s foreign relations. For the first time the Government of the USA was directly involved in Greek affairs alongside Britain, though occupation in the Allied Mission for observing the Greek elections. It was a first step towards the Truman Doctrine\u201d. (Woodhouse C.M Ibid; p. 257).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The defeat of left and communist forces at Athens had decimated left resistance.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Behind both the King and the Parliament lay the Army, and the most right-wing section of the army \u2013 the group known as <strong>IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers)<\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cAfter 1949, the ruling class was no longer threatened. \u2026 their enemies had been effectively destroyed for a generation.\u2026..<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">After its victory, the Right imposed a quasi-parliamentary r\u00e9gime on the country: a r\u00e9gime with \u2018open\u2019 franchise, but systematic class exclusions. The Communist Party was outlawed and an intricate set of legal and illegal mechanisms of repression institutionalized to exclude left-wing forces from political activity. The job of guaranteeing this r\u00e9gime fell to the agency which created it: the army. The state was nominally headed by the monarchy and political power was supposedly vested in parliament. In reality, however, the army, and more specifically a powerful group of anti-communist officers within it, played the key role in maintaining the whole structurally repressive apparatus\u2026 in particular IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers), which was to play a key role in post-war politics.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. \u2018Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece\u201d; New Left Review; I\/96, March-April 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Tsildardis government gave way to the more right wing <strong>Demetrios Maiximos<\/strong> with General <strong>Zervas<\/strong> (Formerly of EEDS) as Minister of Public Order. Brutal repressions of left forces continued despite both international protests and the presence of a United Nations observership. We will examine the Civil war and the Varzika Agreement in detail in a subsequent article.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By October 1948, martial law was imposed. Under this direct attack by the right-wing forces, and the simultaneous Yugoslav revisionist turn and exposure by the Marxist-Leninist Cominform of 1948:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe rebel leaders admitted defeat by proclaiming a \u2018temporary cessation of hostilities\u2019\u2026 a caretaker government.. lifting of martial law, .. withdrawal of the British service missions and the renewal of friendly relations with Yugoslavia.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Woodhouse C.M Ibid p. 260)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Greek government joined NATO in 1951, as well as the Council of Europe; and the Security Council of the UN.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Although throughout this period numerous governments based on varying participation of right-wing forces were only able to hold power for brief periods. The <strong>National Progressive Union of the Center<\/strong> (EPEK) \u2013 led by General Plastiras and Emmanuel <strong>Tsouderous<\/strong> held power until displaced by the virulently anti-communist General Papagos leading the Greek Rally:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe days of Plastiras\u2019 government were clearly numbered when not only the Greek public but also the US authorities became impatient \u2026 Under pressure from the US Embassy the government resigned in 1952\u2026 (leading) to electoral overwhelming victory for the Greek Rally.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Woodhouse C.M Ibid pp.261-263).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Army vicious actions purged all state structures \u2013 which was key to the state through the immediate post-War period:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cMilitary reaction established firm control over the whole of Greek territory and consolidated a system of \u2018repressive parliamentarism\u2019 or \u2018guided democracy\u2019. This was controlled by a triarchy of throne, army and bourgeois parliament. Within this power bloc it was the army, the victor of the civil war, which played the dominant role.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Industrial Policy of the Greek Capitalists in this Period<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">For the next 11 years, both the Army (Marshall <strong>Papagos<\/strong>) representatives, or parliamentary figures (George Papandreou before the coup and later Constantine Karamanlis) wanted to consolidate the neo-colonial status to the USA. This started with an economy based on agriculture, tourism and a small manufacturing base.<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cthe country was far from self-sufficient. .. the chief market for tobacco was revived (West Germany).. expenditure of tourists which came to take second place only to agricultural products as a source of foreign exchange. The development of manufacturing industry and mining with indigenous capital, in place of foreign concessions, (was) a healthy trend. But the lack of home produced source of energy was a severe handicap. It remained true that Greece was still dependent upon foreign aid and there was no end to this condition in sight.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Woodhouse C.M Ibid p. 267)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Five special features of the Greek state\u2019s path to modernisation, can be seen:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">1. The political and organisational strength of the working class and peasantry was weak, having been decimated during the second world war and after by the brutality of the state. The KKE was almost devoid of leadership, with key leaders in exile.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">2. The small native capitalist class was out-numbered by the many Greek capitalist who were based overseas (shipping) \u2013 and did not have the necessary local capital to invest. Hence the small resident Greek capitalists used the State machinery to develop. This state machinery swelled the size of the bureaucracy who became a large state dependent stratum. They aspired to \u2018middle-class\u2019 status but were objectively privileged sections of a growing working class.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">3. The state still needed the heavy investment of the overseas imperialists. They first aligned themselves to the USA, and then by the 1970s to Europe.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">4. These strategies effectively left Greece a dependent state with the beginnings of large overseas debt.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">5. An immiseration \u2013 poverty and desperation &#8211; of the working peoples, led to increasing emigrations to both the USA, Canada and Europe<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">After the devastation of the Second World War there had been an impressive return to Greek per-war levels of production:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Second World War and the civil war had devastating effects on the Greek economy. For instance, at the end of the Second World War, 9,000 villages and 23 per cent of all buildings had been destroyed. It was partially a sign of the vitality of Greek capitalism that by the middle fifties, pre-war levels of output had been reached again and the economy was growing at a fast rate (the average rate of growth in the fifties was 6 per cent).\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. \u2018Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece\u201d; New Left Review; I\/96, March-April 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">However, despite this growth, manufacturing industry remained undeveloped. Nor did the rise of the shipping industry enable Greek capitalists to retain revenues within Greece to more easily enable a home manufacturing base to be built up:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cthe Greek economy of the fifties did not manage to overcome a major feature of its underdevelopment: its weak manufacturing sector. Greek capital, whether in its mercantile, industrial or finance form, was unable to orient itself towards the manufacturing sector\u2014especially in those key branches (chemicals, metallurgy) which, through their multiplying effects and their great transformative powers, can contribute most to a rapid growth of the industrial sector\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cshipping\u2026 assumed colossal proportions in the post-war period. \u2026..Greek seamen helped the economy by reducing unemployment and by providing valuable foreign currency through their remittances home. On the other hand, since shipping capital lies outside the effective control of the Greek state (it can always move elsewhere if the state bothers it with heavy taxes or other restrictions), it becomes increasingly an avenue of escape for Greek merchant capital. In this way, if migration robs Greece of its most valuable human resources, shipping plays a similar role with respect to the country\u2019s financial resources..\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece\u2019s age-old specialization within the inter- national economy had gradually given rise to a spectacular concentration of capital among a handful of shipping magnates, mainly based in London or New York, whose aggregate holdings are widely reckoned to exceed the GNP of Greece.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras, James. \u201cThe Contradictions of Greek Socialism\u201c: New Left Review; I\/163, May-June 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In conclusion, Greece did not break out of the strait-jacket of a dependent economy. Despite large state structure support, Greek capitalists did not establish an effective manufacturing base:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cfrom a \u2018under-developed\u2019 economy: i.e. a fast-growing, highly parasitic tertiary sector, a weak and more or less stagnant manufacturing sector with a low labour absorption capacity, and a large but inefficient agricultural sector\u2026\u2026Whereas in 1938 manufacturing output amounted to 85\u00b76 per cent of all industrial output, it declined to 79\u00b77 per cent in 1948\u20139 and to 73 per cent during the 1959\u201360 period.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThus in the late fifties more than half the labour force was still employed in agriculture, whereas the contribution of the industrial sector to the GNP was only around 25 per cent.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Correspondingly foreign investors ensured that favourable legislation was passed in 1953, and by the 1960s a large scale influx of foreign capital flowed in. This was concentrated in the heaviest key sectors, and by the mid 60\u2019s the industrial development had qualitatively changed with heavy industry capital making goods predominating<\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201c<strong>TABLE 1 Flow of Foreign Capital into Greece (Dollars)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">1960 11,683,700<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1961 13,509,809<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1962 16,764,758<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1963 50,026,290<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1964 59,716,887<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1965 111,596,368<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1966 157,606,242<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1967 32,265,000<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1969 64,000,000<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1970 70,000,000<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By the end of 1973, foreign capital invested in Greece had risen to a total of approximately $725 million\u2026. not very impressive if one takes into account that in a single year (1969) $2,504 million went to the gross formation of fixed capital in the Greek economy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Nevertheless, as foreign capital was mainly directed to-wards the key manufacturing sectors, its impact on the economy was much greater than its relatively small size would suggest. In fact, especially during and after the years 1962\u20133, when the metallurgical, chemical and metal construction industries experienced a great boost due to foreign investments, one can speak of a qualitative break in the growth of Greek industry. Not only did the industrial sector start expanding at a much faster rate, but there was an important shift in investment from light consumer goods to capital goods and durables.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Whereas in the period 1948\u201350 light industry represented 77\u00b75 per cent of total manufacturing output, its share went down to 60\u00b79 per cent in 1963\u201370.31 This important shift is clearly reflected in the changing structure of the Greek export trade.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Correspondingly, there was shift away from agriculture in the economy. And by the 1970s the economy had become qualitatively industrialised:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn 1960 agricultural products constituted 80 per cent of the country\u2019s exports, but this figure went down to 54 per cent in 1966 and to 42 per cent in 1971, as Greece was more able to export industrial goods. \u2026 Despite the dramatic decrease of the agricultural population during the fifties and sixties, the agrarian structure does not show any signs of basic change: there is no marked tendency towards land concentration or the emergence of large-scale capitalist enterprises in agriculture.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">There was a major qualitative change by the 60s, towards industrial development. But it did not eliminate \u2018under-development\u2019:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThus the sixties saw a qualitative advance in the industrialization of modern Greece. There can be little doubt that the ability of the Greek economy to reap the benefits from concentrated foreign investment in manufacturing was due to its own pre-existing capitalist development. This was not able to generate a significant industrial sector autonomously, but it could adapt itself to, and consolidate one with exceptional rapidity. Yet this type of capitalist development not only failed to eliminate some fundamental aspects of Greek under-development, but on the contrary accentuated them, creating disruptions and dislocations which are directly relevant to an understanding of developments in the political superstructure.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">There ensued an enormous state monopoly centralized economy in the industrial sector:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe intrusion of foreign capital, in close collaboration with Greek capital and the Greek state, reinforced the already impressive degree of capital concentration in the economy. A first rough intimation of this is conveyed by the enormous size (in terms of assets) of such giants as ESSO-Pappas or Pechiney, or the fact that out of the 200 largest companies in terms of fixed capital, seventeen were fully foreign-owned and in another thirty-nine foreign capital had a degree of participation varying from 10 to 90 per cent. As the share of foreign capital in the GNP steadily increased (from 2\u00b715 per cent in 1962 to 8\u00b715 per cent in 1972), the monopolistic tendencies of the Greek economy were markedly accentuated. If in the fifties monopoly or oligopoly were due mainly to indiscriminate and nepotistic state protectionism, in the sixties they were due rather to the capital intensive nature of the new industries and the small size of the Greek market.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">But the working class was still small. This is reflected in the predominance of small artisanal or petit-bourgeois production:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThis impressive concentration of industrial capital did not eliminate the plethora of small industrial units, which for the most part have a family-oriented, artisanal character. Indeed, one of the most striking characteristics of Greek industry is the persistence, especially in the more traditional sectors of the economy (footwear, clothing, leather, wood products), of small, low-productivity units side by side with large firms that exercise a quasi-monopolistic control of the market. The extent to which small firms persisted in the Greek manufacturing sector can be seen by the fact that whereas in 1930 93\u00b72 per cent of manufacturing establishments were employing fewer than five persons, by 1958 this percentage had only gone down to 84\u00b79 per cent. In 1958 the percentage of firms employing more than twenty persons was 2\u00b71 per cent.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The working class and peasantry of Greece became progressively more squeezed:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGross per capita in- come, approximately $500 at the beginning of the\u00a0sixties, had reached the $1,000 level by the end of the decade.38 But the\u00a0few rough calculations which have been made in the absence of complete\u00a0data leave us in no doubt as to the inequities which disfigure this\u00a0spectacular gain. For instance, according to a relatively recent estimate, 40<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">per cent of the lowest income groups receive 9\u00b75 per cent of the national\u00a0income (after deduction of taxes and social security benefits), whereas the\u00a017 per cent in the top income brackets receive 58 per cent. From 1954 to\u00a01966, when the national income approximately doubled, profits tripled\u00a0(banking profits between 1966 and 1971 quadrupled). <\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Obviously, as the\u00a0relative share of big capital increases, the relative share of all other income\u00a0decreases.\u00a0Those engaged in agriculture are, as usual, the worst off. Thus in 1951\u00a0agricultural income amounted to 83\u00b73 per cent of the average national\u00a0income; the proportion dropped to 60\u00b73 per cent in 1962 and 51\u00b71 per cent\u00a0in 1971\u2026 in 1950 independent cultivators and their working family-members\u00a0constituted 92\u00b739 per cent of the agricultural labour force.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In summary, there was an unusual dual character to the industrial landscape in Greece. It was one of a state sponsored heavy industry tied into foreign capital, while the petit-bourgeois remained very active:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cthe capitalist mode of production, dominant in the Greek social formation, is linked to the mode of simple commodity production (agriculture, artisanal industry) in such a way as to keep growing continuously at the expense of the latter\u2014neither destroying it completely, nor helping it to develop. And it is precisely here that the most crucial difference lies between the western European and the Greek models of industrialization. The former involved either the destruction of simple commodity production in agriculture and industry, or its articulated incorporation into the capitalist mode of production through a specialization which established a positive complementarity with big industry. As a result, the effects of technical progress, which originated in the dynamic sectors, spread fairly quickly to the rest of the economy, with beneficial consequences for income distribution, the expansion of internal markets and so on. In the Greek social formation, by contrast, capital intensive industrial production has taken an \u2018enclave\u2019 form. Despite its rapid growth in the sixties, it has not succeeded in expanding or even transferring its dynamism and high productivity to the backward sectors of the economy. Thus simple commodity production looms large within the Greek economy. It gives a lot (directly and indirectly) to the capitalist mode of production, but takes very little in return\u2014just enough to reproduce itself. As a consequence, inequalities in Greece are much greater than those found in the West. For in addition to the usual inequalities between labour and capital in the sectors where the capitalist mode is dominant, Greece has inequalities resulting from the persistence of vast productivity differentials between \u2018modern\u2019 and \u2018backward\u2019 sectors of the economy.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As the Greek countryside was becoming depopulated, many peasants emigrated. This deprived the Right wing forces in the countryside of support. The on-going immiseration-depression of the living standards of the working people led to a resurgence of left support. After some electoral gains of the left, the RIght wing army faction decided to set aside the triarchy of Army, parliamentary forces and Monarchy \u2013 and to become the sole power base.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>How Cyprus Became the Focus of Imperialism and Heated Up Greek Battles<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">During this time, the relations between the Greek and Turkish pro-USA client states became strained with the Cyprus crisis. The Cyprus struggle had initially started as a war of liberation against the Ottoman Empire and Turkish oppression. It now pitched a small weak Cypriot national bourgeoisie against both the pro-Greek compradors and the pro-Turk compradors.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe movement for liberation began under Turkish rule among the Greek Cypriots, who suffered particular oppression, and its main demand was for &#8220;Hellenic unity&#8221;, for &#8220;<strong>enosis<\/strong>&#8221; (that is, union with Greece). The movement continued to develop under British rule, and with the development of a weak Cypriot national bourgeoisie this class came to lead the liberation struggle. The effective leader of the movement was the Ethnarch of the Greek Orthodox Church, Mihail Mouskos &#8212;<strong> Archbishop Makarios<\/strong> &#8212; and embraced two organization<br \/>\n1) the <strong>National Organisation for Cypriot Struggle<\/strong> (EOKA), a right-wing body sponsored by the Greek government and led for many years by Greek General <strong>Georgios Grivas<\/strong>; and by<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">2) the <strong>Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus<\/strong> (AKEL) a body representing more directly the interests of the Cypriot national bourgeoisie, and presenting a left-wing image to appeal to the workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie; it was led by <strong>Ezekias Papaioannou<\/strong>.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Marxist Leninist Organisation of Britain (MLOB) &#8220;THE CARVE-UP OF CYPRUS&#8221; &#8220;Class Against Class&#8221;; No.7, 1974. (<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/espressostalinist.com\/2014\/01\/22\/the-carve-up-of-cyprus\/\">http:\/\/ml-review.ca\/aml\/MLOB\/CYPRUS_Fin.htm<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The fortunes of the Cyprus liberation movement were inextricably tied to the turn of events in Greece. Here the US imperialists held dominant sway:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cBy 1966 Greece had become a semi-colony of US imperialism, and this position of dependence was reinforced by the military coup of 1967 which established a military dictatorship in Greece subservient to US imperialism. From now on the demand of the Cypriot national bourgeoisie (represented by the Makarios government) for national independence had the overwhelming \u2028support of the mass of the Greek Cypriots, while enosis became the demand only of the pro-imperialist Greek Cypriot comprador bourgeoisie.\u201c<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(MLOB, &#8220;The carve-up of Cyprus&#8221; Ibid)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">What was the character of the \u2018Independent\u2019 state of Cyrus? In reality it was a neo-colony of Britain:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn December 1959, prior to the granting of &#8220;independence&#8221;, elections were held for a Provisional President of Cyprus, Makarios stood on a platform of acceptance, with reservations, of the British imperialists&#8217; plan and was elected by a large majority.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Despite the fact that Makarios represented the interests of the Cypriot national bourgeoisie, the British imperialists felt it safe to hand over &#8220;power&#8221; to a government headed by him by reason of the antagonisms artificially built up between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island, believing that these antagonisms and other &#8220;safeguards&#8221; could be effective in preventing the Makarios government from taking any steps to end the neo-colonial status of the island.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The &#8220;independent&#8221; Republic of Cyprus which came into being on August l6th, 1960 was, in reality a neo-colony of British imperialism.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(MLOB &#8220;The carve-up of Cyprus&#8221; Ibid)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">While Archbishop Makarios was a representative of the Cypriot national bourgeois, he was unwilling to launch a struggle that unleashed the power of the working class and peasantry. Thus he was left to resort to intrigue and maneuvers aimed at \u201cseeking advantage of the contradictions between various powers\u201d (MLOB). However this was ineffective as the USA blocked shipped arms from the USSR.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>3. The\u00a0Greek Junta &#8211; Greece by now fully a client state of the USA<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As noted, the 1967 Greek military dictatorship was established by a coup backed by the USA. It was precipitated by the increasing working class struggles against the poor economic situation of the neo-colonial state of Greece, whereby:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cUS civil aid came to an end in 1962; Greece was admitted as an Associate to the European Economic Community; and partial settlement was reached of Greece\u2019s long-standing indebtedness to creditors in the USA and to private creditors in Britain. In each case the result was to add to the strain on the balance of payments..\u2026. nearly one third of the budget was still devoted to defence\u2026 The stringency of the economic state of the country led to a number of ugly demonstrations. Strikes became increasingly frequent..\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Woodhouse C.M Ibid p. 282-283.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The then King, Constantine II was the Commander-in-chief of the army.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">That the right wing forces were loosing support became clear from the 1958 electoral gains by left wing party EDA. The right wing section of the army &#8211; IDEA \u2013 launched the &#8220;Pericles&#8221; Plan:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cdevised for the purpose of neutralizing the communists in case of war, this was used instead by the Right to achieve victory in the 1961 elections.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This move by the extreme right-wing of the army, prompted George Papandreou<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">to start &#8220;Anendotos&#8221; \u2014 a \u201cfight against the repressive policies of the Right.\u201d His party was the &#8220;<strong>Center Union.&#8221;<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn the 1964 elections, Papandreou\u2019s Centre Union successfully challenged the electoral dominance of reaction. In the elections of the following year, it further consolidated its position by gaining an unprecedented 53 per cent majority. Meanwhile, a strong left wing emerged within the Centre Union, under the leadership of Papandreou\u2019s son Andreas.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Although George Papandreou tried to move against IDEA. He also tried to improve some aspects of working peoples lives. Together this prompted the Army and the Monarchy to plot against Center Union by slandering his son Andreas, as a traitor who shared state secrets. An interim coalition government of centrists was formed but fell quickly. <strong>Panagiotis Kanellopoulos<\/strong> formed a \u2018Service Government\u2019, prior to an election. However, the Army remained determined to sweep away any opposition:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn 1967, the Greek military seized power in a <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Coup_d'\u00e9tat\">coup d&#8217;\u00e9tat<\/a><\/span>, overthrew the centre right government of <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Panagiotis_Kanellopoulos\">Panagiotis Kanellopoulos<\/a><\/span>. It established the <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Greek_military_junta_of_1967-1974\">Greek military junta of 1967-1974<\/a><\/span> which became known as the R\u00e9gime of the Colonels.\u201d<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/History_of_Greece\">https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/History_of_Greece<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Colonels did not change the economic direction of Greece, they made it simpler \u2013 they suppressed both workers, peasants and small petit-bourgeoisie \u2013 in support of the capitalists:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe colonels, by following the logic of the economic model they had inherited, gave their unlimited support to big capital, foreign and indigenous. They made sure through repression that the ensuing growing inequalities would be accepted unconditionally, without protests or strikes to frighten capital away. After a short period of hesitation&#8230; private investment rose again and foreign capital continued its penetration of the Greek economy. The rate of growth soon surpassed pre-dictatorial levels and sustained an impressive acceleration. This achievement was a clear indication of the \u2018fit\u2019 between rapid capital accumulation and the dictatorship. Moreover\u2026 despite growing inequalities, the standard of living grew steadily during the period of the dictatorship. The colonels brought to fruition a process of dependent industrialization that had started before them. They did not initiate it, they merely pursued it with vigour and consistency.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mouzelis, Nicols. Ibid; New Left Review; 1976).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Although Mouzelis is sceptical that the USA supported the coup, it most likely they did. Much later on, USA <strong>President Clinton<\/strong> &#8211; admitted that the USA had backed the Junta:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cWhen US President Clinton visited Greece in 1999, he obliquely offered what sounded like an apology when talking about a &#8220;painful&#8221; aspect of their recent history.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cWhen the junta took over in 1967 here, the United States allowed its interests in prosecuting the Cold War to prevail over its interests &#8212; I should say, its obligation &#8212; to support democracy, which was, after all, the cause for which we fought the Cold War.\u201d Clinton said in his conciliatory remark,<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;It&#8217;s important that we acknowledge that.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Remarks By President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Simitis of Greece to the Government of Greece, Business and Community leaders. Inter-Continental Hotel Athens, Greece &#8211; November 20, 1999.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Anti-Revisionism in Greece \u2018The Rule of the Colonels\u2019<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8211; the military Junta 1967-1974<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/history\/\/erol\/greece\/junta-note.pdf\">https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/history\/\/erol\/greece\/junta-note.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">But there was never any serious threat to the Parliamentary section of the Triarchy. The working class had simply been resisting the economic pressures.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">They had not been organised into a meaningful communist resistance.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Junta soon became led by George Papadopoulos, who instituted a reign of terror against leftists and communists. The King tried in 1967 to establish himself as a sole dictator, but was rebuffed and fled to exile.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As Prime Minister, Papadopoulos continued a brutal dictatorship overseen by the dreaded <strong>Military Service Police<\/strong> (ESA) of Ioannides. The crude overthrow of any democratic norms even led the Council of Europe to demand Greece\u2019s resignation. But:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Western Alliance as a whole continued to tolerate the dictatorship, on the grounds that Greece formed an essential part of NATO\u2026.. The US went still further.. American policy became one of active support. American and Soviet strategists were engaged in a duel in the eastern Mediterranean. It became even more intense after the \u2018Six-Day War\u2019 of June 1967 between Israel and the Arab states\u2026 In September 1972, an agreement was signed by which the US Sixth Fleet would enjoy home-port facilities at Piraeus.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Woodhouse C.M Ibid pp.298-99)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Repressions continued and provoked even a Mutiny in the Navy in 1973. In an infamous incident, the students at Athens Polytechnic were brutally assaulted in November 1973. Using tanks to suppress a sit-in, more than 20 students died. This allowed <strong>Brigadier Ioannidis<\/strong> to seize power for himself, behind a puppet <strong>General Grivkas<\/strong> (Woodhouse Ibid p. 305). Formal martial law was again installed.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Ioannidis now also moved to oust Archbishop Makarios from Cyprus in a coup d\u2019etat. Moreover this was coordinated with the imperialists in order to ensure the partition of Cyprus into a \u2018Greek\u201d area and a \u201cTurkish\u201d area. Events unfolded as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe pretext for action was a note from Makarios to Greek President Phaedon Gizikis on July 2nd., demanding the recall of the Greek officers of the National Guard on the grounds that they had been collaborating with EOKA-B (the terrorist Organisation formed by Grivas following his return to Cyprus in 1979 and continuing in existence after Grivas&#8217;s death in January 1974) in attempts to assassinate him and overthrow the government. The note set the deadline of July 20th. for compliance with the demand.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">So, on July 16th, on the orders of their Greek officers, units of the (Greek Cypriot)&#8211;National Guard, in full collaboration with EOKA-B and with the Greek troops stationed on the island, staged a military coup and established a military dictatorship over the part of the island outside the enclaves under the control of the Turkish Cypriot comprador bourgeoisie&#8217;s &#8220;Transitional Administration&#8221;. A new puppet &#8220;President&#8221; was installed, one <strong>Nicos Sampson<\/strong>, a curfew imposed and thousands of supporters of the Makarios government arrested.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Greek government recognised its puppet regime almost immediately. while the Turkish government threatened that unless the situation in Cyprus were reversed it would order its troops to invade Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">For four days the US imperialists and their allies in London, not only took no action, they deliberately obstructed the calling of the Security Council of the United Nations which could have taken some action. As Lord Caradon put it bluntly in a letter to the press:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;Due to the deliberate delay of the United States and the United Kingdom, it was not until after the invasion (i.e. of Cyprus by Turkish troops &#8212; Ed.) that the Security Council passed any resolution at all.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Lord Caradon: Letter to &#8220;The Guardian&#8221; 11 July 31st, 1974; p. 12).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Meanwhile, Makarios had managed to escape from Cyprus. He was received by the British government with formal, but non-committal, protocol, but the United States government talked with him only in his ecclesiastical capacity&#8221;:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;The President (i.e., Makarios &#8212; Ed.) had been given the chilly US reception of &#8212; in Dr. Kissinger&#8217;s terms &#8212; &#8216;a loser&#8217;, without hope of a comeback&#8221;.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">(&#8220;The Observer&#8221;, July 28th.9 1974; p. 9).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">On July 20th., therefore, some thousands of Turkish troops invaded northern Cyprus according to plan, occupying the principal area inhabited by Turkish Cypriots from the port of Kyrenia to the outskirts of the capital, Nicosia.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Later the same day, the US and British imperialists brought the Security Council into action, and it passed a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire on Cyprus. And Greece and Turkey &#8212; despite being, according to the world press &#8220;on the verge of war&#8221; &#8211; dutifully obeyed.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(MLOB; Ibid).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As Woodhouse rightly comments:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe US was legitimately suspected of having backed Ioannidis\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Woodhouse Ibid p.305)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong><span style=\"color:#000000\">4. Capitalist Class of Greece Moves to \u201cdemocracy\u201d and Europe<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The work of the overt and now discredited dictatorship of the generals was done, they had suppressed any internal left opposition. The stage was set for the partition of Cyprus. Now under an international odium, the Colonels \u201ctook off their uniforms\u201d \u2013 again under pressure again from the USA imperialists. As the MLOB put it:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Colonels Take Off Their Uniforms<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">On July 23rd 1967. The military junta that had exercised a military dictatorship suddenly stepped into the background over the people of Greece since 1967, and announced that they had invited civilian politician <strong>Konstantinos Karamanlis<\/strong> to form a civilian Cabinet.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Karamanlis is mainly remembered for his role as Prime Minister in arranging the murder (and its subsequent cover-up) of rival politician <strong>Gregori Lambrakis<\/strong> (portrayed in the film &#8220;<strong>Z<\/strong>&#8220;). While in exile in Paris, he was in June 1965 voted into Karamanlis\u2019 party \u2018New Democracy\u2019. He was committed for trial by an investigating committee of the Greek Parliament for &#8220;bribery, dereliction of duty and maladministration&#8221;.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Due to an unfortunate error, the &#8220;democratic revolution&#8221; in Athens was announced by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger the day before it actually happened. Even the capitalist press was compelled to treat the &#8220;revolution&#8221; with some cynicism:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;Dr. Kissinger and his emissary Mr. Joseph Sisco have played a key role in promoting governmental change in Gioecell.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(&#8220;The Guardian&#8221;, July 24th., 1974; p. 2).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">And in fact, little fundamental in Athens seemed to be changed. True, a considerable number of political prisoners were released (a necessary step in order to obtain enough politicians to form a government). But Brigadier-General Dimtrios Ioannides remained in office as head of the hated military police, martial law continued and in his Message to the Nation Karamanlis was careful not to mention the word &#8220;democratisation.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Marxist Leninist Organisation of Britain (MLOB) &#8220;THE CARVE-UP OF CYPRUS&#8221; &#8220;Class Against Class&#8221;; No.7, 1974. (<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/ml-review.ca\/aml\/MLOB\/CYPRUS_Fin.htm\">http:\/\/ml-review.ca\/aml\/MLOB\/CYPRUS_Fin.htm<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Nonetheless Karamanlis did restore the Constitution of 1952 (making it again a monarchy) and released all political prisoners and \u201clegalised the CP for the first time since 1947\u201d. (Woodhouse; Ibid; p. 305). In actual fact he had no real choice as the prior alliance that had formed the Triarchy (Army, right-wing parliamentarians, and Monarchy) had been totally discredited.<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cWhen Constantinos Karamanlis, the grand old man of the Greek Right, stepped into the breech and formed the first post-junta government in 1974, it was immediately apparent that there could be no simple reversion to the old model of repressive parliamentarism&#8230; (But) his freshly formed New Democracy party retained and expanded the electoral support that had previously gone to the parties of the Right. But the political discrediting of both the army and the throne\u2014which had, in any case, regarded with suspicion Karamanlis\u2019s sixties project of modernizing the monarchy\u2014left him with little choice but to seek the consolidation of right-wing hegemony through a populist inflection of internal and external policy&#8230; Within months of coming to power, the National Unity Government headed by Karamanlis had withdrawn from NATO\u2019s military command structures, legalized the Communist Party for the first time since the civil war, organized relatively free general elections, and called a referendum that produced a 69 per cent majority in favour of the republic. Subsequent trials of junta leaders\u2014in some cases leading to sentences of life imprisonment\u2014underlined the subordination of the officer caste in \u2018normal\u2019 political activity&#8230;\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras, James. \u201cThe Contradictions of Greek Socialism\u201c: New Left Review; I\/163, May-June 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By November 1974, elections had elected Karamanlis\u2019 \u2018New Democracy\u2019 party. A further plebiscite confirmed a popular rejection of the monarchy. Karamanlis tellingly revealed his government\u2019s objective nature:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cKaramanlis once remarked that he was himself the Americans\u2019 only friend in Greece, and he dared not admit it.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Woodhouse Ibid p. 308).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Where was the economic development of Greece by now?<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The hopes of the Greek capitalists had in fact not been fulfilled:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn Greece\u2026 the early seventies already witnessed a rise in the specific weight of food, clothing and construction industries, and in the latter half of the decade manufacturing as a whole was contributing less than fifteen per cent of the annual increase in GDP, while fully three-quarters of GNP growth came from the inflated services sector. Manufacturing exports, given the small size of the internal market, had originally been conceived as one of the principal keys to success, and at first a number of important openings were found in this area. However, the recessionary tides of the seventies, together with the intense competition of low-wage economies precisely in textiles and other such goods, led to a loss of Greece\u2019s market share everywhere except in the Middle East. By 1980, when PASOK was preparing to take over the reins of government, it was possible to talk of an actual tendency of deindustrialization, as the import\/export ratio of manufacturing goods had risen to 3.2:1 from 2.5:1 in 1974.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras, James. \u201cThe Contradictions of Greek Socialism\u201c: New Left Review; I\/163, May-June 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">While Karamanlis was not anti-American, he was moving Greece towards Europe. Relations with Europe, in order to join the <strong>European Economic Community (EEC)<\/strong>, became the focus. Karamanlis had spent 15 years as an exile in France, and the French government had sent him back to Greece on a government plane.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">On 1 January 1981, Greece joined the EEC becoming its tenth member.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">But Karamanlis was struggling to withstand the growing resistance as inflation drove a left shift. The by now openly revisionist Communist party of Greece (KKE) had begun to capture a portion of the electorate:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cAt the left end of the spectrum, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) rapidly consolidated a strong position in industry and a ten-per-cent bloc of the electorate\u201d;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras Ibid New Left Review 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">A new fa\u00e7ade to divert the masses was urgently needed. The prior \u2018centrist\u2019 party of George Papandreou had been the \u2018Centre Union\u2019. After the Junta dissolved itself, this won 20% in the first elections, and supported Karamanlis in government. Consequently it soon disintegrated. George\u2019s son, <strong>Andreas Papandreou<\/strong> had been trained as an economist in the USA. He had been instrumental in the pre-Junta parliamentary government, in attempting to curb the most right-wing elements of the Army (IDEA). He had fled into exile after the coup, and from there organised a resistance grouping &#8211; <strong>Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement (PAK)<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">After the Karamanlis return to parliamentary rule, Papandreou organised the<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)<\/strong>. Within 7 years it had won the in the Greek elections of 1981. It was an explicitly social-democratic formation proposing:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cfull-scale nationalization and \u2018an end to the exploitation of man by man\u2019. \u2026. And an all-round modernization of Greece\u2019s productive system that would bring to the fore hi-tech industries employing local and expatriate skilled labour and producing for internal consumption and export. In foreign policy, Papandreou retained his reputation as an intransigent opponent of NATO and of any Greek involvement in the EEC .. All these themes came together in skillful and insistent propaganda centred on the need for comprehensive change or allaghi.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras Ibid New Left Review 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By October, Andreas Papandreou was elected into power for the PASOK party.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">It is true that early progressive moves were made during its government including early secularisation and improvements in the role of women:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe more general secularization of Greek society, and the introduction of divorce by consent, civil marriage and equal rights for children born out of wedlock.. the Greek parliament has abolished various repressive laws from the fifties as well as some of the extreme powers given to the police, and although the military has largely remained a world apart, subject to no fundamental restructuring or parliamentary scrutiny, it has been deprived of the means of direct intervention that used to be provided by its own radio station. .. the EAM\/ELAS Resistance was officially rehabilitated.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras Ibid New Left Review 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">However PASOK retreated quickly upon attempts to tax urban real estate, and did not try seriously to ever move on this front again. Industry remained at a comparatively low level against other countries of Europe. PASOK did not base itself on the working class, and thus never proposed any resolve to deal with either the Greek capitalists, or the petit-bourgeois small business. Corruption was a real problem and Petras proposes the term \u2018kleptocrats\u2019 to describe a stratum of especially corrupt business:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cMost of the \u2018industrialists\u2019 continued to accumulate wealth by borrowing huge amounts of capital from the state banks, investing a fraction and diverting the rest to overseas bank accounts. The debt\/ capital-investment ratio remained one of the highest in the world because industry was directed not by the usual kind of entrepreneur but by a highly distinctive stratum of kleptocrats. Agriculture too suffered from underinvestment, irrational and costly marketing systems, with a multiplicity of small farms divorced from organized credits or from productive systems capable of providing cheap inputs or processing outputs.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras Ibid New Left Review 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The preponderance of petit-bourgeois ownership of small businesses had bred its brand of tax evasion and corruption:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn Greece, \u2026the pervasiveness of petty-bourgeois ideology and the ability of the non-productive classes to evade taxes and acquire multiple sources of income. Until Greek society recognizes the working class as its most valuable asset in the drive for industrialization, it will be doomed to stagnation and crisis.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras Ibid New Left Review 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">PASOK would not move against the capitalist class. Instead it resorted to short term loans to head off worker and petit bourgeois discontent. PASOK rule led to inflation and the start of the debt. At the same time debt increased. Meanwhile<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The financial sectors were bolstered whilst manufacturing was neglected:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cPASOK\u2019s early spending spree\u2026 increase(d) the consumption of nearly all sections of the population without creating any new industrial capacity to meet that demand. The government raised wage income, partially offsetting the inflationary erosion in Karamanlis\u2019s final two years; private capital responded by slowing investment to the merest trickle. Exports stagnated, while imports mushroomed and invisible earnings (the mainstay of the external sector) began a sharp decline. To secure the populist compromise the regime had turned to foreign loans, fiscal deficits and EEC subsidies; \u2026.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Public sector borrowing soared from 12\u20131 per cent of GDP in 1983 to 17\u20131 per cent in 1985, without having any effect on domestic output; and particularly in the run-up to the June 1985 elections it was increasingly used to finance current expenditures, which rose from 39 per cent of GDP in 1984 to 41 percent in 1985. As one study has noted:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2018The fastest-growing category was employment in services, almost\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">exclusively led by continuing substantial increases at around 3 per cent\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">per annum in employment in the public sector and in banks . . . In the\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">three years to 1985 employment in manufacturing declined by around\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">2\u20131 per cent.\u2019 Table Two (below) sets out the still sharper fall in output during<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">the first PASOK term.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Table 2: Greek Industry, 1981\u20131984: 1970 =100<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0<strong>1981 1982 1983 1984<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Consumer goods<\/strong> 195 \u00a0 \u00a0 191 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0188 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0192<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Capital goods<\/strong> \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0180 \u00a0 \u00a0 163 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0167 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0172<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Source: OECD Report on Greece, 1985\/86.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras Ibid New Left Review 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Agriculture also saw falling production:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cAgricultural growth for its first term was as follows:<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">_1.6, 1981; _2.4, 1982; _6.8, 1983; _6.4, 1984; _0.5, 1985.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The reason for these meagre results was that only a small part of the funds were actually used in agriculture. The remainder were employed to \u2018finance consumption, to be redeposited with banks at much higher rates, and to be used for the acquisition of real estate in urban areas.\u2019\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras Ibid New Left Review 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In fact, while the now infamous external Debt of Greece, became a ballooning problem under PASOK. Petras cites figures from the <strong>OECD<\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cPASOK has also increased Greece\u2019s role as a subordinate debtor nation beyond the worst period of the old Right&#8230; (See Table 3 Below.) The foreign debt stands at 45 per cent of GDP and payments account for close to a quarter of export earnings. Given the phasing- out of EEC balance of payments assistance, commercial borrowing will soon have to increase more than twofold, on terms dictated by the foreign banks: namely, the closure of unprofitable public enterprises; greater freedom for employers to hire and fire workers; tough anti- strike legislation, relaxation of price controls, an expansion of public\u2013 private ventures, and an open door to foreign investment.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Table 3:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Greece\u2019s External Debt (in billions of $)<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a01981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Total Debt \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 7.9 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a09.5 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a010.6 \u00a0 12.3 \u00a0 \u00a014.8 \u00a0 \u00a017.0\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras Ibid New Left Review 1987)\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In fact \u2013 all this is very similar to today, and the same demands for \u2018austerity\u2019 were raised then by the European banks.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This social-democratic party, now more openly objectively played the role of a pro-European comprador:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cPapandreou .. freely engaged in anti-American rhetoric\u2026 contending that the American imperialism was the most serious threat to humanity, Papandreou unnecessarily antagonised Washington.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Kofas JV; \u201cUnder the Eagle\u2019s Claw \u2013 Exceptionalism in Postwar US-Greek Relations\u201d; Westport 2003; p.184)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Meanwhile Papandreou was moving Greece firmly into dependency to the EEC:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cDependency results from the growing EEC domination of the Greek economy. While the EEC has increased the transfer of loans and grants to Greece, this has been more than offset by the takeover of internal markets and the displacement of Greek manufacturers and farmers. To quote again from the OECD report: \u2018Whereas Greek manufacturing output has remained broadly stagnant in the three years to 1985, import volume of manufactures may have risen by roughly one fourth in the same period.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras Ibid New Left Review 1987)\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Neither PASOK nor the party <strong>New Democracy<\/strong> (Led by<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kostas_Karamanlis\">Kostas Karamanlis<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">, the nephew of the former President) \u2013 differed substantially in their political orientation towards Europe. Both were realigning from the USA to Europe:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece evolved from a client-patron relationship with the US to being an EU member, subordinating its national sovereignty to the community\u2026.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">With increased competition of the regional economic blocs.. after the Cold War Greece drifted further from the US, because Europe was drifting as it strengthened and expanded its own sphere economically financially, politically, and militarily&#8230;\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Kofas JV; \u201cUnder the Eagle\u2019s Claw \u2013 Exceptionalism in Postwar US-Greek Relations\u201d; Westport 2003; p.248)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece\u2019s leaders also did not appreciate the USA more overtly favouring Turkey as its vassal state of choice in the Aegean and Mediterranean. But in fact, Papandreou was posturing \u2013 and perhaps to the populist base that PASOK had bult, that he was ant-USA. After all, Papanadreous signaled to the USA that were better terms given to Greece, that this re-orientation could be re-visited. Correspondingly during the 1984-1985 year, the total US military aid to Greece actually went up (Kofas, p.200 Ibid). Moreover he renewed Greece\u2019s allegiance to NATO, and enabled the US fleet continued facilities.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This hesitation of Greece\u2019s capitalist leader to completely cut the USA off as their pay-master, reflects that of the European powers themselves (see below). The determination of the EEC to sharply diverge, reject its subordinate status and openly challenge the USA, was still to come.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By 1985, PASOK reversed all its earlier progressive steps for workers wages and trade unions. It increased unemployment to doubled its rate (it was now above 10%). It enabled employers to revert to arbitrary practices of hiring and firing, and empowered them to break strikes.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece\u2019s path was set by the refusal to tackle the core problem: Refusing an independent path and adopting a pro-European comprador path \u2013 just as before it had been a pro-USA comprador path. What did this mean? Essentially it mean chronic indebtedness with no possible release. Warnings that were later to be echoed in 2014 \u2013 began to sound:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cInterest payments on the external debt have been undergoing a geometric progression (up from $466 million in 1980 to $1.1 billion in 1984), while exports have fallen from $4.7 billion in 1981 to $4.4 billion in 1984. \u2026 Capital flight has increased significantly in the 1980s, as it has done in other indebted rentier states. \u2026.. a positive $15 million balance of payments in 1980 became a negative $312 million in 1984. For these reasons\u2014together with the overwhelming predominance of speculative over entrepreneurial capital\u2014it is clear that the financing of further growth is virtually excluded. Far from inducing the inflow of new resources for development, Greece\u2019s \u2018opening to the outside\u2019 or \u2018liberalization of the economy\u2019 will facilitate the outflow of resources, thereby deepening underdevelopment. Nor will the device of lowering wages make Greek capital competitive, so long as industrial capital acts principally as a financial intermediary and fails to innovate and invent.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Petras Ibid New Left Review 1987)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The details of individual governmental changes up to the 2010 financial crisis in Greece, are beyond the scope of this article. In fact, they do not substantially alter the analysis. The trajectory of Greece was now set. While the political leaders were acting in the interests of the dependent capitalists (in essence all of Greek capital) \u2013 the compact with foreign imperialism would ensure the Greece crisis became a financial chain-reaction.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">We must briefly examine the politics of the European coalition at this point.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>The Appendix<\/strong> carries a detailed chronology describing the history of Greece from 1981 up to 2010.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>5. The USA\u00a0Moves to Become the World Imperialist Leader &#8211; The Character of the European Union \u2013 from pro-USA states to anti-USA coalition<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Moving to a meaningful trans-national coalition of European capitalist states \u2013 took several steps and forms. The coalition morphed from a post-war Europe wish to re-build, through to the European Economic Community (EEC) and then to the <strong>European Union (EU)<\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Community&#8217;s initial aim was to bring about economic integration, including a common market and customs union, among its six founding members: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. It gained a common set of institutions along with the <strong>European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)<\/strong> and the <strong>European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM<\/strong>) as one of the European Communities under the 1965 Merger Treaty (Treaty of Brussels). In 1993, a complete single market was achieved allowing for the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people within the EEC\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Upon the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EEC was renamed the European Community to reflect that it covered a wider range than economic policy. This was also when the three European Communities, including the EC, were collectively made to constitute the first of the three pillars of the European Union, which the treaty also founded. The EC existed in this form until it was abolished by the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, which incorporated the EC&#8217;s institutions into the EU&#8217;s wider framework and provided that the EU would &#8220;replace and succeed the European Community.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Wikipedia:<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/European_Economic_Community\">https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/European_Economic_Community<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Through these steps, the class alliances of the countries of the European alliance changed in its essential character.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Immediately post-Second World War, the European countries, were formed into a pro-USA formation. However over time they became anxious to attain autonomy from the USA. This fight-back reached a climax after the USA launched its financial attack in launching the Dollar Hegemony in the <strong>Plaza Agreement<\/strong> of <strong>Richard Nixon<\/strong> in August 1971. This act finally precipitated the formation of the Eurozone. This section traces the course of the changing class character of Europe in the post-Second World War decades.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">At the end of the Second World War, the USA planned to rebuild European capitalism through the USA Marshall Plan for its own ends. This was facilitated by the fact that the Second World War had physically devastated Europe, and that many countries were in debt to the USA. Britain, for example was now completely beholden to its major competitor &#8211; the USA:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;When sales of foreign investments and of gold and dollars are added in, the net change on capital account between the outbreak of war and the end of 1945 amounted to no less than Pounds Sterling 4,700 million. The United Kingdom ended the war with the largest debt in history.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(A.Cairncross. Years of Recovery, British Economic Policy. 1945-51. London, 1985. p.7).\u00a0<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">American imperialists recognised that Europe needed to be re-built as a bulwark against further socialist upheavals. Especially as the USSR successful battles, had become an inspiration across the world. The USA imperialists &#8211; as personified by <strong>James Warburg<\/strong> (part owner of the <strong>House of Morgan<\/strong>, a controller of USA international finance and industrial and utility trusts) &#8211; remarked:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGermany was the hub of the weak German economy \u2018the largest single compact mass of skilled labour on the Continent\u2019, it should be transformed from \u2018the present poor-house and plague-center\u2019.. \u2018into a powerhouse for a rapid reconstruction of Europe, without letting the powerhouse acquire too broad a permanent franchise and \u2013 above all \u2013 without letting the powerhouse ever again become an arsenal\u2019&#8230;. \u2018The Westward thrusting of communism will not be stopped by an physical frontier. It can be only stopped only a planned, US-Aided reconstruction so liberal and even revolutionary as to meet the challenge on its own grounds, and to strike the meaning from the accusation of American \u201cdollar diplomacy.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Van Der Pijl, K. \u2018The making of an Atlantic ruling class\u201d; pp. 42-43,146; London 2012).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As time would show, once Europe had been rebuilt as a bulwark, the USA could not restrain European capitalists wanting their own dominance.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In postwar Europe &#8211; the <strong>Marshall Plan<\/strong> was one of the three trade and economic tactical instruments by which the USA imperialists wished to take advantage of the post-Second World War crippling of the European powers. The other two were the creation of the <strong>International Monetary Fund (IMF)<\/strong> and the creation of the <strong>General Agreement of Trades and Tariffs (GATT)<\/strong>. The military instrument to back these up was of course the <strong>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)<\/strong>. The Marshall Plan was conceived as an anti-communist and anti-nationalist weapon and a means to erode European independence:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe establishment of American hegemony in the North Atlantic area was directed simultaneously against the spread of planned economy and social revolution beyond the Soviet-controlled area in Europe and against the national, self-contained reconstruction programs pursued by most West European states in the immediate post-war period. These programs in which local Communists parties participated, were judged unsuited for maintaining capitalist rule in the long run. \u2018Europe would have been Communistic if it had not been for the Marshall Plan, Marshall Aid administrator Paul Hoffman claimed in February 1950.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Van Der Pijl, K. Ibid; p.148-9)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Van Pijil summarises that:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThrough the Marshall offensive, the Pax American was imposed on the economic ruins of the defunct Pax Britannica in Europe.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(van Pijl Ibid p. 167) .<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">But the formation of the IMF was another key strand of the USA design.<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cBretton Woods.. Shorthand for the system, designed by the US and Britain, that governed international monetary and economic relations in the decades following the Second World War. \u2026 (It was) the launch of the post-war phase of super-dominance of the US and the dollar. .. All member countries pledged themselves to play by an internationally agreed set of rules\u2026these rules were quite strict, and enforced by a new world economic policeman, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Countries had to declare a \u2018par value\u2019 \u2013 an exchange rate \u2013 of their currency in terms of the American dollar and\/or gold, and change it only in consultation with the IMF. Various forms of currency manipulation were named \u2026 to prevent a return to the competitive devaluations and currency chaos of the 1930s. While countries could keep some controls on movements of capital, they basically undertook gradually to dismantle the wartime systems of exchange and trade controls and to move towards the free convertibility of their currencies\u2026 they also pledged themselves to adhere to the rules of the multilateral trades and payments scheme\u201d;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Dean, Marjorie &amp; Pringle, Robert \u201cThe Central Banks\u201d; London 1994 p.75).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In return for this agreement, the USA agreed to take over the position as \u201clender of last resort\u201d \u2013 whereby it would honour those creditors who wished to remove gold in exchange for dollar. It would:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSubmit to discipline by its agreement to convert into gold any dollar balances presented to it by overseas central banks at the fixed price of $35 an ounce. The US was the only country to accept such a gold convertibility obligation and the only one in a position to do so, having ended the war owning about two-fifths of the world\u2019s stock of monetary gold\u201d;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Dean and Pringle; Ibid p. 76.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This in effect took over the dominant position of lender of last resort that the British government had previously held from 1924 to September 1931 (Dean and Pringle Ibid p. 63). The US was anxious to see this agreement effected as it would enable the USA to control international monetary policy:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn these countries (Ed -ie. those agreeing to join the IMF) national central banks of countries other than the US had little influence on policy decisions. Domestic and economic policy came to be dominated by one objective \u2013 the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate against the dollar \u2013 and exchange rate policy, was of course entirely a matter for government\u2026. For the most part, a government would respond to an impending payments deficit by tightening fiscal policy (Ed-i.e. dropping the printing of money) or putting up interest rates; and a country with a surplus would ease fiscal policy or lower interest rates. Of the major countries only France resorted regularly to devaluation as way of maintaining its export competitiveness and growth.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Dean and Pringle; Ibid p. 76).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This meant that the USA did not need to try to maintain its currency value. All countries had to acquire the dollar; there was no need for the dollar to be defended at any particular rate of exchange. By 1949 the US had acquired 72 % of the world&#8217;s gold. The Bretton Woods Proposal had been resisted by Lord <strong>Maynard Keynes<\/strong> of Britain, but to no avail. This Agreement eased the post war period for the USA, because all other Central Banks had to have a dollar reserve:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;Making the dollar a reserve currency meant that central bankers round the world had to have dollars. They had to buy dollars in the marketplace which pushed up the price of the dollar up, threatening the parity of the currency with the dollar. Thus they could only buy when the dollar was weak\u2026 This suited the US and the US Federal Reserve which could follow a very lax monetary policy to make sure that there were always dollars to go around. It worked wonders for post-war US domestic policy, helping promote the wartime dream of full employment.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Bose, Mihir &#8220;The Crash&#8221; London, 1988. p.135).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The USA was in an unusual position of dominance. It had funded the war for the Western capitalist allies, detonated the Atom bomb thereby showing its military dominance, and had a home base that was unaffected to a large extent by the war. It proceeded to further dictate terms, to ensure its vote in the IMF on decisions, was a veto:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;In order to finance European and other foreign purchases from America, that is to ensure adequate financial resources to sustain US exports, (&#8220;world trade&#8221;) the US Government had taken the lead in 1944 at Bretton Woods to establish the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Loans were provided by the U.S. Government and US credit markets via the World Bank to European governments, which used them mainly to pay for goods supplied by American exporters. The source of the original loan funds provided by the IMF came from foreign currency and gold subscriptions by the participating nations. America&#8217;s subscription amounted to almost $3 billion and entitled it to nearly 30% of the voting power. The member nations agreed that an 80% majority vote would be required for most rulings, thus conceding unique veto power to the US\u2026 Europe was fully aware that it was ceding to America the option of determining its own currency values and tariffs. The US was the only nation with sufficient foreign exchange to finance a program of overseas investments, long term financing and foreign aid\u2026&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Hudson, Michael. Global Fracture, the new international Economic Order. New York, 1977. p.11-12).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Such a ceding of power to the USA was self-evident as any debts to the USA were only made payable in dollars or gold. The Bretton Woods Agreement had after all made the dollar &#8220;as good as gold.&#8221; The USA actively hoarded gold. Until 1958 and the Korean war the gold stocks of the USA remained exceedingly high, in correspondence with the USA stipulations on repayment). The USA also ensured that the major European powers joined the Gold Pool. This served:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;To ensure that the gold parity of the dollar would be supported by the central banks, the European ones mainly, who would thus have to sell central bank&#8217;s stocks of gold as the occasion demanded. The price of gold was kept artificially low at a time when the price of goods was rising. The dollar thus stayed as good as gold and the US was freed from the threat of having to support the gold parity of the dollar by itself, or of seeing gold overtake the dollar as an international reserve instrument which remained a theoretical possibility in the framework of the Bretton Woods Agreement. The US spared no efforts in its campaign to impose and maintain the Gold Standard.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Fiit,Yann, Faire, Alexandre, and Vigier, Jean-Pierre; (&#8220;The World Economic Crisis, US imperialism at Bay&#8221;; London, 1980; p.76.;p.83).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Britain was being firmly eclipsed by the USA as the foremost imperialist. The pivotal point forcing even the most stubborn British imperialists to recognise this, came in the Suez disaster of 1956 (these events were described in \u201cThe Gulf war &#8211; the USA Imperialists Bid To Recapture World Supremacy\u201d at<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/ml-review.ca\/aml\/allianceissues\/alliance2-gulfwar.htm\">http:\/\/ml-review.ca\/aml\/allianceissues\/alliance2-gulfwar.htm<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Meanwhile the other European capitalists searched for ways to move into more independence. This was a slow process. The USA continued to exert major obstruction to real independence for some time. Within each of the major European states, some elements were more inclined towards the USA (i.e. compradors &#8211; the so-called <strong>pro-\u2018Atlantic\u2019 bourgeoisie<\/strong>), some were more interested in maintaining an independent sovereignty (the so-called<strong> \u2019Euro-nationalists\u2019<\/strong>). These tensions played out over decades, spanning three \u201cwaves\u201d of USA offensives:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThree successive strategies of Atlantic unity .. corresponded to the different offensives periods of American capitalism. The first was Roosevelt\u2019s concept of Atlantic universalism, which derived its specific Atlantic dimension from the American focus of World War Two and the key position of the British Empire in the world America wanted to expand into. The second version of Atlantic unity was the Atlantic Union idea, which surfaced at the time of the Marshall Plan and combined a status quo approach to control of the periphery with a high-pitched Cold War unity against the Soviet Union. The third Atlantic strategy was the Atlantic partnership scheme promulgated by President Kennedy in an attempt to restore unity of purpose to an Atlantic world in which the establishment of a restrictive EEC demonstrated the degree to which Western European capital had emancipated itself from American tutelage and was intent on carving out a sphere-of-interest of its own.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Van Der Pijl, K; Ibid; p.xxxiv; London 2012).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The so-called <strong>Atlanticists<\/strong> (the comprador bourgeoisie for the USA \u2013 a term usually reserved for countries of colonial or semi-colonial status) were largely representatives of <strong>finance capital<\/strong>. These were interested in the freedom of shipping capital reserves freely across international boundaries. They are also termed &#8220;liberal internationalists\u201d by van der Pijil.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In contrast the <strong>\u201cEuro-nationalists\u201d<\/strong> represented <strong>industrial capital<\/strong> \u2013 and were interested in ensuring reinvestment in and redeveloping a European heavy industrial base. They supported single \u2018sovereign\u2019 or independent, state funding of heavy industry and can be termed state monopolists .<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As an internal intra-European battle between these two segments of capital occurred, the USA imperialists initially favoured steps to a pan-European supra-national state. Of course this single supra-national state, has still not been achieved. However between 1945-1998 &#8211; there were periods where the European Euronationalist capitalist powers waxed and waned, as USA imperialism counter attacked.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Regardless of whose interests it served, the overall tendency was towards a move for unity of the smaller European countries. Only later was directed against the USA hegemony. The class character of the European coalescing would shift form a pro-USA vassal coalition to an anti-USA coalition. Ultimately this would end up being dominated by the German bourgeoisie.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Through this period, the fading British imperialists continued to rely and favour USA imperialism. In fact it was actually <strong>Ernest Bevin<\/strong>, British Foreign Secretary who first proposed the NATO alliance:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe actual initiative to found a North Atlantic military alliance was taken by Ernest Bevin in 1948 following a series of defence treaties between Western European states\u2026 Bevin .. in early 1948, urged \u2026 formal Atlantic cohesion of a political nature.. to USA Ambassador Lew Douglas.. the treaty establishing the NATO was concluded in April 1949\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Van Pijl Ibid p. 157).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Early on French imperialism, as represented by <strong>General De Gaulle<\/strong>, wished to utilise USA strength to stand against the USA. The early events were summarised as below:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe war encouraged a proliferation of new schemes for European regional organisation. De Gaulle for instance repeatedly voiced the idea that European unity might be a bulwark against both the Soviet Union and the United States, and comparable arguments were heard in various segments of the German, Italian, and Dutch bourgeoisie Resistances\u2026.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Churchill\u2019s proposal for a Council of Europe provides probably the best example of the (Atlanticist) concept of European unity\u2026 coupled to Britain\u2019s desire to maintain its special link with the Commonwealth and the United States.. \u201c<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Van Der Pijl, K. Ibid; p26; London 2012).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In contrast:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Euronational concept combined a number of state-monopolisitic attributes like a strong emphasis on a \u201cEuropean\u201d economic policy with a distinct rejection of Atlantic unity\u201d ;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Van Der Pijl, K. Ibid; p26; London 2012).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The first USA steps to infiltrate Europe were actually before the Second World War. In most accounts, <strong>Jean Monnet<\/strong> the post-war Finance Minster of France figures prominently:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;Jean Monnet\u2026 was perhaps one of the foremost in the European postwar leaders to see the necessity of a coalition of European countries\u2026. As early as 1921 Monnet had advised <strong>Eduard Benes<\/strong>: To address the problem of the weakness of Central European economic by establishing a &#8220;federation because of the region formed a &#8220;natural economic unit.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(James Laxer. &#8220;Inventing Europe&#8221;; Toronto, 1991.p. 27).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Later in the Second World War: \u2028<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;Writing on behalf of the French Committee of National Liberation, Monnet for the first time advocated the formation of a federation of European states to be established following the conflict..&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Laxer, Ibid, p. 27).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">But Jean Monnet was in reality, a pro-USA comprador. He had spent many years working in banking in the USA and had married a scion of the US ruling classes. Ultimately he saw not a rivalry between the USA and pan-Europe, but a partnership, which later USA <strong>President Kennedy<\/strong> was also to espouse (van Pijl p. 29):<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe most important representative of the Atlantic Partnership, or Euramerican concept in France was Jean Monnet. 1962 was Monnet\u2019s year of triumph, in which he thought the partnership of equals between the US and the EEC, by which the Soviet union could be effectively checked, was actually materializing. In Monnet\u2019s view this would entail European military autonomy as well. \u2018Equal partnership must also apply to the responsibilities of common defense, it requires amongst other things, the organisation of a European atomic force including Britain and in partnership with the US.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Van der Pijl: Ibid; P. 225).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Monnet\u2019s relationship with the USA ruling class representatives of capital was close at even a personal level:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThere is no doubt.. Monnet\u2019s initiatives .. owed much to American encouragement. His decisive advantage was the closeness of his association with the USA political elite.. the <strong>Dulles brothers, Acheson, Harriman, McCloy, Ball and Brice<\/strong> and others.. he was to become widely distrusted in his own country because of it..\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Anderson, Perry. \u201cThe New Old World\u201d; London 2009 p.15)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cMonnet\u2019s strength as an architect of integration (i.e. of Europe \u2013 ed) did not lie in any particular leverage with European cabinets\u2026 but in his direct line to Washington.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Anderson, Perry. Ibid; p. 17)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By May 1949, the first concrete post-war steps for uniting Europe into a pro-Atlantic (i.e. pro-USA) bloc led to the <strong>Statute of the Council of Europe<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">On 9 May 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed to integrate the coal and steel industries of Europe. The<strong> Schumann Proposal for the European Iron and Steel Community<\/strong>, was designed to form a competitive market in iron and steel, using substantial public sector capital. Britain refused to join at that stage. By 1958, trade in the ECSC in steel had increased by 157% and steel output by 65% (Laxer, p. 38).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In \u201cAlliance Marxist-Leninist\u201d of October 1992, the Schumann Plan was portrayed as an anti-American move; and Jean Monnet as a Euronationalist. Alliance was <strong>incorrect<\/strong> in this analysis. (Alliance Marxist-Leninist ALLIANCE (MARXIST-LENINIST (Number 3, October 1992) \u201cCrisis In Capital And Their Solution &#8211; Free Trade And Protectionism In Developed Countries\u201d<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/ml-review.ca\/aml\/AllianceIssues\/ALLIANCE3ECONOMICS.html\">http:\/\/ml-review.ca\/aml\/AllianceIssues\/ALLIANCE3ECONOMICS.html<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p>The reality was far more complex. In fact the USA had argued that the Schumann Plan was of use since:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSecretary of State Acheson in 1951 estimated that the Schumann Plan was useful.. since it would \u201cpull Germany, certainly Western Germany into economic relationship with Europe. It will tie it in and lay a foundation which will ally fears the Germany might come loose and go off on an independent or pro-Russian policy.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(van Pijl Ibid p. 157) .<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The USA imperialists with their European stooges &#8211; and even with the Euro-nationalists \u2013 at this stage all continued to agree that Europe needed to unite. The vision of many planners of USA strategy, was akin to that of <strong>Paul Hoffman<\/strong> \u2013 leading member of the Committee headed by <strong>Averell Harriman<\/strong> secretary of Commerce &#8211; speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1950:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cWe know that there is no possibility of Europe becoming the kind of an economy that will make it a great force of strength in the Atlantic community unless we break down the barriers between those 17 political subdivisions with which we are working\u2026 so that you have a single market, or something close to it, in which you will have large-scale manufacturing because you have a large market in which to sell it.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Van Pijl Ibid p. 197)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Britain and France after <strong>Suez<\/strong>, had to accept that in the immediate future, their only role on the world stage would be as a junior partner to USA imperialism. They threw their lot in with the Americans. The USA used their influence with the British to disrupt attempts at a defence force independent of the US.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">But as the USA became ever more hegemonic in Europe, De Gaulle and others turned to resist USA incursion. This was forseen by <strong>J.V.Stalin<\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;Britain and France .. are imperialist countries.. Can it be assumed that they will endlessly tolerate the present situation in which.. Americans are penetrating into the economies of Britain and France and trying to convert them into adjuncts of the USA economy?<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><br \/>\n&#8230;Would it not be truer to say that capitalist Britain and France will be\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">compelled in the end to break from the embrace of the USA and enter into\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">conflict with it in order to secure an independent position and of course\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">high profits?&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(J.V. Stalin, &#8220;Economic problems of the Socialism in the USSR&#8221;; Moscow,\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">1952. p. 38).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The loosening of the dependency chains on European nations formed by the credit of the USA Marshall Plan would take several interim steps.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By 1957, the<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><strong><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Treaties_of_Rome\">Treaty of Rome<\/a><\/strong><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">was signed which established the<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/European_Economic_Community\">European Economic Community<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\"> (EEC). Consistent with its overall European strategy, the formation of the EEC was supported by the USA. In fact:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201c<strong>Eisenhower<\/strong> (said) .. that the Treaty of Rome would be one of the finest days in the history of the free world, perhaps even more so than winning the war\u201d;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Anderson; Ibid; p. 18).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">There was now a dramatic opening of the European market for financial penetration \u2013 to take over European industries, as well as their markets:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe shift from commercial to financial penetration (ie of Europe \u2013 by the USA -ed) was confirmed by the formation of the EEC. The Common Market dramatically changed American prospects for expansion in this respect.\u201c<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Van der Pijil; Ibid, p.193)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In reply to De Gaulle, the USA attempted to weaken the development of the future European Union, by using its stooge the weak British imperialists. Thereupon French General De Gaulle later on vetoed the entry of Great Britain into the EEC for precisely this reason.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By the time of Nixon and Kissinger, the situation had shifted. Now the USA perceived the threat in the now built up European Community:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201c(they) started to perceive the potential for a rival great power in Western Europe\u201d;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Anderson Ibid p. 21).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">How had things changed so dramatically? The balance of power between the Euronationalists and the pro-US Atlanticists had changed after the rise of the dollar hegemony. To recap, the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 to stay on a gold convertibility was simply put aside by the USA. By the 1960s, under USA <strong>President Johnson<\/strong>, inflation was created by printing more dollars. This enabled the USA to fund the Vietnam War and its limited social reforms of the so-called \u2018Great Society\u201d (Dean &amp; Pringle Ibid p.80; Palmer Ibid p.61). This had dire consequences:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe net result in the succeeding decades was a scale of Federal domestic budget deficit and increasingly, balance of payments deficit without precedent in US history. At first the deficits and consequential outflow of dollars into the world economy had been regarded as benign.. The deficits initially helped to finance the mutual economic recovery of Americans\u2019 allied (and client) economies. But as the outflow of dollars turned into a might flood, American control over banks grew by leaps and bounds, Between 1970 and 1975 the assets of overseas branches of US banks grew from $47 billion to $166 billion. The over-valued US dollar came to be seen as the means by which European industry was being acquired cheaply by US interests\u2026 fears were expressed that Western Europe was being turned into a fiefdom of US multinationals.. By the late 1960s the gap between the US dollar\u2019s internal purchasing power and its international value had widened alarmingly. The Europeans were faced with the choice of either accepting these depreciating dollars (and thus, in effect, of subsidizing the American economy and worldwide military and political commitments) or exploiting America\u2019s Bretton Woods commitment to swap dollars for gold at the fixed prices.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Palmer Ibid p. 62).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">De Gaulle remarked early on, that this was a USA attack using dollarization of the world economy, and warned that:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Americans only used the atom device twice on Asia. \u2026 but they use the dollar on Europe every day\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Cited Palmer, John: \u201cEurope without America? The crisis in Atlantic Relations\u201d; Oxford; 1988; p.62)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Essentially the USA was pursuing a policy of financial export to drive acquisition of European industrial and financial companies. Simultaneously it unwittingly began the financialization driving world inflation \u2013 from \u2018hot money\u2019. European nationalist leaders of many countries objected. As well as De Gaulle, French President <strong>Giscard d&#8217;Estaing<\/strong> objected:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;It is rather remarkable that the war in Vietnam, a localized conflict of a very special nature involving a great power and a small power could have such a far reaching effects on world economic equilibrium.. Any other country that was faced with a balance-of-payment deficit of this magnitude would have been obliged to take steps to restore balance whereas the US was not obliged to do so; the method of financing its deficit exempted it from having to restore equilibrium and it was therefore a system which caused considerable inequality in the interplay of monetary power&#8230;&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Hudson, Michael, Global Fracture, the new international Economic Order. New York, 1977; p.31).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In another more serious threat to USA hegemony, the German state had become more pro-independent. Earlier leaders (<strong>Konrad Ardenauer<\/strong> Chancellor [1949-1962] and <strong>Ludwig Erhard<\/strong> [Chancellor 1963-1965]) of post-war West Germany had been resolutely pro-USA. The attitude of later German leaders can be gauged from a remark made by Chancellor <strong>Helmut Schmidt<\/strong> (Chancellor 1974-1982) when he decried:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe misuse of the dollar as an instrument of US foreign policy.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Cited Palmer John: \u201cEurope without America? The crisis in Atlantic Relations\u201d; Oxford; 1988; p. 10)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This reaction against the USA had its counterpart in Britain in the Westland Helicopter crisis, where Defence Minister <strong>Michael Hesletine<\/strong> revolted against Mrs Thatcher. He was soon despatched by the stalwart pro-USA <strong>Mrs Thatcher<\/strong>. This was pointed out by the Communist League at the time.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The salient point is that the USA fiscal policies prompted the Euronationalists to move towards the <strong>European Monetary System (EMS)<\/strong> and before that the <strong>Snake<\/strong>. This then became the <strong>European Monetary Union (EMU)<\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cEuropean Community alarm at the misuse of the dollar\u2019s privileged position in the world currency system encouraged the EEC states to distance themselves in monetary policy from the US in the late 1970\u2019s. President Valery Giscard D\u2019Estaing of France led \u2013 despite British opposition \u2013 to the creation of \u2026 the EMS.. the breakup of the dollar-dominated monetary system also marked the end of the earlier Atlantic consensus enshrined in the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944\u201d;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Palmer J ibid p. 11).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In <em>Alliance Marxist-Leninist<\/em> Number 3, 1992, we traced the rise of the European Union and the emerging hegemonic role of the unified single German State \u2013 after the disintegration of the Comecon states including former East Germany.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">We concluded <em>Alliance 3<\/em>\u00a0by characterising the then inter-imperial rivalries as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201c<strong>The current crisis of capital forces formation of blocs.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The current epoch is one of a disintegration of the power of the USA imperialists and an increase in power of the German and thereby European imperialists and the Japanese imperialists. Each of these competitors strive to create a super trading bloc; <strong>within<\/strong> whose borders free trade (or &#8216; freer trade&#8217;) occurs. <strong>Outside<\/strong> of the bloc, protectionism is the policy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">These policies result from the major crisis of over-production that the world is experiencing. The final rupture of the Comecon capitalist block offers the only untapped market; and so the Blocs are trying to extend themselves into the ex-Comecon markets.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In the case of the <strong>USA<\/strong> Free Trade Bloc being set up between Mexico, the USA and Canada; the Block is clearly under the domination of the USA. Here there is no effective balance between opposing international imperialism. The differences between the European imperialists do allow for a certain balance; this is not achievable between the USA and Canada; and less so between USA and Mexico.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2026.. The <strong>European Economic Community<\/strong> is more delicately balanced between the competing imperialists. Of the nations within the fold, only Britain (now a junior partner) has significant allegiance to the USA. The others are far more committed to the EEC; even risking domination by Germany.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In the <strong>Far East<\/strong>, it is likely that a massive trading bloc between <strong>Japan and China<\/strong> is going to make it impossible for many of the Pacific basin nations not to enter an alliance dominated by the Japanese imperialists.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">These maneuvers are the first salvoes of the next World War.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Alliance 3: Ibid:<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/ml-review.ca\/aml\/AllianceIssues\/ALLIANCE3ECONOMICS.html\">http:\/\/ml-review.ca\/aml\/AllianceIssues\/ALLIANCE3ECONOMICS.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">We believe that these assessments &#8211; overall \u2013 remain correct. They are also, consistent with Stalin\u2019s famous prediction that under capitalism competitive wars for markets were inevitable, and that sooner or later &#8211; Europe would chafe under USA domination:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;Inevitability of Wars between Capitalist Countries&#8221;; Some comrades think that owing to the development of new international conditions since the Second World War, wars between capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable. These comrades are mistaken. Outwardly everything would seem to be going well; the USA has put Western Europe, Japan, and other capitalist countries on rations; Germany (Western), Britain, France, Italy &amp; Japan have fallen into the clutches of the USA and are meekly obeying its commands. But it would be mistaken to think that things can continue to &#8220;go well&#8221; for &#8221; all eternity&#8221;, that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavor to tear loose from American bondage and take the part of independent development.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Stalin; \u2018Economic Problems of the USSR\u201d: Peking; p.33).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Now in 2015, as we update the picture in 2015, the basic rhythm of inter-imperialist struggle has not changed dramatically but become even more intense. The final crumbling of the ex-Comecon countries postponed the \u2018final reckoning\u2019 of the European and USA rivalries. And yet rivalries have sharpened with the entry of China into the leading echelons of imperialist rivalry. In this period:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">i) Germany has benefited the most and now become the leading (if not yet quite hegemonic) partner of the imperialist coalition of the EU.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">ii) The EU has expanded enormously to now include the so-called Southern fringe (including Greece, Portugal, Spain, with continuing discussion with Turkey); and the ex-Comecon countries.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">iii) There has been a renewed attempt of the Russian bourgeoisie led by Putin to recreate its own imperial zone.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">iv) China has dramatically enhanced its imperial might and come to near logger-heads with the neighboring Pacific Oceanic states \u2013 in particular those nations most tied to the USA (Japan, Philippines).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">v) The most advanced of the former under-developed colonised world (Brazil, India) have been organized by the renewed Chinese imperialists into conglomerates that pose increasing challenges to both the USA and EU hegemony. Namely BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and the newly created International Bank.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>The still unresolved contradiction at the heart of the European Community<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Of course the EU has a major problem: Even now, it is not a unitary state with unitary fiscal policies. Although the leaders of the EU wish to concentrate power against the USA, they are unwilling to cede complete national autonomy to a Supra-European force \u2013 (namely the European Union based at Brussels). However while EU leaders can attempt to combine the monetary resources, unless there is a complete <strong>political<\/strong> unity \u2013 there are centrifugal forces they cannot control. For this would require to be overcome, a single unitary Bank.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This is far from a new realisation. The insoluble contradiction was pointed out by astute economists long ago such as Lord <strong>Nicholas Kaldor<\/strong> (1908-1986). Kaldor was a Keynesian, who polemicized against both <strong>Milton Friedman<\/strong> and <strong>Mrs. Thatcher<\/strong>\u2019s worship of monetarism. He cited Keynes to say:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cKeynes (a pamphlet far ahead of the times and ahead of much of his own future writing on the subject), in which he branded monetary policy as &#8216;simply a campaign against the standard of life of the working classes&#8217;, operating through the &#8216;deliberate intensification of unemployment . . . by using the weapon of economic necessity against individuals and against particular industries &#8212; a policy which the country would never permit if it knew what was being done&#8217;.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill (London, 1925), reprinted in the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. IX (London, 1972), pp. 207-30; Cited Foreword Second edition; Kaldor, N: The Scourge of Monetarism\u201d; Oxford 1986<\/span>. <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.questia.com\/read\/13674203\/the-scourge-of-monetarism\">https:\/\/www.questia.com\/read\/13674203\/the-scourge-of-monetarism<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In 1971, Kaldor pointed out that in the proposed Eurozone, there would be a tendency for some countries \u201cto acquire increasing (and unwanted surpluses) in their trade with other members, whilst others face increasing deficits\u201d. This could only be overcome he foresaw, by fuller political union:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe events of the last few years \u2026 have demonstrated that the Community is not viable with its present degree of economic integration. The system presupposes full currency convertibility and fixed exchange rates among the members, whilst leaving monetary and fiscal policy to the discretion of the individual member countries. Under this system, as events have shown, some countries will tend to acquire increasing (and unwanted surpluses) in their trade with other members, whist others face increasing deficits. This has two unwelcome effects. It transmits inflationary pressures emanating from some members to other members; and it causes the surplus countries to provide automatic finance on an increasing scale to the deficit countries.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Since exchange-rate adjustments or \u201cfloating rates\u201d between members are held to be incompatible with the basic aim of economic integration (and are incompatible also with the present system of common agricultural prices fixed in international units) the governments of the Six, at their Summit meeting in The Hague in December 1969, agreed in principle to the creation of a full economic and monetary union, and appointed a high-level committee (the so-called \u201cWerner Committee\u201d) to work out a concrete programme of action..\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Nicholas Kaldor On European Political Union Cited by Ramanan, 6 November 2012; in<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.concertedaction.com\/\">The Case For Concerted Action<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">Post-Keynesian Ideas For A Crisis That Conventional Remedies Cannot Resolve; at<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.concertedaction.com\/2012\/11\/06\/nicholas-kaldor-on-european-political-union\/\">http:\/\/www.concertedaction.com\/2012\/11\/06\/nicholas-kaldor-on-european-political-union\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Those planning a momentary union explicitly recognised that in the ultimate \u201cthird phase\u201d the \u201cindividual central beings (being) would be abolished altogether, or reduced to the state of the old colonial \u201cCurrency Boards\u201d:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe realisation of economic and monetary union, as recommended in the Werner Report, involves three kinds of measures, each introduced in stages: monetary union, tax harmonisation, and central community control over national budgets. \u00a0It envisages a three-stage programme, with each stage lasting about three years, so that the whole plan is designed to be brought into operation by 1978-80.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In the monetary field in the first stage the interest and credit policy of each central bank is increasingly brought under common Community surveillance and permitted margins of variations between exchange rates are reduced or eliminated. In the second stage exchange rates are made immutable and \u201cautonomous parity adjustments\u201d are totally excluded. In the third stage the individual central banks are abolished altogether, or reduced to the status of the old colonial \u201cCurrency Boards\u201d without any credit creating power.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Nicholas Kaldor Ibid)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Other political issues would also pose problems including the harmonisation of tax differences and differing budget polices requiring \u201cfiscal standardisation\u201d between countries:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn the field of tax harmonisation it is envisaged that each country\u2019s system should be increasingly aligned to that of other countries, and that there should be \u201cfiscal standardisation\u201d to permit the complete abolition of fiscal frontiers, which means not only identical\u00a0forms but also identical\u00a0rates of taxation, particularly in regard to the value added tax and excise duties.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In the field of budgetary control the Werner Report says \u201cthe essential elements of the whole of the public budgets, and in particular variations in their volume, the size of balances and the methods of financing or utilizing them, will be decided at the Community level.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Nicholas Kaldor Ibid)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>However, ominously for the proponents of a single currency \u2013 responsibilities to have individual country Budgets and tax polices set centrally &#8211; were not envisaged as necessary. This was according to Kaldor, \u201cthe basic contradiction\u201d:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cWhat is\u00a0not\u00a0envisaged is that the main responsibility for public expenditure and taxation should be transferred from the national Governments to the Community.\u00a0Each member will continue to be responsible for raising the revenue for its own expenditure (apart from the special taxes which are paid to finance the Community\u2019s own budget but which will remain a relatively small proportion of total public expenditure and mainly serve the purposes of the Agriculture Fund and other development aid).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">And herein lies the basic contradiction of the whole plan.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Nicholas Kaldor Ibid)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Kaldor argued this had to have harsh implications for inequity in the well-being of the peoples of different countries. It was clear that unless \u201charmonisation\u201d of country provision of benefits paid through by taxation \u2013 was ensured, there would be rising inequity:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cFor the Community also envisages that the scale of provision of public services (such as the social services) should be \u201charmonised\u201d \u2013 i.e., that each country should provide such benefits on the same scale as the others and be responsible for financing them by taxation raised from its own citizens. This clearly cannot be done with\u00a0equal rates of taxation unless all Community members are equally prosperous and increase their prosperity at the same rate as the other members. Otherwise the taxation of the less prosperous and\/or the slower-growing countries is bound to be higher (or rise faster) than that of the more prosperous (or faster-growing) areas.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Nicholas Kaldor Ibid)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In turn, this rising inequity in the poorer countries would likely need to be countered by spiraling taxes, in order to maintain a \u201cfiscal balance\u201d with the remained of \u201cthe Community.\u201d But this would then become the source of \u201cvicious circle\u201d as these higher taxes would lead to a further compromise of the less \u201ccompetitive\u201d countries. Worsening of the inter-country inequity would need for distributing relief funds from the center:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Community will control each member country\u2019s fiscal balance \u2013 i.e., it will ensure that each country will raise enough in taxation to prevent it from getting into imbalance with other members on account of its fiscal deficit. To ensure this the taxes in the slow growing areas are bound to be increased faster; this in itself will generate a vicious circle, since with rising taxation they become less competitive and fall behind even more, thereby\u00a0necessitating higher social expenditures (on unemployment benefits, etc.) and more restrictive fiscal policies. A system on these lines would create rapidly growing inequalities between the different countries, and is bound to break down in a relatively short time. \u2026<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This is only another way of saying that the objective of a full monetary and economic union is unattainable without a political union; and the latter pre-supposes fiscal\u00a0integration, and not just fiscal\u00a0harmonisation.\u00a0It requires the creation of a Community Government and Parliament which takes over the responsibility for at least the major part of the expenditure now provided by national governments and finances it by taxes raised at uniform rates throughout the Community. With an integrated system of this kind, the prosperous areas automatically subside the poorer areas; and the areas whose exports are declining obtain automatic relief by paying in less, and receiving more, from the central Exchequer. The cumulative tendencies to progress and decline are thus held in check by a \u201cbuilt-in\u201d fiscal stabiliser which makes the \u201csurplus\u201d areas provide automatic fiscal aid to the \u201cdeficit\u201d areas.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Kaldor, Nicholas \u201cOn European Political Union Ibid)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Kaldor concluded that the Community\u2019s present plan was like the house which \u201cdivided against itself cannot stand\u201d and that \u201cit was \u201cdangerous error: to have a \u201cfull economic and monetary union\u201d preceding a political union\u201d:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Community\u2019s present plan on the other hand is like the house which \u201cdivided against itself cannot stand.\u201d Monetary union and Community control over budgets will prevent a member country from pursuing full employment policies on its own \u2013 from taking steps to offset any sharp decline in the level of its production and employment, but without the benefit of a strong Community government which would shield its inhabitants from its worst consequences.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Some day the nations of Europe may be ready to merge their national identities and create a new European Union \u2013 the United States of Europe. If and when they do, a European Government will take over all the functions which the Federal government now provides in the U.S., or in Canada or Australia. This will\u00a0involve\u00a0the creation of a \u201cfull economic and monetary union\u201d. But it is a dangerous error to believe that monetary and economic union can\u00a0precede\u00a0a political union or that it will act (in the words of the Werner report) \u201cas a leaven for the evolvement of a political union which in the long run it will in any case be unable to do without\u201d. For if the creation of a monetary union and Community control over national budgets generates pressures which lead to a breakdown of the whole system it will prevent the development of a political union, not promote it.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Nicholas Kaldor Ibid)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">We believe that the current crisis in Greece, fully confirms these warning. However Kaldor being a representative of the ruling capitalist class in Britain, could hardly envisage a political solution of benefit to the goals of achieving a socialist Europe. It is in this backdrop, that the Greek Crisis plays out.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>6. The Greek Economic Crisis 2009-2015 &#8211; How did it get to this stage?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Throughout the turn towards Europe, the ruling class of Greece faced the hostility of the Greek working class and the rural small peasants. Nonetheless the ruling class allied itself firmly to the European imperialist bloc of the European Union (Previously the EEC). To recap: the Greek state opened the doors to foreign debt. From the viewpoint of a small capitalist class, who were not about to enter a left policy \u2013 there was no alternative. In doing so they also built a bureaucratic state machine, packed with prot\u00e9g\u00e9s of the states. In addition the overwhelming strength of petit-bourgeois production \u2013 combined to allow a nepotistic and corrupt state. In this period, the Greek capitalist economy did not do very well.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In reality profits for the leading elite of the Greek capitalist class were immense. While the international financial capitalists are a giant leech on the back of the people, the main enemy of working people, remains the Greek capitalist class.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">A common complaint from European bankers is that the Greek people are lazy and inherently corrupt. This propaganda has found resonance in otherwise progressive and people \u2013 who are themselves hard-pressed by capital. It is therefore important to refute the slander on \u201cthe lazy Greek people\u201d \u2013 and attach the charge of laziness and parasitism to where it belongs \u2013 to the ruling capitalist class of Greece. The propaganda often cites the &#8220;lax tax laws&#8221; and the \u2018pampered pension clauses\u2019. Let us examine these aspects first.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>i) Tax and Pensions in Greece<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The capitalist class structured the tax system to its advantage, and also enabled the petit-bourgeois:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreek taxation is a mess (there are six different bands and the wealthiest band of shipping is often referred to as a \u201ctax-free zone\u201d) and over 133 separate pension funds.\u201d Buchanan, Rose T; \u201cGreece debt crisis explained: A history of just how the country landed itself in such a mess\u201d; The Independent 4 July 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/greece-debt-crisis-explainer-a-history-of-how-the-country-landed-itself-in-such-a-mess-10365798.html\">http:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/greece-debt-crisis-explainer-a-history-of-how-the-country-landed-itself-in-such-a-mess-10365798.html<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cData from one of Greece\u2019s ten largest banks, (allowed) economists Nikolaos Artavanis, Adair Morse and Margarita Tsoutsoura..to (estimate lost tax revenue)\u2026. The economists\u2019 conservatively estimate that in 2009 some \u20ac28 billion in income went unreported. Taxed at 40%, that equates to \u20ac11.2 billion \u2014 nearly a third of Greece\u2019s budget deficit.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Why hasn\u2019t Greece done more to stop tax evasion? The economists were also able to identify the top tax-evading occupations \u2014 doctors and engineers ranked highest \u2014 and found they were heavily represented in Parliament\u201d.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><br \/>\n\u201cGreeks Hide Tens of Billions From Tax Man\u201d; Wall St Journal 9 July 2012.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/blogs.wsj.com\/economics\/2012\/07\/09\/greeks-hide-tens-of-billions-from-tax-man\/?mod=WSJBlog&amp;utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wsj%2Feconomics%2Ffeed+%28WSJ.com%3A+Real+Time+Economics+Blog%29\">http:\/\/blogs.wsj.com\/economics\/2012\/07\/09\/greeks-hide-tens-of-billions-from-tax-man\/?mod=WSJBlog&amp;utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wsj%2Feconomics%2Ffeed+%28WSJ.com%3A+Real+Time+Economics+Blog%29<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The scandal of refusal to take action on the &#8220;<strong>Lagarde List<\/strong>\u201d, makes the responsibility of the Greek ruling class for the &#8220;tax imbroglio&#8221; even more clear<\/span>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Greek government has not completed an investigation of a list of 1,991 persons purported to hold accounts with Swiss bank HSBC that it received in 2010 from former French finance minister Christine Lagarde. Initially, officials claimed at various times to have lost or misplaced the information. On 29 October 2012 the government changed its position saying it would not use stolen information to prosecute suspected offenders. Instead, Greek authorities arrested Kostas Vaxevanis, journalist and editor of the weekly magazine Hot Doc, who published the &#8220;Lagarde list.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The list includes an advisor to former Greek prime minister Antonis Samaras, as well as a former minister and a member of Samaras&#8217; New Democracy political party. The list also contains the names of officials in the finance ministry.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Mr. Vaxevanis said he thought the government had not acted on the list because it included friends of ministers, businessmen and powerful publishers.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Tax_evasion_and_corruption_in_Greece\">https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Tax_evasion_and_corruption_in_Greece<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>ii) Pensions<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">First if examined by unadjusted numbers it does appear that the Greek pension system is the most expensive in the OECD countries. We follow the Wall Street Journal analysis of February 2015\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Dalton, Matthew: \u201cGreece\u2019s Pension System Isn\u2019t That Generous After All\u201d; February 27 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/blogs.wsj.com\/brussels\/2015\/02\/27\/greeces-pension-system-isnt-that-generous-after-all\/\">http:\/\/blogs.wsj.com\/brussels\/2015\/02\/27\/greeces-pension-system-isnt-that-generous-after-all\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">):<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><em><strong>Graphs 1-3 on Pensions In Greece<\/strong><\/em><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cFirst, how much does Greece spend as percentage of GDP on pensions? The data from Eurostat looks like this as of 2012, with Greece expenditure easily highest in the eurozone as a percentage of GDP:<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece2.jpg?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-20359\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece2.jpg?resize=553%2C369&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Greece2\" width=\"553\" height=\"369\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">However \u2013 the Wall Street Journal goes on to break this down, first as a percent of GDP and then by the proportion of pensioners over the age of 65 years:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cBut part of that is due to the collapse in GDP suffered by Greece during the crisis\u2026 look at pension expenditure as a percentage of potential GDP, the level of economic output were eurozone economies running at full capacity:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece3.jpg?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-20360\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece3.jpg?resize=553%2C369&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Greece3\" width=\"553\" height=\"369\" \/><\/a><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece is still near the top, though it\u2019s not so far from the eurozone average. Moreover, Greece\u2019s high spending is largely the result of bad demographics: 20% of Greeks are over age 65, one of the highest percentages in the eurozone. What if instead you attempt to adjust for that by looking at pension spending per person over 65 (graph below). Adjusting for the fact that Greece has a lot of older people, its pension spending is below the eurozone average.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece4.jpg?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-20361\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece4.jpg?resize=553%2C369&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Greece4\" width=\"553\" height=\"369\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">And finally a large proportion of the population are pensioners over 65 and many households depend on the pension:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cFirst, demographics. About 20.5% of Greeks are over 65 \u2013<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/eurostat\/tgm\/table.do?tab=table&amp;init=1&amp;language=en&amp;pcode=tps00028\">behind only Italy and Germany in the EU<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">when it comes to an ageing population. And with the country\u2019s youth unemployment rate still above 50%, its young people are not going to be able to pay for their grandparents pensions any time soon.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Second, Greek society has a dependency on pensioners.<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.macropolis.gr\/?i=portal.en.society.947\">One in two households rely on pensions<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">to make ends meet and the country has an<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/eurostat\/statistics-explained\/index.php\/Population_structure_and_ageing\">old-age dependancy ratio above 30%<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">, which means that for every 100 people of working age in Greece there are 30 people aged 65 or over.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Third,<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/blogs.wsj.com\/brussels\/2015\/02\/27\/greeces-pension-system-isnt-that-generous-after-all\/\">Greek pensions aren\u2019t so generous<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">. About 45% of pensioners receive pensions below what is considered the poverty limit of \u20ac665 per month.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Looking at the actual expenditure on beneficiaries, Greece\u2019s figures don\u2019t stand out as exceptional and are instead on par with the EU average.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Nardelli, Alberto: \u201c Unsustainable futures? The Greek pensions dilemma explained\u201c; Guardian, 15 June 2015; at<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/2015\/jun\/15\/unsustainable-futures-greece-pensions-dilemma-explained-financial-crisis-default-eurozone\">http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/2015\/jun\/15\/unsustainable-futures-greece-pensions-dilemma-explained-financial-crisis-default-eurozone<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">There is no doubt a large financial burden form the pension schemes \u2013 but they provide at an individual level a very modest income:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cWhat makes the country\u2019s pension system unsustainable is not the specific size of each individual pension, but the overall cost of a grossly inefficient and badly funded system (yes, mainly due to of decades of<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/greece-struggles-to-get-citizens-to-pay-their-taxes-1424867495\">endemic tax evasion<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">that means as much tax revenue slips through Athens\u2019 fingers as it collects). According to analysis by Macropolis, the average pension in Greece is roughly \u20ac700 per month, while the supplementary one is \u20ac169.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The same analysis also shows that nearly 90% (\u20ac2.07bn) of the total monthly expenditure (\u20ac2.35bn) on pensions in March went towards the main pension.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">It also reveals that only 0.6% of supplementary pensions were above \u20ac500 a month.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">For 60% of pensioners the total gross monthly intake is below \u20ac800. In addition, many retirees in Greece have already seen their pensions cut.<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2015\/may\/21\/fight-save-greek-pension-centre-stage-brussels-athens\">Some by a third<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">, others<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2015\/06\/09\/world\/europe\/greece-pensions-debt-negotiations-alexis-tsipras.html?_r=0\">by nearly 50%<\/a>.<\/span>\u201d<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Nardelli,; Guardian, 15 June 2015; Ibid)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Moreover, although cutting them might shave off some debt \u2013 not only is this unable to repair the basic financial problem of a dependent economy:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn 2012, pension funds, which were obliged under a law introduced in 1950 by the then king of<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/greece\">Greece<\/a><span style=\"color:#000000\">,<\/span><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\"> <strong>Paul I<\/strong>, to keep a minimum of 77% of their assets in government bonds, took an \u20ac8.3bn hit following the restructuring of sovereign debt.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Nearly<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.macropolis.gr\/?i=portal.en.economy.1312\">a third of what pension funds have lost since then<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">is due to a fall in contributions on the back of surging unemployment. The unemployment rate is still painfully high (26.6%, while in 2009 it was 9.5%), and nearly eight out of 10 of the country\u2019s jobless have been out of work for 12 months or more.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Any saving brought about by simply purging early retirees\u2019 benefits, cutting supplementary pensions horizontally across the board, or revenue raised by squeezing a drastically depleted pool of taxpayers, would in the short-term allow Greece to unlock the \u20ac7bn tranche of bailout funds<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.macropolis.gr\/?i=portal.en.the-agora.2080\">it needs to carry on servicing its debt<\/a> <\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">(and not default).<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">However, it would do little to solve the underlying challenges in the longer term.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Nardelli,; Guardian, 15 June 2015; Ibid)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Debt and printing money drive Greek Inflation<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As discussed in prior sections, the ruling class used inflationary funding to enable it to fool and quieten the working classes. The scale of this is shown below.<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece has had a tricky time with its finances. In the 1990s it consistently ran significant budget deficits while using the Drachma. As a result of this economic mismanagement it joined the Euro in 2001, rather than 1999 like many other EU nations.\u201d (Buchanan, Rose T; \u201cGreece debt crisis explained: A history of just how the country landed itself in such a mess\u201d; The Independent 4 July 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/greece-debt-crisis-explainer-a-history-of-how-the-country-landed-itself-in-such-a-mess-10365798.html\">http:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/greece-debt-crisis-explainer-a-history-of-how-the-country-landed-itself-in-such-a-mess-10365798.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The following <strong>Graph 4<\/strong>, from the \u2018Michael Roberts Blog,\u201d tracks the inflation to the deflation tipping point, after the debt crisis became evident:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece5.png?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-20362\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece5.png?resize=700%2C457&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Greece5\" width=\"700\" height=\"457\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Roberts M; \u2018Greece Cannot Escape\u201d; 2nd Nov 2014:<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/thenextrecession.wordpress.com\/2014\/02\/11\/greece-cannot-escape\/\">https:\/\/thenextrecession.wordpress.com\/2014\/02\/11\/greece-cannot-escape\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>However, once it was in the Eurozone, Greece\u2019s government could no longer so easily use inflationary economics to easily boost living standards, as it was bound by the Eurozone and the single currency.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The alternative of devaluing its currency to boost its exports was also not possible. This left only loans. Since it was now the era of financial \u2018hot money\u2019 and rampant money-speculation had become standard, this was easy at first, and the inflation graph shows that even the loan-injection money fueled a degree of inflation. But the spigot was soon to be turned off with the Wall Street cras<\/span>h:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cShortly after joining the single currency,<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.sheffield.ac.uk\/news\/nr\/greece-bailout-referendum-1.476244\">Greece enjoyed a period of growth<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">(2001-2007). However, economist and analysts have retrospectively labeled this boom as \u201cunsustainable,\u201d pointing out that Greece (very broadly speaking) profited off the cheap loans available from the EU. This house of cards came tumbling down with the financial crash of 2008. Like many other countries in the EU Greece was seriously affected, but it was unable to climb out of the hole as it had in the past by printing more currency (thus boosting the economy) as the Euro was controlled by the European Central Bank (ECB). Unemployment spiraled to 28 per cent.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Buchanan, Rose T; \u201cGreece debt crisis explained: A history of just how the country landed itself in such a mess\u201d; The Independent 4 July 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/greece-debt-crisis-explainer-a-history-of-how-the-country-landed-itself-in-such-a-mess-10365798.html\">http:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/greece-debt-crisis-explainer-a-history-of-how-the-country-landed-itself-in-such-a-mess-10365798.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece\u2019s relationship to the EU was as a dependent colony to the leading capitalist countries of the EU. These were of course Germany and also France.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">International agencies progressively lent Greek governments large amounts of money. Consequently, Greece progressively developed an external debt of gigantic proportions as seen below in the brown\/dark red line (<strong>Graph 5<\/strong>):<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece6.png?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-20363\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece6.png?resize=700%2C475&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Greece6\" width=\"700\" height=\"475\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>What is the nature of these debt burdens that the Greek government faces?<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The German locomotive pushing the EU economy \u2013 needed markets. The &#8220;under-developed&#8221; Southern perimeter of the EU was one of the natural &#8220;new&#8221; markets:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cEconomist<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><strong><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Paul_Krugman\">Paul Krugman<\/a><\/strong><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">wrote in February 2012:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;What we\u2019re basically looking at&#8230;is a balance of payments problem, in which capital flooded south after the creation of the euro, leading to overvaluation in southern Europe.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">He continued in June 2015:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;In truth, this has never been a fiscal crisis at its root; it has always been a balance of payments crisis that manifests itself in part in budget problems, which have then been pushed onto the center of the stage by ideology.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The translation of trade deficits to budget deficits works through<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Sectoral_balances\">sectoral balances<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">. Greece ran current account (trade) deficits averaging 9.1% GDP from 2000\u20132011. By definition, a trade deficit requires capital inflow (mainly borrowing) to fund; this is referred to as a capital surplus or foreign financial surplus. This can drive higher levels of government budget deficits, if the private sector maintains relatively even amounts of savings and investment, as the three financial sectors (foreign, government, and private) by<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Sectoral_balances\">definition<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">must balance to zero.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">While Greece was running a large foreign financial surplus, it funded this by running a large budget deficit. As the inflow of money stopped during the crisis, reducing the foreign financial surplus, Greece was forced to reduce its budget deficit substantially. Countries facing such a sudden reversal in capital flows typically devalue their currencies to resume the inflow of capital; however, Greece cannot do this, and has suffered significant income (GDP) reduction, another form of devaluation.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Greek_government-debt_crisis#\/media\/File:HellenicOeconomy(inCurrentEuros).png\">https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Greek_government-debt_crisis#\/media\/File:HellenicOeconomy(inCurrentEuros).png<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Lord Kaldor\u2019s warnings about this developing were discussed above.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Who owns this debt?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Graph 6: Current account imbalances in the European Union (1997\u20132014)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The graph below (from Wikipedia at: https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:Current_account_imbalances_EN_(3D).svg)<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">shows that one of the major owners is Germany. In more detail, the \u2018Economist Online\u201d of October 2011 described the major ownership of the Greek debt. The main institutions owning the Greek debt are the IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB) and various European governments:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece has total debts of \u20ac346.4bn. About a third of this debt is in public hands (34.8% is attributable to the IMF, ECB and European governments), roughly another third is in Greek hands (28.8%, essentially for banks) with the remainder (36.4%) held by non-Greek private investors.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/economistonline.muogao.com\/2011\/10\/who-owns-greek-debt.html\">http:\/\/economistonline.muogao.com\/2011\/10\/who-owns-greek-debt.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece7.png?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-20364\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece7.png?resize=300%2C407&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Greece7\" width=\"300\" height=\"407\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">And the New York Times Business news cites similar data:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cAlmost two-thirds of Greece\u2019s debt, about 200 billion euros, is owed to the eurozone bailout fund or other eurozone countries. Greece does not have to make any payments on that debt until 2023\u201d. (Editor: <strong>Graph 7<\/strong>: below graphically displays the ownership of the debt.)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece8.png?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-20365\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece8.png?resize=600%2C565&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Greece8\" width=\"600\" height=\"565\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece\u2019s debt crisis explained\u201d \u2013 International Business; New York Times updated July 27, 2015<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/interactive\/2015\/business\/international\/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html?_r=0\">http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/interactive\/2015\/business\/international\/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html?_r=0<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">During this period, Greece\u2019s finances were monitored by external agencies, largely those who had loaned monies to Greece. These were the <strong>International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Community (EU) and the European Central Bank (ECB)<\/strong>. These formed the so-called Troika. The Troika was to become hated by the Greek peoples as they plunged Greece into major social chaos and forced the living standards of the Greek people down.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As the New York Times comments, in many ways the \u201ccrisis\u201d can be considered as a manufactured one as only a portion of debt is coming due in the short term:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe International Monetary Fund has proposed extending the grace period until mid-century. So while Greece\u2019s total debt is big\u2014as much as double the country\u2019s annual economic output\u2014it might not matter much if the government did not need to make payments for decades to come. By the time the money came due, the Greek economy could have grown enough that the sum no longer seemed daunting.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">In the short term, though, Greece has a problem making payments due on loans from the International Monetary Fund and on bonds held by the European Central Bank. Those obligations amount to more than 24 billion euros through the middle of 2018, and it is unlikely that either institution would agree to long delays in repayment.\u201d<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece\u2019s debt crisis explained\u201d \u2013 International Business; New York Times updated July 27, 2015<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/interactive\/2015\/business\/international\/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html?_r=0\">http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/interactive\/2015\/business\/international\/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html?_r=0<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Two additional problems have conspired to make the &#8220;original sin&#8221; of debt \u2013 of even more enormous consequence.<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">Firstly<\/span>, quite early on during this crisis, it was clear to the Troika lenders that the Greek government was in trouble in repaying any significant fraction of this debt. However this was ignored. In fact the IMF \u2013 despite its own rules and despite the worries about \u201cdefault\u201d \u2013 continued to fuel the fire of debt by giving more loan<\/span>s.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Then <span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">secondly<\/span>, to worsen matters, the Greek government falsified data about the extent of its debt, and was helped by the greed of USA banking capital.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">As early as 2004<\/span>, in its negotiations with the EU, the ruling class of Greece falsified the degree of its debt. <strong>Goldman Sachs<\/strong> \u2013 the giant stockbroker and trader bank of Wall Street, aided the Greek government in doing this:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn 2001, Greece was looking for ways to disguise its mounting financial troubles. The Maastricht Treaty required all Eurozone member states to show improvement in their public finances, but Greece was heading in the wrong direction. Then Goldman Sachs came to the rescue, arranging a secret loan of 2.8 billion euros for Greece, disguised as an off-the-books \u201ccross-currency swap\u201d\u2014a complicated transaction in which Greece\u2019s foreign-currency debt was converted into a domestic-currency obligation using a fictitious market exchange rate.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As a result, about 2 percent of Greece\u2019s debt magically disappeared from its national accounts. Christoforos Sardelis, then head of Greece\u2019s Public Debt Management Agency, later described the deal to Bloomberg Business as \u201ca very sexy story between two sinners.\u201d For its services, Goldman received a whopping 600 million euros ($793 million), according to Spyros Papanicolaou, who took over from Sardelis in 2005. That came to about 12 percent of Goldman\u2019s revenue from its giant trading and principal-investments unit in 2001\u2014which posted record sales that year. The unit was run by <strong>Blankfein<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Then the deal turned sour. After the 9\/11 attacks, bond yields plunged, resulting in a big loss for Greece because of the formula Goldman had used to compute the country\u2019s debt repayments under the swap. By 2005, Greece owed almost double what it had put into the deal, pushing its off-the-books debt from 2.8 billion euros to 5.1 billion. In 2005, the deal was restructured and that 5.1 billion euros in debt locked in. Perhaps not incidentally, <strong>Mario Draghi<\/strong>, now head of the European Central Bank and a major player in the current Greek drama, was then managing director of Goldman\u2019s international division.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Robert B. Reich \u2018How Goldman Sachs Profited From the Greek Debt Crisis\u201d; The Nation16th July 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.thenation.com\/article\/goldmans-greek-gambit\/\">http:\/\/www.thenation.com\/article\/goldmans-greek-gambit\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Such was the pervasive greed, that of course such \u2018creative\u2019 financing\u2019 was standard, as explained by <strong>Robert Reich<\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece wasn\u2019t the only sinner. Until 2008, European Union accounting rules allowed member nations to manage their debt with so-called off-market rates in swaps, pushed by Goldman and other Wall Street banks. In the late 1990s, <strong>J.P.Morgan<\/strong> enabled Italy to hide its debt by swapping currency at a favorable exchange rate, thereby committing Italy to future payments that didn\u2019t appear on its national accounts as future liabilities. But Greece was in the worst shape, and Goldman was the biggest enabler. Undoubtedly, Greece suffers from years of corruption and tax avoidance by its wealthy. But Goldman wasn\u2019t an innocent bystander: It padded its profits by leveraging Greece to the hilt\u2014along with much of the rest of the global economy. Other Wall Street banks did the same. When the bubble burst, all that leveraging pulled the world economy to its knees.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.thenation.com\/authors\/robert-b-reich-0\/\">Robert B. Reich<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2018How Goldman Sachs Profited From the Greek Debt Crisis\u201d; The Nation16th July 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.thenation.com\/article\/goldmans-greek-gambit\/\">http:\/\/www.thenation.com\/article\/goldmans-greek-gambit\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Of course such greed driven lying enabled the Greek Government to gain more loans. This was of itself a problem since the country was developing intractable recession.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>The Crisis heats up and the infamous Troika Memorandum<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By 2009, significant fears that Greece would default on its loans prompted alarm. The Troika made moves to yet another loan \u2013 this time of $110 billion \u2013 but only if there were significant <strong>\u201causterity measures.\u201d<\/strong>\u00a0Of course this was intended to be an \u201causterity\u201d for the working classes and not for the ruling classes:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cFrom late 2009, fears of a sovereign debt crisis developed among investors concerning Greece&#8217;s ability to meet its debt obligations due to strong increase in government debt levels. This led to a crisis of confidence, indicated by a widening of bond yield spreads and risk insurance on credit default swaps compared to other countries, most importantly Germany. Downgrading of Greek government debt to junk bonds created alarm in financial markets.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cOn 2 May 2010, the Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund agreed on a \u20ac110 billion loan for Greece, conditional on the implementation of harsh austerity measures. In October 2011, Eurozone leaders also agreed on a proposal to write off 50% of Greek debt owed to private creditors, increasing the EFSF to about \u20ac1 trillion and requiring European banks to achieve 9% capitalization to reduce the risk of contagion to other countries. These austerity measures have proved extremely unpopular with the Greek public, precipitating demonstrations and civil unrest.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Greek_government-debt_crisis#\/media\/File:HellenicOeconomy(inCurrentEuros).png\">https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Greek_government-debt_crisis#\/media\/File:HellenicOeconomy(inCurrentEuros).png<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">It was the collapse of the international financial and banking industries from the USA sub-prime crisis which rapidly became an international financial crisis, that mushroomed the Greek situation into a crisis. Greece had no choice but to reveal a truer picture of its deficit financing to the world\u2019s creditors to seek more credit:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece became the epicenter of Europe\u2019s debt crisis after Wall Street imploded in 2008. With global financial markets still reeling, Greece announced in October 2009 that it had been understating its deficit figures for years, raising alarms about the soundness of Greek finances. Suddenly, Greece was shut out from borrowing in the financial markets. By the spring of 2010, it was veering toward bankruptcy, which threatened to set off a new financial crisis.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece\u2019s debt crisis explained\u201d \u2013 International Business; New York Times updated July 27, 2015<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/interactive\/2015\/business\/international\/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html?_r=0\">http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/interactive\/2015\/business\/international\/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html?_r=0<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">Up to around 2011<\/span>, the loan monies in Greece continued to drive an inflation.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">But then a sharp deflation began, as the Troika turned the screw on Greece. The Troika insisted on marked cuts in the living standards of the Greek people the working lass and peasantry. Not the standard of the ruling class of course who has moved its savings out of reach of the Greek state or the Troika. The Troika\u2019s conditions are noted here:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe so-called troika \u2014 the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission \u2014 issued the first of two international bailouts for Greece, which would eventually total more than 240 billion euros, or about $264 billion at today\u2019s exchange rates. The bailouts came with conditions. Lenders imposed harsh austerity terms, requiring deep budget cuts and steep tax increases. They also required Greece to overhaul its economy by streamlining the government, ending tax evasion and making Greece an easier place to do business.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece\u2019s debt crisis explained\u201d \u2013 International Business; New York Times updated July 27, 2015<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/interactive\/2015\/business\/international\/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html?_r=0\">http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/interactive\/2015\/business\/international\/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html?_r=0<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Of course the Greek capitalists complied, and drove down and depressed the wage rates of the Greek people:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIt\u2019s true that the crushing of the living standards and wage earnings of Greek households is making Greek industry more \u2018competitive\u2019 \u2013 labour costs per unit of (falling) production have dropped 30% since 2010 (See <strong>Graph 8<\/strong> below).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece9.png?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-20366\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece9.png?resize=675%2C441&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Greece9\" width=\"675\" height=\"441\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">((Roberts M; \u2018Greece Cannot Escape\u201d; 2nd Nov 2014:<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/thenextrecession.wordpress.com\/2014\/02\/11\/greece-cannot-escape\/\">https:\/\/thenextrecession.wordpress.com\/2014\/02\/11\/greece-cannot-escape\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Again \u2013 the burden of \u2018austerity\u2019 \u2013 was laid only on the working class of Greece:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cWhen Greece did cut some of its spending, the EU and ECB asked for a reduction in wages rather than a cut in spending. So \u2013 for example \u2013 while the<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2015\/jul\/03\/greece-overspending-defence-wages-taxation-economic-crisis\">military budget remains intact<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">, soldiers have seen their wages fall by 40 per cent. Their experience is replicated across other public sector fields \u2013 notably in nurses and doctors\u201d. Buchanan, Rose T; \u201cGreece debt crisis explained: A history of just how the country landed itself in such a mess\u201d; The Independent 4 July 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/greece-debt-crisis-explainer-a-history-of-how-the-country-landed-itself-in-such-a-mess-10365798.html\">http:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/greece-debt-crisis-explainer-a-history-of-how-the-country-landed-itself-in-such-a-mess-10365798.html<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">An external \u2013 German \u2013 research agency found that indeed, <span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">it was the poor<\/span> that had suffered disproportionate cuts as compared to the rich:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe poorest households in the debt-ridden country lost nearly 86% of their income, while the richest lost only 17-20%.\u00a0 The tax burden on the poor increased by 337% while the burden on upper-income classes increased by only 9% This is the result of a study that has analyzed 260.000 tax and income data from the years 2008 \u2013 2012.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2013 The nominal gross income of Greek households decreased by almost a quarter in only four years.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2013 The wages cuts caused nearly half of the decline.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2013 The net income fell further by almost 9 percent, because the tax burden was significantly increased<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2013\u00a0 While all social classes suffered income losses due to cuts, tax increases and the economic crisis, particularly strongly affected were households of low- and middle-income. This was due to sharp increase in unemployment and tax increases, that were partially regressive.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2013 The total number of employees in the private sector suffered significantly greater loss of income, and they were more likely to be unemployed than those employed in the public sector.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">-From 2009 to 2013 wages and salaries in the private sector declined\u00a0in several stages at around 19 percent. Among other things, because the minimum wage was lowered and collective bargaining structures were weakened. Employees in the public sector lost around a quarter of their income.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Unemployment &amp; Early Retirement<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Unemployment surged from 7.3% in the Q2 2008 to 26.6% in the Q2 2014. among youth aged 15-24, unemployment had an average of 44%.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Early retirement in the Private Sector increased by 14%.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Early retirement in the Public Sector* increased by 48%<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The researchers see here a clear link to the austerity policy, that\u2019s is the Greek government managed to fulfill the Troika requirements for smaller public sector. However, this trend caused a burden to the social security funds.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">* Much to KTG\u2019s knowledge public servants with 25 years in the public administration rushed to early retirement in 2010 out of fear of further cuts in their wages and consequently to their pension rights.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Taxes<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Taxes were greatly increased, but they had a regressive effect.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Since beginning of the austerity, direct taxes increased by nearly 53%,\u00a0while indirect taxes increased by 22 percent.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The taxation policy has indeed contributed\u00a0significantly to the consolidation of the public budget, but by doing so the social imbalance was magnified.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Little has been done against tax avoidance and tax evasion, however, the tax base was actually extended \u201cdownwards\u201d with the effect that households with low-income and assets were strongly burdened.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Particularly poorer households paid disproportionately more in taxes and the tax burden to lower-income rose by 337%. In comparison, the tax burden to upper-income households rose by only 9%.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">In absolute euro amounts, the annual tax burden of many poorer households increased \u201conly\u201d by a few hundred euros. However, with regards to the rapidly declining of incomes and rampant unemployment, this social class was over-burdened with taxes.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>The Poor suffered more<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">On average, the annual income of Greek households before taxes fell from \u20ac23,100 euros in 2008 to just below \u20ac17,900 euros in 2012. This represents a loss of nearly 23 percent.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The losses were significantly different to each income class with\u00a0the poorest households to have suffered the biggest losses.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Almost one in three Greek household had to make it through 2012 with an annual income below \u20ac7,000\u201d.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">(Research of the \u201cGerman Institute for Macroeconomic Research (IMK) affiliated with the Hans B\u00f6ckler Foundation\u201d; given blog \u2018Keep Talking Greece\u2019; by 20 March 2015; at <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.keeptalkinggreece.com\/2015\/03\/20\/shocking-austerity-greeces-poor-lost-86-of-income-but-rich-only-17-20\/\">http:\/\/www.keeptalkinggreece.com\/2015\/03\/20\/shocking-austerity-greeces-poor-lost-86-of-income-but-rich-only-17-20\/<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Both the Greek ruling class and the Troika saw that this squeeze on the poor and working class, was creating such a social upheaval, as to be potentially pre-revolutionary. Yet they were caught, since the alternatives were dismal for the international capitalist. Even the IMF\u2019s own rules were flouted. In 2010 the situation was as follows in Michael Roberts telling:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe irony is that while austerity in Greece continues to be applied mercilessly, the IMF recently issued a report that concluded that the Troika\u2019s approach was mistaken in imposing severe fiscal retrenchment back in May 2010 when Greece could no longer finance its spending through borrowing in bond markets (<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/pubs\/ft\/scr\/2013\/cr13156.pdf\">http:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/pubs\/ft\/scr\/2013\/cr13156.pdf<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Back then, the Troika had three options. First, it could have provided a massive fiscal transfer to the Greek government to tide it over without demanding massive cuts in public spending that eventually led to a fall in Greek real GDP of nearly 20%, unemployment of over 25% and government debt to GDP of 170%, with economic depression likely to continue out to the end of the decade.\u00a0 Or it could have allowed the Greek government to \u2018default\u2019 on its debts to the banks, pension funds and hedge funds and negotiate an \u2018orderly haircut\u2019 on those debts.\u00a0 But the Troika did neither and opted instead for a third way.\u00a0 It insisted that in return for bailout funds the Greek government meet its obligations in full to all its creditors by switching all its available revenues to paying its debts at the expense of jobs, health, education and other public services.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Troika insisted on this because it reckoned 1) that austerity would be shortlived and economic growth would quickly return and 2) if the banks and others took a huge hit on their balance sheets from a Greek default it would put European banks in danger of going bust (Greek banks first).\u00a0 There could be \u2018contagion\u2019 if other distressed Eurozone governments also opted not to pay their debts, using Greece as the precedent.\u00a0 Of course, economic growth has not returned and despite huge efforts on the part of Greek governments to meet fiscal targets through unprecedented austerity, government debt has increased rather than fallen and the economy has nosedived.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Eventually, the Troika had to agree that the private sector took a \u2018haircut\u2019 after all, massaged as it was with cash sweeteners and new bonds with high yields.\u00a0 Now the IMF in its report admits that austerity was too severe and debt \u2018restructuring\u2019 should have happened from the beginning.\u00a0 The IMF, now in its semi-Keynesian mode, tries to put the blame for the failure to do this on the EU leaders and the ECB, which has not made the latter too happy, especially as the current IMF chief, Lagarde was strongly in favour of the austerity plan when she was French finance minister in 2010.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIf Greeks had defaulted back in 2010, that could have led to other defaults and Europe\u2019s banks were in no state to absorb such losses.\u00a0 As a recent study shows<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.voxeu.org\/article\/ez-banking-union-sovereign-virus\">http:\/\/www.voxeu.org\/article\/ez-banking-union-sovereign-virus<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">), German banks were heavily overleveraged back in 2010 and they are not much better even now.\u00a0 There was no way the German government was going to put German banks in jeopardy and allow the \u2018profligate\u2019 Greeks to get a huge handout of German taxpayers money to boot.\u00a0 No, the Greeks had to pay their debts, just as the Germans had to pay their reparations to the French after 1918, even if it meant Germany was plunged into permanent depression.\u00a0 Ironically, the Germans did not and have not paid promised billions in reparations to the Greeks after 1945 \u2013 something the Greeks are pursuing in negotiations!\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Michael Roberts Blog: \u201cGreece, the IMF and debt\u00a0default; 16th June 2013;\u201c<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/thenextrecession.wordpress.com\/2013\/06\/16\/greece-the-imf-and-debt-default\/\">https:\/\/thenextrecession.wordpress.com\/2013\/06\/16\/greece-the-imf-and-debt-default\/<\/a><\/span>)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As noted before, this fueling of the debt by new loans, was against even the principles of the <strong>International Monetary Fund (IMF)<\/strong>, and senior strategists in the IMF warned that the polices of the IMF in regards to Greece were seriously in error, from the year 2010.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>As stated above, one underlying reason on insisting that the Greek Government paid its debt fully<\/strong>, was simply the usurer\u2019s wish to ensure that debts owed by Greece to both France and Germany would be honoured. German and French banks had become vulnerable by <span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">over-leveraging<\/span> themselves. (i.e they had loaned so much money that their actual capital holdings were unable to support them if there was a \u201crun\u201d on their deposits). The Eurozone banks had become very vulnerable:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Table below shows the degree of \u2018domestic leverage\u2019 of the systemically important banks in major Eurozone countries .. in most countries the domestic banking system would not survive a Greek-style \u2018haircut\u2019 on public debt. (In March 2012, holders of Greek bonds had to accept a nominal haircut of over 50%, and on a mark-to-market basis the haircut was over 80%. It is apparent that no bank that has a sovereign exposure worth over 100% of its capital would survive such a loss).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><em><strong>Table 4: Domestic sovereign debt leverage\u00a0(sovereign exposure\/capital)<\/strong><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece-table.jpg?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-20357\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece-table.jpg?resize=306%2C269&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Greece Table\" width=\"306\" height=\"269\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Source: CEPS database. (From Roberts 16 June 2013; \u201cGreece, the IMF and debt default ibid) Michael Roberts Blog: \u201cGreece, the IMF and debt\u00a0default; 16th June 2013;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201c<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/thenextrecession.wordpress.com\/2013\/06\/16\/greece-the-imf-and-debt-default\/\">https:\/\/thenextrecession.wordpress.com\/2013\/06\/16\/greece-the-imf-and-debt-default\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Amazingly, the IMF policy remained unchanged \u2013 new loans were issued to Greece &#8211; at least up till May 2015:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece&#8217;s onerous obligations to the IMF, the European Central Bank and European governments can be traced back to April 2010, when they made a fateful mistake. Instead of allowing Greece to default on its insurmountable debts to private creditors, they chose to lend it the money to pay in full.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">At the time, many called for immediately restructuring privately held debt, thus imposing losses on the banks and investors who had lent money to Greece. Among them were several members of the<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/blogs.wsj.com\/economics\/2013\/10\/07\/imf-document-excerpts-disagreements-revealed\/\">IMF\u2019s board<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">and <strong>Karl Otto Pohl<\/strong>, a former president of the <strong>Bundesbank<\/strong> and a key architect of the euro. The IMF and European authorities responded that restructuring would cause global financial mayhem. As Pohl candidly<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/international\/germany\/former-central-bank-head-karl-otto-poehl-bailout-plan-is-all-about-rescuing-banks-and-rich-greeks-a-695245.html\">noted<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">, that was merely a cover for bailing out German and French banks, which had been among the largest enablers of Greek profligacy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Ultimately, the authorities&#8217; approach merely replaced one problem with another: IMF and official European loans were used to repay private creditors. Thus, despite a belated restructuring in 2012, Greece&#8217;s obligations remain unbearable &#8212; only now they are owed almost entirely to official creditors.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Five years after the crisis started, government debt has jumped from 130 percent of gross domestic product to almost 180 percent. Meanwhile, a deep economic slump and deflation have severely impaired the government&#8217;s ability to repay.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Almost everyone now agrees that pushing Greece to pay its private creditors was a bad idea. The required fiscal austerity was simply too great, causing the economy to collapse. The IMF acknowledged the error in a 2013<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/pubs\/ft\/scr\/2013\/cr13156.pdf\">report<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">on Greece. In a recent staff paper, the fund said that when a crisis threatens to spread, it should seek a collective global solution rather than forcing the distressed economy to bear the entire burden. The IMF\u2019s chief economist,<strong> Olivier Blanchard<\/strong>, has<\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\"><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/pubs\/ft\/wp\/2013\/wp1301.pdf\">warned<\/a><\/span> that more austerity will crush growth.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Oddly, the IMF\u2019s proposed way forward for Greece remains unchanged: Borrow more money (this time from the European authorities) to repay one group of creditors (the IMF) and stay focused on austerity. The fund&#8217;s latest projections assume that the government&#8217;s budget surplus (other than interest payments) will reach 4.5 percent of GDP, a level of belt-tightening that few governments have ever sustained for any significant period of time.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Following Germany&#8217;s lead, IMF officials have placed their faith in so-called structural reforms &#8212; changes in labor and other markets that are supposed to improve the Greek economy&#8217;s longer-term growth potential. They should know better. The fund&#8217;s latest World Economic Outlook<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/pubs\/ft\/weo\/2015\/01\/pdf\/c3.pdf\">throws cold water<\/a> <\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">on the notion that such reforms will address the Greek debt problem in a reliable and timely manner. The most valuable measures encourage research and development and help spur high-technology sectors. All this is to the good, but such gains are irrelevant for the next five years. The priority must be to prevent Greece from sinking deeper into a debt-deflation spiral. Unfortunately, some reforms will actually accelerate the spiral by weakening demand.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">On April 9, Greece repaid 450 million euros ($480 million) to the IMF, and must pay another 2 billion in May and June. The IMF\u2019s managing director, Christine Lagarde, has made clear that delays in repayments will not be tolerated.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cI would, certainly for myself, not support it,\u201d<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2015-04-16\/eu-official-dismisses-greek-rhetoric-on-debt-payments\">she told<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">Bloomberg Television.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bloombergview.com\/contributors\/ashoka-mody\">Ashoka Mody<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">; Bloomberg 81 April 21 2015; The IMF&#8217;s Big Greek Mistake;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bloombergview.com\/articles\/2015-04-21\/imf-needs-to-correct-its-big-greek-bailout-mistake\">http:\/\/www.bloombergview.com\/articles\/2015-04-21\/imf-needs-to-correct-its-big-greek-bailout-mistake<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Recall &#8211; Lagarde was once the Minister of Finance for France:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Graph number 5 (see above) displays that it is not only Greece in<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">hock\u201d to Germany, but there are several leading Eurozone states in debt to Germany. In especial note the deficits of France and of Italy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>This is the second reason \u2013 at least for German imperialism &#8211; on insisting that the Greek Government paid its debt fully.<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">If the Greeks are allowed to default, what happens to the other loans that are outstanding? It has long been recognised that Germany has been running a huge trade surplus, and it has been under pressure to alleviate this for some time<\/span>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cFor years, Germany has been running a large current account surplus, meaning that it sells a lot more than it buys. The gap has only grown\u00a0since the start of the crisis,<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2015-02-09\/germany-posting-record-surplus-gives-fodder-to-economy-s-critics\">reaching<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">a new record of 215.3 billion euros ($244 billion) in 2014. Such insufficient German demand weakens world growth, which is why the<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.treasury.gov\/resource-center\/international\/exchange-rate-policies\/Documents\/2013-10-30_FULL FX REPORT_FINAL.pdf\">U.S. Treasury<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">and the International Monetary Fund have long prodded the country to buy more. Even the<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/europe2020\/pdf\/csr2015\/cr2015_germany_en.pdf\">European Commission<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">has concluded that Germany&#8217;s current-account imbalance is &#8220;<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/europa.eu\/rapid\/press-release_MEMO-14-2231_en.htm\">excessive<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bloombergview.com\/contributors\/ashoka-mody\">Ashoka Mody<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">, Bloomberg188 July 17, 2015, \u2018Germany, Not Greece, Should Exit the Euro\u2019)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Any lifting of the restrictions upon Greece will lead to repercussions as to what happens to the debts of these other leading countries. It is no doubt, for this reason, that both Italy and France have been trying to ease pressures from Germany, arguing that there must be a debt restructuring.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This fits with the later 2015 U-Turn of Cristine Lagarde and the IMF (Discussed in section 9 below) \u2013 who are now at the last moment &#8211; urging the German government to reduce the obligations of the Greek government of Tsipras. We believe also, that this U-Turn supports the USA wish to attack the German government\u2019s current rising economic strength.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Moreover, the USA government itself \u2013 suffers from an astronomical debt.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>7. The Marxist View of \u2018National Debt\u2019 under capitalism<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">What do Marxists and other informed economists make of the notion of a national Debt? Falling into debt of a country \u2013 or large institutions \u2013 has been a historical feature of the growth of capital. Karl Marx pointed this out in \u2018Capital\u2019, saying that the \u201conly part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters the possession of modern people is their national debt.\u201d In full:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe system of public credit, i.e., of national debts, whose origin we discover in Genoa and Venice as early as the Middle Ages, took possession of Europe generally during the manufacturing period. The colonial system with its maritime trade and commercial wars served as a forcing-house for it. \u2026 National debts, i.e., the alienation of the state \u2013 whether despotic, constitutional or republican \u2013 marked with its stamp the capitalistic era. The only part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the collective possessions of modern peoples is their national debt. Hence, as a necessary consequence, the modern doctrine that a nation becomes the richer the more deeply it is in debt. Public credit becomes the credo of capital. And with the rise of national debt-making, want of faith in the national debt takes the place of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which may not be forgiven.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As with the stroke of an enchanter\u2019s wand, it endows barren money with the power of breeding and thus turns it into capital, without the necessity of its exposing itself to the troubles and risks inseparable from its employment in industry or even in usury. The state creditors actually give nothing away, for the sum lent is transformed into public bonds, easily negotiable, which go on functioning in their hands just as so much hard cash would. But further, apart from the class of lazy annuitants thus created, and from the improvised wealth of the financiers, middlemen between the government and the nation \u2013 as also apart from the tax-farmers, merchants, private manufacturers, to whom a good part of every national loan renders the service of a capital fallen from heaven \u2013 the national debt has given rise to joint-stock companies, to dealings in negotiable effects of all kinds, and to agiotage, in a word to stock-exchange gambling and the modern bankocracy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">At their birth the great banks, decorated with national titles, were only associations of private speculators, who placed themselves by the\u00a0side of governments, and, thanks to the privileges they received, were in a position to advance money to the State. Hence the accumulation of the national debt has no more infallible measure than the successive rise in the stock of these banks, whose full development dates from the founding of the Bank of England in 1694. The Bank of England began with lending its money to the Government at 8%; at the same time it was empowered by Parliament to coin money out of the same capital, by lending it again to the public in the form of banknotes. It was allowed to use these notes for discounting bills, making advances on commodities, and for buying the precious metals. It was not long ere this credit-money, made by the bank itself, became. The coin in which the Bank of England made its loans to the State, and paid, on account of the State, the interest on the public debt. It was not enough that the bank gave with one hand and took back more with the other; it remained, even whilst receiving, the eternal creditor of the nation down to the last shilling advanced. Gradually it became inevitably the receptacle of the metallic hoard of the country, and the centre of gravity of all commercial credit. What effect was produced on their contemporaries by the sudden uprising of this brood of bankocrats, financiers, rentiers, brokers, stock-jobbers, &amp;c., is proved by the writings of that time, e.g., by Bolingbroke\u2019s\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Marx, Karl: Capital Volume One Chapter Thirty-One: Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist; at:<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/marx\/works\/1867-c1\/ch31.htm\">https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/marx\/works\/1867-c1\/ch31.htm<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Not only is \u201cNational Debt\u201d crucial for the capitalist, but it was coincident with the \u2018credit system\u2019, and this in turn was associated with an international trade of capital (i.e. money) and systems of &#8220;modern taxation&#8221;:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cWith the national debt arose an international credit system, which often conceals one of the sources of primitive accumulation in this or that people. Thus the villainies of the Venetian thieving system formed one of the secret bases of the capital-wealth of Holland to whom Venice in her decadence lent large sums of money. So also was it with Holland and England. By the beginning of the 18th century the Dutch manufactures were far outstripped. Holland had ceased to be the nation preponderant in commerce and industry. One of its main lines of business, therefore, from 1701-1776, is the lending out of enormous amounts of capital, especially to its great rival England. The same thing is going on today between England and the United States. A great deal of capital, which appears today in the United States without any certificate of birth, was yesterday, in England, the capitalised blood of children.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Marx, Karl: Capital Volume One Chapter Thirty-One: Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist; at:<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/marx\/works\/1867-c1\/ch31.htm\">https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/marx\/works\/1867-c1\/ch31.htm<\/a><\/span>)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Moreover, Marx points out that governments want loans for \u201cextraordinary expenses\u201d. This is because they do not want to tax the people too heavily lest it anger them. But eventually these loans will need an increase in taxes to pay the loan off. Then a vicious circle begins, where even more loans are needed to off-set the higher taxation burden:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cAs the national debt finds its support in the public revenue, which must cover the yearly payments for interest, &amp;c., the modern system of taxation was the necessary complement of the system of national loans. The loans enable the government to meet extraordinary expenses, without the tax-payers feeling it immediately, but they necessitate, as a consequence, increased taxes. On the other hand, the raising of taxation caused by the accumulation of debts contracted one after another, compels the government always to have recourse to new loans for new extraordinary expenses. Modern fiscality, whose pivot is formed by taxes on the most necessary means of subsistence (thereby increasing their price), thus contains within itself the germ of automatic progression. Overtaxation is not an incident, but rather a principle. In Holland, therefore, where this system was first inaugurated, the great patriot, DeWitt, has in his \u201cMaxims\u201d extolled it as the best system for making the wage labourer submissive, frugal, industrious, and overburdened with labour. The destructive influence that it exercises on the condition of the wage labourer concerns us less however, here, than the forcible expropriation, resulting from it, of peasants, artisans, and in a word, all elements of the lower middle class. On this there are not two opinions, even among the bourgeois economists. Its expropriating efficacy is still further heightened by the system of protection, which forms one of its integral parts.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Marx, Karl: Capital Volume One Chapter Thirty-One: Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist; at:<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/marx\/works\/1867-c1\/ch31.htm\">https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/marx\/works\/1867-c1\/ch31.htm<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">What were these \u201cextraordinary expenditures&#8221; the state wished to fund? Even bourgeois economists recognise that wars were one key such expenditures:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Bank of England was created\u2026 explicitly,, to finance wars, in its case the Nine Years War with France which started in 1688\u2026\u2026The Bank of France .. having been started with that name in 1800 specifically to satisfy Napoleon\u2019s wartime financial needs\u201d. (Dean and Pringle Ibid; \u2018Central banks\u201d; pp38; p. 42).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Modern bourgeois economists have of course long supported the principle of national debts. Maynard Keynes recognised the utility of deficit financing for the capitalist control of the state, as he stated:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201c\u2019Loan expenditure.. may .. enrich the community on balance\u201d; ref 31: (Cited Van Der Pijl, K. \u2018The making of an Atlantic ruling class\u201d; p.17; London 2012).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">While we cannot dwell further on the subject in this article, the amount of the USA current debt is astonishingly large. So there is nothing reprehensible about the Greek Debt per se. What is at issue is an international lack of confidence that the Greek state would be able to pay it back. There is no underlying manufacturing or trading base to support the debt, and will not be. Unless \u2013 a complete break with the past &#8211; is offered. However thus far, a meaningful solution has never been on offer by the Greek or international merchants of capital, to the Greek working people.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>8. The Debt Crisis leads to an increasing struggle of the growing Greek working class and gives rise to the United Front of Syriza &#8211; the political parties of the left<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By the time of the current era in 2000-2015, the Greek social and class structure had changed dramatically. Despite the absence of a major manufacturing sector, unemployment was rising, and the urban-rural divide was widening \u2013 even before the austerity moves of the Troika:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece is still low on competitiveness and this undermines self-sustaining growth, with low employment rates, low R&amp;D, high levels of poverty, especially in rural and remote areas. The Greek economy grew by 0.7 per cent in the 1980s, compared with 2.4 per cent in other EU states. Demographically, the number of over 65-year-olds, set to increase by 30 per cent between 2010 and 2050, with fewer people in employment, will create a massive dependency on social security and health care. Greece has the largest agricultural population in the EU, with a low capacity to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). The collapse of the Soviet Union and opening of markets in the Balkans means that many investors have relocated their activities in neighbouring countries.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Since 2004 there has been a drop in most manufacturing output (textiles, leather goods, paper, office equipment, furniture), steadily constant production of food, beverages, oil, with the only growth in tobacco, chemicals and plastic goods. Therefore, long-term stagnation in manufacturing has led the state to adopt \u2018rescue\u2019 interventions or public loans. Shipping and tourism contributes 17 per cent to gross domestic product (GDP) and employs 18 per cent of the working population. The uneven rural\/urban divide is particularly acute as some areas, notably the islands and the farming communities, benefited more from Euro-funds for tourism or agridevelopment than others. Athens, in particular has had massive infrastructure developed.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Liddle, Joyce. \u201cRegeneration and Economic Development in Greece:<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">De-industrialisation and Uneven Development \u201cp.340; Local Government Studies; Vol. 35, No. 3, 335\u2013354, June 2009)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Nonetheless, the weight of the working class had risen between 1991 and 2011, as had a class polarisation:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cBased on the Greek Statistic Service data for the fourth trimester of 2011 in comparison to those of 1991 consists in<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">1. an increase of the bourgeois class (3.4% from 1.4%) and of the rich rural strata (0.6% from 0.3%),<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">2. a huge decline of the traditional petit-bourgeois class (15.2% from 13.2%), and of the middle rural strata (2.2% from 3%),<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">3. a small increase of the new petit-bourgeois class (15.2% from 13.2%), due to the increasing demand of their abilities for the achievement of capital profitability, in parallel to an effort of their submission to the most direct capital exploitation and domination,<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">4. An important increase of the working class (62.2% from 47.5%), and<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">an important decrease of the poor rural strata (6% from 47.5%).<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">*In any case, what is clear is the tendency of intensification of class polarisation, which leads to the adoption of a social structure akin to that of other European countries (small number of farmers and of the traditional petit-bourgeois class, stable presence of the new petit-bourgeois class as the executive organizer of the productive process, broader bourgeoisie and heterogeneous uneven but<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">numerous working class\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Eirini Gaitanou. An examination of class structure in Greece, its tendencies of transformation amid the crisis, and its impacts on the organisational forms and structures of the social movement. At:<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.academia.edu\/9400998\/An_examination_of_class_structure_in_Greece_its_tendencies_of_transformation_amid_the_crisis_and_its_impacts_on_the_organisational_forms_and_structures_of_the_social_movement\">http:\/\/www.academia.edu\/9400998\/An_examination_of_class_structure_in_Greece_its_tendencies_of_transformation_amid_the_crisis_and_its_impacts_on_the_organisational_forms_and_structures_of_the_social_movement<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Under these enormous burdens, the now sizeable working classes of Greece mounted serious struggles to resist \u201causterity.\u201d The ruling classes struggled to implement their commitments to the EU and the IMF. Consequently a series of short lived coalition governments took power.<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cFollowing the May 2012 legislative election where the New Democracy party became the largest party in the Hellenic Parliament, Samaras, leader of ND, was asked by Greek President Karolos Papoulias to try to form a government. However, after a day of hard negotiations with the other parties in Parliament, Samaras officially announced he was giving up the mandate to form a government. The task passed to Alexis Tsipras, leader of the SYRIZA (the second largest party) who was also unable to form a government. After PASOK also failed to negotiate a successful agreement to form a government, emergency talks with the President ended with a new election being called while Panagiotis Pikrammenos was appointed as Prime Minister in a caretaker government.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Voters once again took to the polls in the widely-watched June 2012 election. New Democracy came out on top in a stronger position with 129 seats, compared to 108 in the May election. On 20 June 2012, Samaras successfully formed a coalition with PASOK (now lead by former Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos) and DIMAR. The new government would have a majority of 58, with SYRIZA, Independent Greeks (ANEL), Golden Dawn (XA) and the Communist Party (KKE) comprising the opposition. PASOK and DIMAR chose to take a limited role in Samaras&#8217; Cabinet, being represented by party officials and independent technocrats instead of MPs.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Antonis_Samaras\">https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Antonis_Samaras<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">We discuss these parties below. The coalition government led by Samaras, proved to be another short lived and contentious government, as it toed the line of Troika conditions. As such it was unable to disguise its nature from the increasingly militant and impoverished working class of Greece.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By the time of the January 2015 elections, the situation had become even more parlous for Greece\u2019s working people:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece saw official unemployment rising up to 27% \u2013 and youth unemployment up to 50% \u2013 suffered a cumulative contraction of almost 25%, saw a massive reduction in wages and pensions, and witnessed the passage of massive legislation oriented towards privatizations, labor market liberalization, and neoliberal university reform.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Panagiotis Sotiris;<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/viewpointmag.com\/2015\/01\/28\/a-strategy-of-ruptures-ten-theses-on-the-greek-future\/\"> https:\/\/viewpointmag.com\/2015\/01\/28\/a-strategy-of-ruptures-ten-theses-on-the-greek-future\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">A more credible &#8220;left&#8221; bulwark against the masses was necessary for the Greek ruling class. This coincided with a reformation of the Greek left. At this point we must discuss Syriza in more detail.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As seen, PASOK had fallen into rank opportunism and open betrayal of the working class. After ensuing scandals of corruption implicated the leader, Andreas Papandreou, its appeal to the workers and poor of Greece was falling fast:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and his key associates were under accusation of scandal, which involved party funding from illicit sources and revealed the extensive clientelistic linkages between business interests and politics which had been built up under PASOK\u2019s eight-year rule.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Tsakatika, Myrto and Eleftheriou, Costas: \u201cThe Radical Left\u2019s Turn towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths\u201d; South European Society and Politics, 2013; p.3;<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1080\/13608746.2012.757455\">http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1080\/13608746.2012.757455<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>The space on the left had opened up again. Who was there to fill it?<\/strong><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">We reprise the main outlines of events, focusing on analyses by Syriza, the revisionist KKE, and the pro-Hoxha Anasintaxi.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">After the destruction of many of its cadre after the Battle of Athens in 1949, the KKE slowly reformed, after having adopted some mistaken sectarian paths during the Second World War. The KKE went through several splits, summarized below:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThere have been a series of splits throughout the party&#8217;s history, the earliest one being the Trotskyist Organisation of Internationalist Communists of Greece.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">In 1956, after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR\u2026.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">a faction created the <strong>Group of Marxist-Leninists of Greece (OMLE)<\/strong>, which split from party in 1964, becoming the Organisation of Marxists-Leninists of Greece. In 1968, amidst the Greek military junta of 1967\u20131974 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a relatively big group split from KKE, forming <strong>KKE Interior<\/strong>, a Greek Nationalist Communist Party claiming to be directed from within Greece rather than from the Soviet Union.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">In 1988 KKE and Greek Left (the former KKE Interior), along with other left parties and organisations, formed the <strong>Coalition of the Left and Progress<\/strong>.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Also in 1988, the vast majority of members and officials from Communist Youth of Greece (KNE), the KKE&#8217;s youth wing, split to form the <strong>New Left Current (NAR)<\/strong>, drawing mainly youth in major cities, especially in Thessaloniki.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">In the early 2000s, a small group of major party officials such as Mitsos Kostopoulos left the party and formed the Movement for the United in Action Left (KEDA), which in the 2007 legislative election participated in the Coalition of the Radical Left, which was to win the 2015 national elections with a plurality.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Communist_Party_of_Greece\">https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Communist_Party_of_Greece<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">) and also see Tsakatika, Myrto and Eleftheriou, Costas: \u201cThe Radical Left\u2019s Turn towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths\u201d; South European Society and Politics, 2013; p.3;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\"><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1080\/13608746.2012.757455\">http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1080\/13608746.2012.757455<\/a><\/span>)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Marxist Leninist party supporting Hoxha in Greece is \u2018\u0391\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u2019 or \u2018<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><strong><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/plus.google.com\/114443710203719523642\">Anasintaxi Organization<\/a><\/strong><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2019 (reorganization). They are also known as \u201c<strong>The Movement for the Reorganization of the Communist Party of Greece 1918\u201355<\/strong>\u201d \u2013 or <strong>KKE 1918-55<\/strong>. They characterize the KKE disintegration post-war as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe old revolutionary KKE, under the leadership of the then General Sceretary <strong>Nikos Zachariadis<\/strong>, was the only communist party from a capitalist not to have accepted Krushchevian revisionism. For this reason, it was eliminated by the brutal intervention of the soviet Krushchevian revisionists in 1955-1956 and replaced by the Greek <strong>Krushchevian<\/strong> revisionist party (\u201cK\u201dKE), a bourgeois, party of social-democratic type. More than 90% of the party members led by Nikos Zachariadis opposed and fiercely resisted Krushchevian revisionism and many tens of cadres were sent to exile in Siberia including Nikos Zachariadis himself who has murdered by the social-fascist clique of <strong>Brezhnev<\/strong> (CPSU) \u2013 Florakis (\u201cK\u201dKE) in August of 1973, in Sorgut, Siberia after of 17 years of exile. In 1968, \u201cK\u201dKE was split into two parties: the euro-communist part known as \u201cK\u201dKE (interior) and the Krushchevian-Brezhnevite part known as \u201cK\u201dKE. SYRIZA originates from the first part and, consequently, is a social-democratic and reformist party guided by a right opportunist general line and characterized by petty bourgeois class features\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u0391\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c0\u03cc<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/plus.google.com\/114443710203719523642\">Anasintaxi Organization<\/a> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.com\/2015\/03\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html\">\u2018Some questions and answers about the current situation in Greece\u2019<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">; Article to be published in \u201cUnity &amp; Struggle\u201d (Extended version of an interview given to the comrades of Iran); march 30; 2015; at<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/02\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html\">http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/02\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The revisionist KKE\u2019s attitude to the European Union is characterised as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIt is important to clarify that, despite its verbal attacks against EU and the Eurozone, \u201cK\u201dKE does not put forward (not even for the sake of demagogy) the question of Greece\u2019s immediate exit neither from the EU nor the Eurozone. In relation to Euro, the leadership of \u201cK\u201dKE has stated: \u201cA solution outside the euro and return to the drachma in the present circumstances would be catastrophic\u201d (30\/5\/2011), i.e. a position that is similar to the one expressed by the president of the <strong>Union of Greek Industrialists<\/strong> (20\/3\/2012)\u2026: \u201cEurope or chaos\u201d This is also evident in the party\u2019s program that was approved by its last congress). Since some time now, \u201cK\u201dKE has expressed the view that \u201cthe term \u201cnational dependence\u201d is not applicable in contemporary conditions\u201d (1\/2\/2005). After the 19th Congress, it has openly adopted Trotskyite positions that mention \u201cimperialist Greece\u201d, \u201cimperialist Second World War\u201d etc and are evident in the \u201cProgram\u201d approved in the last party Congress: \u201cthe capitalism in Greece is in the imperialist stage of development\u201d (\u201cK\u201dKE Program, p. 12, Athens 2013). Concerning the character of the Second World War it is claimed that: \u201cthe problem was not only with KKE but the overall strategy of the international communist movement before and during the Second World War. In 1941, another negative point was added when the correct assessment of the war as imperialist \u2013 with respect to both sides of capitalist states \u2013 was replaced by the position that it was only anti-fascist\u201d (\u201cRizospastis,\u201d 21\/12\/2104)\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u0391\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c0\u03cc<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/plus.google.com\/114443710203719523642\">Anasintaxi Organization<\/a> \u2018<a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.com\/2015\/03\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html\">Some questions and answers about the current situation in Greece<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2019; Article to be published in \u201cUnity &amp; Struggle\u201d (Extended version of an interview given to the comrades of Iran); march 30; 2015; at<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/02\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html\">http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/02\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As PASOK had been fully exposed, a general disillusion enabled the formation of <strong>Synaspismo<\/strong> (Coalition of the Left and Progress) in 1991:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSynaspismos emerged initially as an electoral coalition at the late 1980s, with the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Greek Left, one of the successors of the eurocommunist KKE Interior, as its largest constituents. The Party of Democratic Socialism, a splinter from the Union of the Democratic Centre which occupied a similar position to PASOK, was the largest non-Communist member party.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Synaspismos\">https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Synaspismos<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The many parties of the left are displayed in the diagram below, which helps to show the umbrella nature of the Syriza United front. Beneath the figure itself (at the site \u201cLenin\u2019s Tomb\u201d) is a potted history of these factions. (Seymour, R. \u2018<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.leninology.co.uk\/2015\/02\/map-of-greek-radical-left.html\">Map of the Greek Radical Left<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2019 February 9, 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.leninology.co.uk\/2015\/02\/map-of-greek-radical-left.html\">http:\/\/www.leninology.co.uk\/2015\/02\/map-of-greek-radical-left.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">).<\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">However the figure does not explain include the currents of the Marxist-Leninist left. The OMLE was a pro-Maoist party. We further discuss at points, the positions of \u0391\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c0\u03cc Anasintaxi Organization, the pro-Hoxha Marxist-Leninists. Here we continue to trace the currents of Syriza.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The revisionist KKE joined Synaspismo, which contested three national elections (June 1989, November 1989, 1990). For a period they joined in Government alliances with mainstream centre-right <strong>New Democracy, ND<\/strong> under the premiership of <strong>Tzannis Tzannetakis<\/strong>. This collaboration was not viewed kindly by the increasingly politicised Greek working class and petit-bourgeois:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe government\u2019s official purpose was to send the former prime minister to trial and impose a clean-up of the corrupt clientelistic politics of the time\u2026 (But) leftist voters did not appreciate the decision of the left parties\u2019 leaderships to engage in government cooperation with the centre-right; moreover, the stated aim of the Tzannetakis government was not achieved: after a long judicial process there was ultimately very little \u2018cleaning up\u2019.. the KKE pulled out of the coalition and lost 40 per cent of its cadres after a major party split in the party\u2019s 13th Congress (February 1991). The former coalition was re-established as a unified party&#8230; In the first part of the 1990s, the Greek left as a whole was thus delegitimised in the eyes of its traditional electorate, bruised by participation in government with the centre-right and experienced internal strife and extensive demobilisation of party members, while the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) added an identity crisis to its woes\u201d. (Tsakatika, and Eleftheriou, Ibid; 2013).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece10.jpg?ssl=1\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-20356\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenixnews.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/greece10.jpg?resize=700%2C841&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Greece10\" width=\"700\" height=\"841\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The United Front of Synapsimos \u2013 or <strong>Syn<\/strong> as it is known \u2013 tried to appeal to a broad front, and one that explicitly crossed class lines:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSYN.. in 2001\u2026 established a political and electoral alliance with a host of smaller parties, groups and networks of the extra-parliamentary left in the context of the Synaspismo Pizospastikh Aristra (Coalition of the Radical Left [SYRIZA])&#8230; SYN was and remained (until 2012) the largest party in the SYRIZA coalition, representing at least 80 per cent of its cadres, activists and voters. SYRIZA was one of the core choices of the party\u2019s new leadership after 2000.. \u201d<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">(Tsakatika, and Eleftheriou, Ibid; 2013).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSYN.. defined itself as a pluralist left party of democratic socialism, neither orthodox communist nor social democratic, supporting a mixed economy and placing a fresh emphasis on \u2018new issues\u2019, particularly feminism, democratic rights and the environment. SYN\u2019s original core consisted of cadres whose political origins lay in the party of the <strong>Ellhnikh Aristra \u0301 (Greek Left [EAR])<\/strong> founded in 1987 (in turn established after the KKE-es leadership\u2019s decision to dissolve the party and contribute to the foundation of a non-communist left party) and a large group of dissidents who broke ranks with the KKE in 1991. It also incorporated a number of individuals and small groups coming from left social democracy, ecologism and the extra-parliamentary left, as well as independents.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><br \/>\nThe party\u2019s founding document appealed to \u2018the men and women of work and culture, the young and the excluded\u2019. This was explicitly not a class appeal, since SYN effectively presented itself as a catch-all party throughout the 1990s, one that aimed to be present in \u2018every nook and cranny of Greek society\u2019. There was also an explicit trans-class appeal to groups affected by gender inequality and environmental degradation. In practice, most of its vote share, membership and cadres have mainly been from among the ranks of highly educated employees in the public sector, professionals and small employers. However, as a result of changes in internal factional dynamics, with the radical, protest-oriented<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">moderate (and sympathetic to government cooperation with PASOK) <strong>Anan vtikh ryga (Renewal Wing)<\/strong> in the party leadership after 2000, SYN shifted to a broadly defined class appeal aimed at targeting, primarily, younger cohorts and, secondarily, precariously employed workers in the services sector, social categories that were politically under-represented\u201d<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">(Tsakatika, and Eleftheriou, Ibid; 2013).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The later creation of Syriza, was also a United Front. The word commonly means \u201ccoalition of the radical left\u201d; or originally \u201ccoming from the roots\u201d (Wikipedia):<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Coalition of the Radical Left (Greek: Synaspism\u00f3s Rizospastik\u00eds Arister\u00e1s), mostly known by its acronym, Syriza which signifies a Greek adjective meaning \u201cfrom the roots\u201d, is a left-wing political party in Greece, originally founded in 2004 as a coalition of left-wing and radical left parties. It is the largest party in the Hellenic Parliament\u2026<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The coalition originally comprised a broad array of groups (thirteen in total) and independent politicians, including social democrats, democratic socialists, left-wing patriots, feminists and green leftist groups, as well as Maoist, Trotskyist, Eurocommunist but also Eurosceptic components. Additionally, despite its secular ideology, many members are Christians who, like their atheistic fellow members, are opposed to the privileges of the state-sponsored Orthodox Church of Greece. From 2013 the coalition became a unitary party, although it retained its name with the addition of &#8220;United Social Front.&#8221;<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Syriza\">http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Syriza<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Syriza between 2004-8 was led by <strong>Alekos Alavanos<\/strong>. They created a vigorous youth movement in the driving force of the Ellhniko \u0301 Koinvniko \u0301 Foroym (Greek Social Forum [<strong>EKF<\/strong>]) which later organised the 4th European Social Forum (ESF) that took place in Athens in 2006. The Syriza United Front did undergo some splinters:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;In March 2009, some 10 small groups and parties formed another coalition, <strong>Antarsya<\/strong> (literally, the Anti-Capitalist Left Cooperation for the Overthrow). Composed primarily of university student activists in various communist organizations of orthodox Marxist, Trotskyist and Maoist backgrounds, as well of members of the relatively new rank-and-file unions outside the established bureaucracies of the official union structure of the country, it proved effective for activism in a broad range of mobilizations, but it never managed to achieve anything more than 1.8 per cent in the regional or general elections.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><br \/>\n(Spourdalakis, Michalis; \u201cLeft strategy in the Greek cauldron: explaining syriza\u2019s success. Socialist Register 2013; p. 105)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By 2010, <strong>Alex Tspiras<\/strong> was leading the Syriza party, after a section (The Renewal Wing\u2019) split to form DIMAR (\u2018Renewal Wing\u2019):<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe exit of the \u2018Renewal Wing\u2019 faction from SYN (which evolved into DIMAR) in the summer of 2010 curtailed political disagreement and factional infighting within SYN and resulted in the effective dominance of Alexis Tsipras\u2019s leadership in both SYN and SYRIZA.\u201d<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">(Tsakatika, and Eleftheriou, Ibid; 2013).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe \u201csocial democratic\u201d wing of Synaspismos definitely lost control of the party in 2006 when Alekos Alavanos was elected its president. This right wing, led by Fotis Kouvelis, almost exclusively originating in the Eurocommunist right group coming from EAR, ultimately left Synaspismos and set up another party called Democratic Left (Dimar): a formation that claims to be a sort of halfway house between Pasok and the radical left.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Stathis Kouvelakis interview with Sebastien Budgen: Greece: Phase One <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2015\/01\/phase-one\/\">https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2015\/01\/phase-one\/<\/a><\/span>)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">But the revisionist KKE left Syn early on, and adopted a sectarian approach. Later on the KKE did not join the Greek Social Forum (EKF). Much of the KKE\u2019s broad front work was instead performed through a Trade Union organisation &#8211; \u201c<strong>Panrgatiko Agvnistiko Mtvpo (All Workers\u2019 Militant Front, PAME)<\/strong> formed in the late 1990s. Insisting on this tactic, the KKE lost ground amongst much of the youth. For example those joining the \u2018<strong>Indignants<\/strong>\u2019 movement \u2013 who rejected all parties.<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cAlso indicative of the qualitative new dimension of the Greek people\u2019s resistance were the now famous mobilizations of the \u2018<strong>aganaktismeni<\/strong>\u2019, i.e. the \u2018frustrated or indignant in the squares\u2019. These movements, which appeared in almost every major city nationwide, used new means of political mobilization (including the internet) and developed a political language which was clearly hostile to the previously existing patronizing practices of the party system. In fact this hostility was frequently displayed by spontaneous verbal and even physical attacks on politicians of the governmental parties, which at times extended to representatives of the established trade unions and the KKE.&#8221;<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><br \/>\n(Spourdalakis, Michalis;\u201cLeft strategy in the Greek cauldron: explaining syriza\u2019s success. Socialist Register 2013; p. 108)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Stathis Kouvelakis<\/strong>, is a member of the central committee of Syriza and a leading member of its Left Platform. Kouvelakis pointed to the post-1968 divisions of the Greek left as &#8220;two poles.&#8221; Supposedly bridged by Syriza: the first bridge to factions of the KKE:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSince 1968, the radical Left had been divided into two poles. The first was the <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2015\/01\/understanding-the-greek-communists\/\">Greek Communist Party<\/a><\/span> (KKE), which (after splits)\u2026 (had) a rightist wing (that) constituted the Greek Left (EAR) and joined Synaspismos from the outset, and the leftist one reforming as the AKOA. The KKE that remained after these two splits was peculiarly traditionalist&#8230; It managed to win a relatively significant activist base among working-class and popular layers, as well as among the youth, particularly in the universities.\u201d (Stathis Kouvelakis interview with Sebastien Budgen: <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2015\/01\/phase-one\/\">Greece: Phase One<\/a> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2015\/01\/phase-one\/\">https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2015\/01\/phase-one\/<\/a><\/span>)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Kouvelakis describes Synaspsimos, as a second \u2018pole\u2019, seeding the later Syriza:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe other pole, Synaspismos, opened out in 2004 with the creation of Syriza, which itself came from the joining together of the two previous splits from the KKE. Synaspismos has changed considerably over time. At the beginning of the 1990s, it was the kind of party that could vote for the Maastricht Treaty, and it was mainly of a moderate left coloration.\u201d (Stathis Kouvelakis interview with Sebastien Budgen; Ibid).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Actually the Marxist-Leninist pro-Hoxha party &#8211; (\u0391\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c0\u03cc <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/plus.google.com\/114443710203719523642\">Anasintaxi Organization<\/a><\/span>) \u2013 is more emphatic. It places Syriza as directly deriving from the revisionist KKE, and as having taken over the KKE \u201csocial-democratic and reformist\u201d character. Although Syriza is \u201csocially\u201d anti-fascist, it has \u201ccontradictions\u201d \u2013 that impede it:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn 1968, \u201cK\u201dKE was split into two parties: the euro-communist part known as \u201cK\u201dKE (interior) and the Krushchevian-Brezhnevite part known as \u201cK\u201dKE. Syriza originates from the first part and, consequently, is a social-democratic and reformist party guided by a right opportunist general line and characterized by petty bourgeois class features.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Syriza has pledged to implement a kind of neo-Keynesian economic program with the aim, at best, of relieving the burden of the consequences coming from the economic crisis of over-production and extreme neo-liberal economic policy without, however, touching the capitalist system and the imperialist dependence of Greece. Nevertheless, the implementation of this program has met negative reactions from the representatives of the imperialist organizations Commission \u2013 ECB \u2013 IMF that continue to interfere in the internal affairs of the country provocatively and without any pretext. This attitude amounts to the annulment of the recent (editor: January 2105) elections in our country.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In the sphere of social questions, Syriza is an anti-fascist party suffering from inconsistencies and contradictions as it is evident from the fact that it formed an alliance with the bourgeois nationalist party of <strong>ANEL<\/strong> and the nomination of <strong>Prokopis Pavlopoulos<\/strong> for President of the Republic, a right-wing politician from Nea Demokratia who was responsible, as Minister of Public Order in the Karamanlis government, for the bloody police violence unleashed on the country\u2019s school youth after the murder of <strong>Alexis Grigoropoulos<\/strong> in December of 2008.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(\u0391\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c0\u03cc<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/plus.google.com\/114443710203719523642\">Anasintaxi Organization<\/a> \u2018<a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.com\/2015\/03\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html\">Some questions and answers about the current situation in Greece<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2019; Article to be published in \u201cUnity &amp; Struggle\u201d (Extended version of an interview given to the comrades of Iran); march 30; 2015. At<\/span> <a href=\"http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/02\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html\">http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/02\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html<\/a><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Syriza was always an electoral alliance:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSyriza was set up by several different organizations in 2004, as an electoral alliance. Its biggest component was <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2015\/01\/alexis-tsipras-interview-syriza\/\">Alexis Tsipras<\/a><\/span>\u2019s party<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Coalition_of_Left,_of_Movements_and_Ecology\">Synaspismos<\/a><\/span> \u2014 initially the Coalition of the Left and Progress, and eventually renamed the Coalition of the Left and of the Movements \u2026. It emerged from a series of splits in the Communist movement. Some (smaller parties also &#8211; Editor) came out of the old Greek far left. In particular, the <strong><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Communist_Organization_of_Greece\">Communist Organization of Greece<\/a><\/span> (KOE)<\/strong>, one of the country\u2019s main Maoist groups. This organization had three members of parliament (MPs)\u00a0elected in May 2012. That\u2019s also true of the <strong><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Internationalist_Workers'_Left_(Greece)\">Internationalist Workers\u2019 Left<\/a><\/span> (DEA)<\/strong>, which is from a Trotskyist tradition, as well as other groups mostly of a Communist background. For example, <strong>the <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Renewing_Communist_Ecological_Left\">Renewing Communist Ecological Left<\/a> <\/span>(AKOA)<\/strong>, which came out of the old <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Communist_Party_of_Greece_(Interior)\">Communist Party\u00a0(Interior)<\/a><\/span>.\u201d (Stathis Kouvelakis interview with Sebastien Budgen; Ibid).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The United Front of Syriza, had almost electoral immediate success:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIt managed to get into parliament, overcoming the 3\u00a0percent minimum threshold.\u201d (Stathis Kouvelakis interview with Sebastien Budgen; Ibid).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Syriza went on to replace PASOK as increasingly, Syriza candidates won in the ballot boxes. By this stage a number of other new parties had emerged, including a fascist party \u2013 <strong>Golden Dawn<\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cAfter three years of political instability, the system collapsed in the dual elections of May and June 2012. New Democracy\u2019s strength was halved and PASOK\u2019s vote share diminished by 75 per cent. Three new political actors emerged, each winning around seven per cent of the vote, namely the party of the <strong>Dhmokratikh Aristra (Democratic Left, DIMAR)<\/strong>, a recent split from SYN, <strong>Anya rthtoi Ellhn(Independent Greeks)<\/strong>, a recent split from ND, and the extreme-right <strong>Xrysh Aygh (Golden Dawn)<\/strong>. (Tsakatika, and Eleftheriou, Ibid; 2013).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">A short lived coalition government in 2012 was formed by ND, PASOK and DIMAR in June 2012<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">What does Syriza represent? According to its own leaders it is an \u201canti-capitalist coalition\u201d \u2013 as \u201cclass-struggle parties &#8211; but both emphasising \u201celectoral alliances\u201d:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSyriza is an anti-capitalist coalition that addresses the question of power by emphasizing the dialectic of electoral alliances and success at the ballot box with struggle and mobilizations from below. That is, Syriza and Synaspismos see themselves as class-struggle parties, as formations that represent specific class interests.\u201d (Stathis Kouvelakis interview with Sebastien Budgen; Ibid).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In another description, it is a \u201chybrid party\u201d:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThat is, it is a political front, and even within Syriza there is a practical approach allowing the coexistence of different political cultures. I would say that Syriza is a hybrid party, a synthesis party, with one foot in the tradition of the Greek Communist movement and its other foot in the novel forms of radicalism that have emerged in this new period.\u201d (Stathis Kouvelakis interview with Sebastien Budgen; Ibid).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In 2012 there were about 16,000 members in Synaspismos, and the Maoist KOE had about 1-1500 members. But in the ensuring period of a year, Syriza grew rapidly further \u2013 to 35,000\u201336,000. By May 2012, it became the second party in Greece with 16.7\u00a0percent of the vote, beating Pasok. It relied largely on a trade union base, and pulled its voters away from the KKE. There were 3 reasons why strategists feel they did so well in the 2012 elections:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cFirst, The violence of the social and economic crisis in Greece and the way it developed from 2010 onward, with the austere-ian purge .. inflicted under the infamous memorandums of understanding (the agreements the Greek government signed with the troika in order to secure the country\u2019s ability to pay off its debts). The second factor resides in the fact that Greece \u2014 and now also Spain \u2014 are the only countries where this social and economic crisis has transformed into a political crisis. .. The third factor is popular mobilization.\u2026 The real breakthrough came when Tsipras focused his discourse on the theme of constituting an \u201canti-austerity government of the Left\u201d now, which he presented as an alliance proposal reaching out to the KKE, the far left, the parliamentary left, and the small dissident elements of Pasok. \u201c (Stathis Kouvelakis interview with Sebastien Budgen; Ibid).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Within the United Front of Syriza itself, there are two main wings (See Diagram above): The Left Platform and the majority. The Left Platform is also a United Front \u2013 of the &#8220;<strong>Left Current&#8221;<\/strong>\u00a0mainly influenced by the KKE and a Trotskyist component:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Left Platform has two components, the Left Current, which is a kind of traditional communist current \u2014 essentially constituted by trade unionists and controlling most of the trade union sector of Syriza. These people in their vast majority come from the KKE, so they are those who broke with the KKE in the last split of the party in 1991. And then there is the Trotskyist component (DEA and KOKKOINO, recently fused).\u201d (Stathis Kouvelakis interview with Sebastien Budgen; Ibid).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In turn, this Left wing has formed a sub-group \u2013 the \u201c<strong>Platform of the 53<\/strong>\u201d:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe left of the majority has coalesced around the \u201cPlatform of the Fifty-Three,\u201d signed by fifty-three members of the central committee and some MPs in June 2014, immediately after the European elections. They strongly criticized Tsipras\u2019s attempts to attract establishment politicians, and for leading a campaign that\u00a0didn\u2019t give a big enough role to social mobilizations and movements\u201d. (Stathis Kouvelakis interview with Sebastien Budgen; Ibid).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">From quite early on, Tsipras had been criticised from his Left \u2013 on charges along the lines of opportunism. What Programme did Syriza put forth?<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>9. What was the elected programme of Syriza?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Thessalonika Conference is accepted as being the progaramme of the United Front of Syriza. (Syriza \u2013 The Thessalonika Programme\u201d at<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.syriza.gr\/article\/id\/59907\/SYRIZA---THE-THESSALONIKI-PROGRAMME.html#.VQSgEChOTdl\">http:\/\/www.syriza.gr\/article\/id\/59907\/SYRIZA&#8212;THE-THESSALONIKI-PROGRAMME.html#.VQSgEChOTdl<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In broadest terms the Programme calls for cessation of \u201cthe Nazi Occupation forced loan from the Bank of Greece\u201d \u2013 and lifting of the Greek Public Debt: A slogan &#8220;No sacrifice of the Euro\u201d was often heard:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cWrite-off the greater part of public debt\u2019s nominal value so that it becomes sustainable in the context of a \u00ab<strong>European Debt Conference<\/strong>\u00bb. It happened for Germany in 1953. It can also happen for the South of Europe and Greece.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Include a \u00abgrowth clause\u00bb in the repayment of the remaining part so that it is growth-financed and not budget-financed.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Include a significant grace period (\u00abmoratorium\u00bb) in debt servicing to save funds for growth.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Exclude public investment from the restrictions of the Stability and Growth Pact.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">A \u00ab<strong>European New Deal<\/strong>\u00bb of public investment financed by the European Investment Bank.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Quantitative easing by the European Central Bank with direct purchases of sovereign bonds.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Finally, we declare once again that the issue of the Nazi Occupation forced loan from the Bank of Greece is open for us. Our partners know it. It will become the country\u2019s official position from our first days in power.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">On the basis of this plan, we will fight and secure a socially viable solution to Greece\u2019s debt problem so that our country is able to pay off the remaining debt from the creation of new wealth and not from primary surpluses, which deprive society of income.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">With that plan, we will lead with security the country to recovery and productive reconstruction by:<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Immediately increasing public investment by at least \u20ac4 billion.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Gradually reversing all the Memorandum injustices.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Gradually restoring salaries and pensions so as to increase consumption and demand.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Providing small and medium-sized enterprises with incentives for employment, and subsidizing the energy cost of industry in exchange for an employment and environmental clause.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Investing in knowledge, research, and new technology in order to have young scientists, who have been massively emigrating over the last years, back home.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Rebuilding the welfare state, restoring the rule of law and creating a meritocratic state.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000;line-height:1.7\">We are ready to negotiate and we are working towards building the broadest possible alliances in Europe.\u201d<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In this document it further says that \u201cwithin our first days in power,\u201d after \u201cnegotiations end\u201d with the Troika (And on its Memorandum)\u2013 they will begin enacting the following \u201cNational Reconstruction Plan\u201d What does this embody? There are Four Pillars to this, which we recap briefly.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201c<strong>The 1st Pillar is \u201cConfronting the humanitarian crisis at an estimated Total estimated cost of \u20ac1,882 billion<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cOur program\u2026. amounts to a comprehensive grid of emergency interventions, so as to raise a shield of protection for the most vulnerable social strata. <strong>Free electricity (Total cost: \u20ac59,4 million).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Programme of meal subsidies<\/strong> to 300.000 families without income. <strong>Total cost: \u20ac756 million.<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Programme of housing guarantee.<\/strong> The target is the provision of initially 30.000 apartments (30, 50, and 70 m\u00b2), by subsidizing rent at \u20ac3 per m\u00b2. <strong>Total cost: \u20ac54 million.<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Restitution of the Christmas bonus<\/strong>, as 13th pension, to 1.262.920 pensioners with a pension up to \u20ac700. <strong>Total cost: \u20ac543,06 million.<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Free medical and pharmaceutical care for the uninsured unemployed. <strong>Total cost: \u20ac350 million.<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Special public transport card<\/strong> for the long-term unemployed and those who are under the poverty line. <strong>Total cost: \u20ac120 million.<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Repeal of the leveling of the special consumption tax on heating and automotive diesel.<\/strong> Bringing the starting price of heating fuel for households back to \u20ac0,90 per lt, instead of the current \u20ac1,20 per lt.\u00a0<span style=\"line-height:1.7\"><strong>Benefit is expected<\/strong>.\u201d<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>The 2nd Pillar is \u201cRestarting the economy and promoting tax justice\u201d Total estimated cost: \u20ac6,5 billion; Total estimated benefit: \u20ac3,0 billion<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThis second pillar is centered on measures to restart the economy. Priority is given to alleviating tax suppression on the real economy, relieving citizens of financial burdens, injecting liquidity and enhancing demand.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Excessive taxation on the middle class as well as on those who do not tax-evade has entrapped a great part of citizens in a situation which directly threatens their employment status, their private property, no matter how small, and even their physical existence, as proved by the unprecedented number in suicides.<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Settlement of financial obligations to the state and social security\u00a0<\/strong><strong>funds in 84 installments. Estimated benefit: \u20ac3 billion<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The revenue which we expect to collect on an annual basis (between 5% and 15% of the total owed) will be facilitated by the following measures:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">The immediate cease of prosecution as well as of confiscation of bank accounts, primary residence, salaries, etc, and the issuance of tax clearance certificate to all those included in the settlement process.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">A twelve-month suspension of prosecution and enforcement measures against debtors with an established zero income, included in the settlement process.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Repeal of the anti-constitutional treatment of outstanding financial obligations to the state as offence in the act (in flagrante delicto).<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Abolition of the mandatory 50% down payment of the outstanding debt as a prerequisite to seek a court hearing. The down payment will be decided by a judge. It will be around 10%-20%, according to the financial circumstances of the debtor.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Immediate abolition of the current unified property tax (ENFIA). Introduction of a tax on large property. Immediate downward adjustment of property zone rates per m\u00b2. Estimated cost: \u20ac2 billion.<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">That tax will be progressive with a high tax-free threshold. With the exception of luxurious homes, it will not apply on primary residence. In addition, it will not concern small and medium property.<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Restitution of the \u20ac12000 annual income tax threshold. Increase in the number of tax brackets to ensure progressive taxation. Estimated cost: \u20ac1.5 billion.<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Personal debt relief by restructuring non-performing loans (\u00abred loans\u00bb) by individuals and enterprises.<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This new relief legislation will include: the case-by-case partial write-off of debt incurred by people who now are under the poverty line, as well as the general principle of readjusting outstanding debt so that its total servicing to banks, the state, and the social security funds does not exceed \u2153 of a debtor\u2019s income.<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Establishment of a public development bank as well as of special-purpose banks: <strong>Starting capital<\/strong> at <strong>\u20ac1 billion<\/strong>.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color:#000000\">Restoration of the minimum wage to \u20ac751. <strong>Zero cost<\/strong>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>The 3rd Pillar is \u201cRegaining employment\u201d Estimated cost: \u20ac3 billion<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">A net increase in jobs by 300,000 in all sectors of the economy \u2013 private, public, social \u2013 is expected to be the effect of our two-year plan to regain employment. \u2026Restitution of the institutional framework to protect employment rights that was demolished by the Memoranda governments\u2026. Restitution of the so-called \u00abafter-effect\u00bb of collective agreements; of the collective agreements themselves as well as of arbitration\u2026.. Abolition of all regulations allowing for massive and unjustifiable layoffs as well as for renting employees.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Zero cost:<\/strong> Employment programme for 300000 new jobs. <strong>Estimated first-year cost: \u20ac3 billion<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>The 4th Pillar is: \u201cTransforming the political system to deepen democracy\u201d<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Total estimated cost: \u20ac0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">From the first year of SYRIZA government, we set in motion the process for the institutional and democratic reconstruction of the state. We empower the institutions of representative democracy and we introduce new institutions of direct democracy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Regional organization of the state. Enhancement of transparency, of the economic autonomy and the effective operation of municipalities and regions. We empower the institutions of direct democracy and introduce new ones.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Empowerment of citizens\u2019 democratic participation. Introduction of new institutions, such as people\u2019s legislative initiative, people\u2019s veto and people\u2019s initiative to call a referendum.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Empowerment of the Parliament, curtailment of parliamentary immunity, and repeal of the peculiar legal regime of MPs\u2019 non-prosecution.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Regulation of the radio\/television landscape by observing all legal preconditions and adhering to strict financial, tax, and social-security criteria. Re-establishment of ERT (Public Radio and Television) on a zero basis.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Thessalalonkia Programme; Ibid)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">This is viewed by significant leaders of the Syriza as a \u201c<strong>transitional programme,<\/strong>\u201d as explained in an interview with <strong>Efklidis Tsakalotos<\/strong>, a member of Parliament with SYRIZA and responsible for the economic policy of Syriza. (An Interview With Syriza&#8217;s Efklidis Tsakalotos Syriza\u2019s Moment; by E. AHMET TONAK\u201d JANUARY 23-25, 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.counterpunch.org\/2015\/01\/23\/syrizas-moment\/\">http:\/\/www.counterpunch.org\/2015\/01\/23\/syrizas-moment\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">) :<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSyriza\u2019s programme is a transitional one. It wants to start the process of not only reversing the policies of austerity but also dismantling some of the central pillars of the neo-liberal order. As with all transitional programmes the goal is to open up fissures for more radical polices. Whether we in Europe can achieve this depends on the extent that social movements are inspired to make use of the opportunities that arise to broaden the agenda in favour of a more participatory, institutionally-diverse, and socially just economy. Left-wing governments can do only so much. Social transformations, especially in the modern era, need the active engagement of millions. Parties and governments of the Left must see their role as catalysts of these wider developments. What is certain is that we are living in interesting times!\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Interview with Tsakalotos Ibid).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In truth, the programme that was put forward by Syriza entirely stays within the confines of the EU. Instead of breaking that mould, it attempts to lay a negotiating position to lessen the burdens that are being demanded of the Greek peoples. It is correct that Syriza has never claimed to be a Leninist type party. Nonetheless, this perspective put above, is the antithesis of Leninism. As explained by <strong>Lenin<\/strong> in \u2018State and Revolution\u201d \u201ctrasnational forms\u201d are needed. Both Marx and Lenin certainly agreed that a \u201cspecial stage\u201d \u2013 or a stage of transition from capitalism to communism was needed:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe first fact that has been established most accurately by the whole theory of development, by science as a whole&#8211;a fact that was ignored by the utopians, and is ignored by the present-day opportunists, who are afraid of the socialist revolution&#8211;is that, historically, there must undoubtedly be a special stage, or a special phase, of transition from capitalism to communism.\u201d<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/lenin\/works\/1917\/staterev\/ch05.htm\">https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/lenin\/works\/1917\/staterev\/ch05.htm<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">However, crucially, this transition needed to be a revolutionary transition:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Previously the question was put as follows: to achieve its emancipation, the proletariat must overthrow the bourgeoisie, win political power and establish its revolutionary dictatorship.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Now the question is put somewhat differently: the transition from capitalist society&#8211;which is developing towards communism&#8211;to communist society is impossible without a &#8220;political transition period&#8221;, and the state in this period can only be the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. What, then, is the relation of this dictatorship to democracy? We have seen that the<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/marx\/works\/1848\/communist-manifesto\/index.htm\">Communist Manifesto<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">simply places side by side the two concepts: &#8220;to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class&#8221; and &#8220;to win the battle of democracy&#8221;. On the basis of all that has been said above, it is possible to determine more precisely how democracy changes in the transition from capitalism to communism. In capitalist society, providing it develops under the most favourable conditions, we have a more or less complete democracy in the democratic republic. But this democracy is always hemmed in by the narrow limits set by capitalist exploitation, and consequently always remains, in effect, a democracy for the minority, only for the propertied classes, only for the rich. Freedom in capitalist society always remains about the same as it was in the ancient Greek republics: freedom for the slave-owners. Owing to the conditions of capitalist exploitation, the modern wage slaves are so crushed by want and poverty that &#8220;they cannot be bothered with democracy,&#8221; &#8220;cannot be bothered with politics&#8221;; in the ordinary, peaceful course of events, the majority of the population is debarred from participation in public and political life.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Lenin State &amp; Revolution: Experience of the Paris Commune of 1871. Marx\u2019s Analysis (<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/lenin\/works\/1917\/staterev\/ch03.htm\">https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/lenin\/works\/1917\/staterev\/ch03.htm<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Lenin points out that there is a \u201chemming in by narrow limits\u201d of democracy. How much \u201cnarrower\u201d is it when not only the single state \u201chems it in\u201d \u2013 but the imperialists of the EU also \u201chem it in?&#8221; The next period, following the January elections of 2015, would answer this question.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>10. Elections of 2015 and Negotiations with the Troika<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The short-lived governments could not maintain credibility, as they were always accomodating to the new Troika demands. The mass movement shifted to the left, as shown by the huge demonstrations in the central Square. The elections of January 25 2015, sealed the rise to power of Syriza:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cAfter the Hellenic Parliament failed to elect a new President of State by 29 December 2014, the parliament was dissolved and a snap 2015 legislative election was scheduled for 25 January 2015. Syriza had a lead in opinion polls, but its anti-austerity position worried investors and eurozone supporters. The party&#8217;s chief economic advisor, John Milios, has downplayed fears that Greece under a Syriza government would exit the eurozone, while shadow development minister George Stathakis disclosed the party\u2019s intention to crack down on Greek oligarchs if it wins the election. In the election, Syriza defeated the incumbent New Democracy and went on to become the largest party in the Hellenic Parliament, receiving 36.3% of the vote and 149 out of 300 seats.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Syriza\">http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Syriza<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cJanuary 25th marks a historic turning point in recent Greek history. After five years of devastating austerity, a social crisis without precedent in Europe, and a series of struggles that at some points, especially in 2010-2012, took an almost insurrectionary form, there has been a major political break. The parties that were responsible for putting Greek society under the disciplinary supervision of the so-called Troika (EU-ECB-IMF) suffered a humiliating defeat. PASOK, which in 2009 won almost 44% of the vote, now received only 4.68%; and the splinter party of Giorgos Papandreou, the PASOK Prime Minister who initiated the austerity programs, got 2.46%. New Democracy came in at 27.81%, almost 9% below SYRIZA. The electoral rise of the fascists of Golden Dawn has been halted, although they still maintain a worrying 6% of the vote. Another pro-austerity party, the <strong>RIVER<\/strong>, representing the neoliberal agenda (although nominally coming from the center-left) took only 6.05%, despite intensive media hype.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Panagiotis Sotiris;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/viewpointmag.com\/2015\/01\/28\/a-strategy-of-ruptures-ten-theses-on-the-greek-future\/\">https:\/\/viewpointmag.com\/2015\/01\/28\/a-strategy-of-ruptures-ten-theses-on-the-greek-future\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Rapidly, by 26 January 2015, Tsipras and<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Independent_Greeks\">Independent Greeks<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\"> (ANEL) leader<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><strong><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Panos_Kammenos\">Panos Kammenos<\/a><\/strong><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">agreed on a coalition government between Syriza and ANEL. Tsipras would be the<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Prime_Minister_of_Greece\">Prime Minister of Greece<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">, with the academic economist<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><strong><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Yanis_Varoufakis\">Yanis Varoufakis<\/a><\/strong><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">as his <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Ministry_of_Finance_(Greece)\">Minister of Finance<\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Yet, in a graphic display of its intended response to the rebuke that the Troika and especially the German imperialists had received, the official line was har<\/span>d:<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGerman government official<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hans-Peter_Friedrich\">Hans-Peter Friedrich<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">however said: &#8220;The Greeks have the right to vote for whom they want. We have the right to no longer finance Greek debt.&#8221;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Syriza\">http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Syriza<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p>The<strong> Greek pro-Hoxha Marxist-Leninist view<\/strong> is that the Greek people took a stand against both the Troika and the Greek capitalists:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cBy voting for SYRIZA, the majority of the Greek people rejected and condemned the cruel economic measures that were imposed, the neoliberal economic policy, in general, and the great-bourgeois parties of ND and PASOK that implemented these measures with the outmost servility. The victory of SYRIZA is also explained by the people\u2019s resentment towards the fascist re-modeling of social life promoted by the government of the fascist scoundrel Samaras\u201d. (January 24, 2015; \u201cBOYCOTT the elections\u2013The elections do not solve the problem of imperialist DEPENDANCE (economic-political-military, NATO bases etc.), nor repel-cancel ongoing EU politics against the people<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/01\/boycott-electionsthe-elections-do-not_24.html\">http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/01\/boycott-electionsthe-elections-do-not_24.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">However Anasintaxi also had called for abstention from the elections of 2015, arguing that:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIn contrary ALL the bourgeois parties are in favor of Greece\u2019s STAY in imperialist European Union, and in EURO-EMU and propagate consciously, serve the interests of the EU imperialists with misleading MYTH-fantasies about &#8220;equal participation&#8221; (!) of the country in the &#8220;pit of lions&#8221; of the powerful European monopolies. At the same time they propagate that Greece leaving the Euro-EMU-EU will be a &#8220;major disaster&#8221; (!).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">ALL the reformist social democratic parties (&#8220;K&#8221; KE-SYRIZA, etc.) and the extra-parliamentary organizations follow the same strategic choice of the EU monopolies and the local capital.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">It is not only SYRIZA which supports the country STAY (in) EURO-EMU-EU, but also the &#8220;K&#8221; KE: \u201cA solution outside the euro and return to the drachma in the present circumstances would be catastrophic\u201d (A. Papariga, \u201cRizospastis\u201d 31\/5\/2011, p.6) Moreover: the leaders of the &#8220;K&#8221; KE definitively renounced the anti-imperialist struggle for the overthrow of dependence\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(January 24, 2015; \u201cBOYCOTT the elections\u2013The elections do not solve the problem of imperialist DEPENDANCE (economic-political-military, NATO bases etc.), nor repel-cancel ongoing EU politics against the people<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/01\/boycott-electionsthe-elections-do-not_24.html\">http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/01\/boycott-electionsthe-elections-do-not_24.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">After the election, Anasintaxi warned that Syriza had entered into coalition with right-wing ANEL. However early on, the government had taken some progressive steps:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cDuring the first three weeks following the elections, the SYRIZA government has taken a series of actions in order to implement its program that has won the support of wide popular strata, an attitude that is unfortunately accompanied by certain illusions. At the same time, the government\u2019s actions have met a very negative reception from Commission \u2013 ECB \u2013 IMF whose pressure and constant interference in the country\u2019s internal affairs is condemned by the Greek people. We think that, up to a certain extent, SYRIZA\u2019s victory creates favorable conditions for the strengthening of class struggles. Whether this possibility becomes a reality depends, of course on many factors the most important of which is the organization of the majority of the working masses in independent and united trade unions and the influence exerted on these and, the society in general, by the consistent left-wing, anti-imperialist and revolutionary communists.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(\u0391\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c0\u03cc Anasintaxi Organization \u2018Some questions and answers about the current situation in Greece\u2019; Article to be published in \u201cUnity &amp; Struggle\u201d (Extended version of an interview given to the comrades of Iran); march 30; 2015. At<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/02\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html\">http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/02\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">At this early point, both Tsipras and Varoufakis were apparently determined to negotiate hard, with the threat to leave the EU if the Troika did not back down:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece\u2019s finance minister Yanis Varoufakis has spelled out the negotiating strategy of the Syriza government with crystal clarity.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cExit from the euro does not even enter into our plans, quite simply because the euro is fragile. It is like a house of cards. If you pull away the Greek card, they all come down,\u201d he said.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cDo we really want Europe to break apart? Anybody who is tempted to think it possible to amputate Greece strategically from Europe should be careful. It is very dangerous. Who would be hit after us? Portugal? What would happen to Italy when it discovers that it is impossible to stay within the austerity straight-jacket?\u201d<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThere are Italian officials \u2013 I won\u2019t say from which institution &#8211; who have approached me to say they support us, but they can\u2019t say the truth because Italy is at risk of bankruptcy and they fear the consequence from Germany. A cloud of fear has been hanging over Europe over recent years. We are becoming worse than the Soviet Union,\u201d he told the Italian TV station RAI.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">This earned a stiff rebuke from the Italian finance minister, <strong>Pier Carlo Padoan<\/strong>. \u201cThese comments are out of place. Italy\u2019s debt is solid and sustainable,\u201d he said.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Yet the point remains. Deflationary conditions are causing interest costs to rise faster than nominal GDP in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, automatically pushing public debt ratios ever higher.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Berkeley economist <strong>Barry Eichengreen<\/strong> warns that Grexit would be \u201cLehman squared\u201d, setting off a calamitous chain reaction with worldwide consequences. Syriza&#8217;s gamble is that the EU authorities know this, whatever officials may claim in public.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Premier Alexis Tsipras is pushing this to the wire. Rightly or wrongly, he calculates that Greece holds the trump card \u2013 the detonation of mutual assured destruction, to borrow from Cold War parlance \u2013 and that all the threats from EMU power centres are mere bluster.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">His cool nerve has caught Brussels, Frankfurt, Berlin, and the markets off guard. They assumed that this 40-year neophyte would back away from exorbitant demands in his landmark policy speech to the Greek parliament on Sunday night. Instead they heard a declaration of war.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">He vowed to implement every measure in Syriza\u2019s pre-electoral Thessaloniki Programme \u201cin their entirety\u201d with no ifs and buts. This even includes a legal demand for \u20ac11bn of war reparations from Germany, a full 71 years after the last Wehrmacht soldier left Greek soil.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">There is no possible extension of Greece\u2019s bail-out programme with the EU-IMF Troika, for that would be an \u201cextension of mistakes and disaster\u201d, a perpetuation of the debt-deflation trap. \u201cThe People have abolished the Memorandum. We will not negotiate our sovereignty,&#8221; he said.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Macropolis said every item was in there: a pension rise for the poorest; no further rises in the retirement age; an increase in the minimum wage to \u20ac751 a month by 2016; a return to collective bargaining; an end to privatisation of utilities; cancellation of a new property tax (ENFIA); a rise in tax-free thresholds from \u20ac5,000 to \u20ac12,000; and a rehiring of 10,000 public workers fired \u201cillegally.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/finance\/comment\/ambroseevans_pritchard\/\">Ambrose Evans-Pritchard<\/a><\/span>. \u201cGreece&#8217;s leaders stun Europe with escalating defiance\u201d. \u2018The Telegraph\u2019; 09 Feb 2015; <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/finance\/economics\/11400778\/Greeces-leaders-stun-Europe-with-escalating-defiance.html\">http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/finance\/economics\/11400778\/Greeces-leaders-stun-Europe-with-escalating-defiance.html<\/a><\/span>)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">However in a foretaste of the future intransigence of the German imperialists, led by<strong> Wolfang Schauble<\/strong> the German Finance Minister &#8211; Greece\u2019s first counter-offer was rejected out of hand:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSchauble continues to insist that Greece sticks to the bailout conditions agreed with previous governments under which financial support will be given only in exchange for substantial structural reforms.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The finance ministry\u2019s position risks deepening splits within Europe over how to deal with Greece as an end of February deadline nears at which the previous bailout agreement with its creditors and the European Central Bank runs out, leaving Greece facing bankruptcy.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">In contrast to Berlin, the EU commission president <strong>Jean-Claude Juncker<\/strong> welcomed the Greek application, saying in his opinion it could pave the way for a \u201csensible compromise in the interest of financial stability in the Eurozone as a whole\u201d.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">But experts said Greece was merely playing for time, and that its application had indeed contained no new commitments. \u201cThe Greeks have simply tried to pass the buck back to the middle,\u201d Matthias Kullas from the Centre for European Politics in Freiburg told The Guardian.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">He stressed the German reaction was not a rejection over reaching a compromise with Greece, but did mean that expectations of an agreement on Friday when finance ministers from the eurogroup meet again, were now \u201cslim\u201d.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cIf an agreement is reached, it will be at the last minute,\u201d he said. \u201cIt\u2019s in the interest of both sides to stick to their guns. The earlier one of them diverts from his course, the weaker his position becomes and the more elbow room he leaves for the other.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Kate Connolly. \u201cGermany rejects Greek bailout plan &#8211; as it happened\u201d. The Guardian 19 February 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/blog\/live\/2015\/feb\/19\/greece-to-seek-bailout-extension-after-33bn-lifeline\">http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/blog\/live\/2015\/feb\/19\/greece-to-seek-bailout-extension-after-33bn-lifeline<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">A furious cycle of media reports and counter reports paralleled a back and forth between the European Union and the Greek negotiating team of Tsipras and Varoufakis. In essence no counter-offer by the Greek team was deemed acceptable. It is true that the initial efforts of the Greek team to counter the demands were insubstantial. However even when substantial retreats had been offered, they were humiliatingly rejected. While the European team was overall untied, strains emerged. It was apparent that the Germans were the most stout in the rejections. However both the French and the Italians were wavering. Nonetheless even the IMF initially firmly supported the German position:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cLast week Greece received a four-month extension of its $277 billion bailout program. The parliaments of Finland, Estonia and, most importantly, Germany, as well as Greece\u2019s other EU partners,<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.euronews.com\/2015\/02\/27\/germany-votes-to-approve-greek-bailout-extension\">approved the bailout program<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">that was agreed to Feb. 20, provided that Greece<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.worldpoliticsreview.com\/trend-lines\/15143\/greece-bailout-talks-are-syriza-s-first-real-test-in-power\">submit a list of planned reforms<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">. Greece submitted six pages of reforms last Monday, but not all of Greece\u2019s creditors think they are sufficient.\u2028\u2028Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/np\/sec\/pr\/2015\/pr1571.htm\">wrote a letter<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">to Dutch Finance Minster <strong>Jeroen Dijsselbloem<\/strong>, who is also president of the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers, expressing her concern that Greece\u2019s proposed reforms were not specific enough, nor did they contain sufficient assurances on their design and implementation. The letter is the most recent, and public, indication of the IMF\u2019s hesitancy toward Greece and its bailout program.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.worldpoliticsreview.com\/authors\/626\/maria-savel\">Maria Savel<\/a><\/span>.<span style=\"color:#000000\"> \u201cIMF Stands Firm, Forcing Greece and Syriza to Accept Hard Concessions\u201d Politics Review, March 3, 2015,<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.worldpoliticsreview.com\/trend-lines\/15210\/imf-stands-firm-forcing-greece-and-syriza-to-accept-hard-concessions\">http:\/\/www.worldpoliticsreview.com\/trend-lines\/15210\/imf-stands-firm-forcing-greece-and-syriza-to-accept-hard-concessions<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By March, Tsipras was still assuming the EU would not want to have a member leave:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cSPIEGEL: Many experts now fear a &#8220;Graccident&#8221; &#8212; Greece&#8217;s accidental exit from the euro. If the ECB doesn&#8217;t agree to your T-Bills, that&#8217;s exactly what might happen.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Tspiras: I cannot imagine that. People won&#8217;t risk Europe&#8217;s disintegration over a T-Bill of almost \u20ac1.6 billion. There is a saying for this in Greece: A wet man does not fear the rain.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Der Spiegel Interview Conducted By <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/impressum\/autor-1078.html\">Manfred Ertel<\/a><\/span>, <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/impressum\/autor-12776.html\">Katrin Kuntz<\/a><\/span> and Mathieu von Rohr: Greek Prime Minister Tsipras: &#8216;We Don&#8217;t Want to Go on Borrowing Forever&#8217;; March 7 2015; at<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"> <a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/international\/europe\/spiegel-interview-with-greek-prime-minister-tsipras-a-1022156.html\">http:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/international\/europe\/spiegel-interview-with-greek-prime-minister-tsipras-a-1022156.html<\/a><\/span>)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As time went on, the Greek banks were forced to put restrictions on withdrawals. The EU allowed some further liquidity in Greece by allowing Greece to print more T-Bills, but purely for internal use. This was violated by Greece. More and more comments were heard that Greece might have to exit the EU \u2013 a so called <strong>Grexit<\/strong> or <strong>Greccident<\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe current money-go-round is unsustainable. Euro-region taxpayers fund their governments, which in turn bankroll the European Central Bank. Cash from the <strong>ECB&#8217;s Emergency Liquidity Scheme<\/strong> flows to the Greek banks; they buy treasury bills from their government, which uses the proceeds to \u2026 repay its International Monetary Fund debts! \u2026<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">There&#8217;s blame on both sides for the current impasse. Euro-area leaders should be giving Greece breathing space to get its economic act together. But the Greek leadership has been<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/videos\/2015-03-16\/german-greek-conflict-becoming-more-personal-fratzscher\">cavalier in its treatment of its creditors<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">. It&#8217;s been\u00a0amateurish in expecting that a vague promise to collect more taxes would win over Germany and its allies. And it&#8217;s been unrealistic in expecting the ECB to plug a funding gap in the absence of a political agreement for getting back to solvency. \u2026\u2026Greece&#8217;s<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2015-03-16\/european-curve-trend-is-intact-with-absurd-yields-no-deterrent\">three-year bond yield<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">is back above 20 percent, double what it was just before Alexis Tsipras was elected prime minister on an anti-austerity platform in January. At that level, there&#8217;s no way Greece can end its reliance on its bailout partners anytime soon.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble was scathing yesterday about Greece&#8217;s efforts to balance its election promises with its bailout obligations, and about its standing with international investors:<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;None of my colleagues, or anyone in the international institutions, can tell me how this is supposed to work. Greece was able to sell those treasury bills only in Greece, with no foreign investor ready to invest. That means that all of the confidence was destroyed again.&#8221;<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Every day&#8217;s delay in cutting a deal pushes Greece a little closer to leaving the common currency. That would be a shame, since it&#8217;s an outcome no one &#8212; apart from Schaeuble &#8212; seems to desire. The mutability of euro membership could also unleash contagion and a domino effect. But it looks increasingly inevitable.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mark Gilbert; \u201cGreece&#8217;s Euro Exit Seems\u00a0Inevitable\u201d: 17 March 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bloombergview.com\/articles\/2015-03-17\/greece-s-euro-exit-seems-inevitable\">http:\/\/www.bloombergview.com\/articles\/2015-03-17\/greece-s-euro-exit-seems-inevitable<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By April 2015, reports circulated that secret plans were being drawn up to revive the <strong>Drachma<\/strong> and go into default (Evans-Pritchard A, 2 April 2015; Telegraph at<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/finance\/economics\/11513341\/Greece-draws-up-drachma-plans-prepares-to-miss-IMF-payment.html\">http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/finance\/economics\/11513341\/Greece-draws-up-drachma-plans-prepares-to-miss-IMF-payment.html<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">On May 4th the BBC reported that Greek banks were not allowing pensioners to withdraw more than a small amount, and that public sector workers were nto being paid regularly (<\/span><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-32580919\">http:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-32580919<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">). However on May 6th however Greece paid back $200 million to the IMF and avoided insolvency. At that time the European Central Bank (ECB) granted further liquidity to Greece. (Phillip Inman and Helena Smith; 6 May, The Guardian; at<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2015\/may\/06\/greek-debt-default-avoided-after-200m-payment-to-imf\">http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2015\/may\/06\/greek-debt-default-avoided-after-200m-payment-to-imf<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">By June the situation was still not resolved, and Greece\u2019s peoples were in an even more precarious position. By this time, Syriza had retreated substantially more. Michael Roberts summarises to June:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe IMF representative in the negotiations, <strong>Poul Thomsen<\/strong>, has \u201cpushed the austerity agenda with a curious passion that shocks even officials in the European Commission, pussy cats by comparison\u201d (here are the latest demands of the Troika<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com\/2015\/06\/greece-policy-commitments-demanded-by-eu-etc-jun-2015.pdf\">Greece \u2013 Policy Commitments Demanded By EU etc Jun 2015<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">). The IMF is demanding further sweeping measures of austerity at a time when the Greek government debt burden stands at 180% of GDP, when the Greeks have already applied the biggest swing in budget deficit to surplus by any government since the 1930s and when further austerity would only drive the Greek capitalist economy even deeper into its depression. As the Daily Telegraph summed it up: \u201csix years of depression, a deflationary spiral, a 26pc fall GDP, 60pc youth unemployment, mass exodus of the young and the brightest, chronic hysteresis that will blight Greece\u2019s prospects for a decade to come.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Syriza government has already made many and significant retreats from its election promises and wishes.\u00a0 Many \u2018red lines\u2019 have been crossed already. It has dropped the demand for the cancellation of all or part of the government debt; it has agreed to carry through most of the privatisations imposed under the agreement reached with the previous conservative New Democracy government; it has agreed to increased taxation in various areas; it is willing to introduce \u2018labour reforms\u2019 and it has postponed the implementation of a higher minimum wage and the re-employment of thousands of sacked staff.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">But the IMF and Eurogroup wanted even more. The Troika has agreed that the original targets for a budget surplus (before interest payments on debt) could be reduced from 3-4% of GDP a year up to 2020 to 1% this year, rising to 2% next etc. But this is no real concession because government tax revenues have collapsed during the negotiation period. At the end of 2014, the New Democracy government said that it would end the bailout package and take no more money because it could repay its debt obligations from then on as the government was running a primary surplus sufficient to do so. But that surplus has now disappeared as rich Greeks continue to hide their money and avoid tax payments and small businesses and employees hold back on paying in the uncertainty of what is going to happen. The general government primary cash surplus has narrowed by more than 59 percent to 651 million euros in the 4-month period of 2015 from 1.6 billion in the corresponding period last year<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The Syriza government has only been able to pay its government employees their wages and meet state pension outgoings by stopping all payments of bills to suppliers in the health service, schools and other public services. The result is that the government has managed to scrape together just enough funds to meet IMF and ECB repayments in the last few months, while hospitals have no medicines and equipment and schools have no books and materials; and doctors and teachers leave the country.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Even <strong>Ashoka Mody<\/strong>, former chief of the IMF\u2019s bail-out in Ireland, has criticised the attitude of his successor in the Greek negotiations: \u201cEverything that we have learned over the last five years is that it is stunningly bad economics to enforce austerity on a country when it is in a deflationary cycle. Trauma patients have to heal their wounds before they can train for the 10K.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The final red lines have been reached. What the Syriza leaders finally balked at was the demand by the IMF and the Eurogroup that the government raise VAT on electricity by 10 percentage points, directly hitting the fuel payments of the poorest; and also that the poorest state pensioners should have their pensions cuts so that the social security system could balance its books. Further down the road, the Troika wants major cuts in the pensions system by raising the retirement ages and increasing contributions. The Syriza leaders were even prepared to agree to some VAT rises and pension \u2018reforms\u2019, but the two specific demands of the Troika appear to have been just too much.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Roberts, Michael Blog; June 15, 2015;: \u201cTen minutes past\u00a0midnight\u201d;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/thenextrecession.wordpress.com\/2015\/06\/06\/ten-minutes-past-midnight\/\">https:\/\/thenextrecession.wordpress.com\/2015\/06\/06\/ten-minutes-past-midnight\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Increasingly leading economists including Nobel Laureates <strong>Joseph Stiglitz<\/strong> and <strong>Paul Krugman<\/strong>, <strong>Amartya Sen<\/strong> and others &#8211; warned about a new \u201cVersailles moment\u201d, and insisted that German stubbornness was actually bad for Europe as a whole, and that a \u201chair-cut\u201d to the debt was necessary \u2013 i.e. a dramatic waiver-cut of the debt (Simon Wren-Lewis. \u201cWhy Amartya Sen Is Right About What Is Being Done To Greece\u201d; 12 June 2015; in \u2018Social Europe\u2019 at<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.socialeurope.eu\/2015\/06\/why-amartya-sen-is-right-about-what-is-being-done-to-greece\/\">http:\/\/www.socialeurope.eu\/2015\/06\/why-amartya-sen-is-right-about-what-is-being-done-to-greece\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">). <strong>President Obama<\/strong> of the USA had already agreed that<\/span>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201c&#8221;You cannot keep on squeezing countries that are in the midst of depression.&#8221;<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;At some point, there has to be a growth strategy in order for them to pay off their debts to eliminate some of their deficits,&#8221; (Aurelia End; Obama joins ally list on Greek austerity relief<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/news.yahoo.com\/obama-joins-ally-list-greek-austerity-relief-033040983.html\">http:\/\/news.yahoo.com\/obama-joins-ally-list-greek-austerity-relief-033040983.html<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As the Left inside Syriza resisted Tsipras\u2019s slippery slope of acceptance of new demands, they increasingly pointed to the example of Iceland who had defaulted on international debts in a similar situation. They got substantial agreement from even the ANSEL coalition party members also. (Ambrose Pritchard-Evans. \u201cSyriza Left demands &#8216;Icelandic&#8217; default as Greek defiance stiffens\u201d.14 June \u2018Daily Telegraph\u2019; <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/finance\/11673989\/Syriza-Left-demands-Icelandic-default-as-Greek-defiance-stiffens.html\">http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/finance\/11673989\/Syriza-Left-demands-Icelandic-default-as-Greek-defiance-stiffens.html<\/a><\/span> ).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In a twist to the pre-July series of negotiations, as even more demands were made of the package being offered by Tsipras and Varoufakis, Tsipras called a snap referendum, saying he needed to have a further mandate form the Greek people, in order to agree to the latest demands and obtain the new tranche of bail-out funds. Bizarrely however, he then wrote to the Imperialists saying he would accept \u2013 only to find that the imperialists had withdrawn their offer. Tsipras had to go on to the snap Referendum:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cTsipras infuriated eurozone finance ministers by calling a snap referendum on proposals to agree a deal to release the \u20ac7.2bn in bailout funds it needed to meet an IMF repayment. His argument was that the concessions still being demanded by creditors, including VAT rises and rapid reform of the unaffordable pension system, and the lack of any serious prospect of debt relief, meant he could not sign up without a fresh public mandate \u2013 and, indeed, he and Varoufakis immediately urged their countrymen to vote \u201cNo\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Yet it emerged that while publicly lambasting the troika, the very same Tsipras had dispatched a two-page letter to Brussels that caved into many of the demands he had angrily rejected a few days earlier \u2013 and continued to insist on putting to the public vote. It was too late: his exasperated creditors, and Germany in particular, in the person of Berlin\u2019s implacable finance minister, Wolfgang Sch\u00e4uble, decided enough was enough and the offer was no longer on the table. Amid the storm of political recriminations, the European Central Bank capped financial support to the Greek banking sector, forcing the government to impose capital controls, to stem the relentless slow-motion bank run that has been leaching the life out of the country\u2019s financial system for months. And last Tuesday, as it warned it would, Athens defaulted on its payment to the IMF. To all intents and purposes, the country is bust.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">So Greek voters now face trudging to the polls today, either to vote Yes to a set of proposals that are no longer on the table \u2013 presumably ushering in a new, more emollient government that would get straight back to the negotiating table \u2013 or to send a defiant no to further austerity. Tsipras and Varoufakis insist that \u201cNo\u201d would not mean plunging out of the eurozone, let alone the EU. Instead, they say they would re-enter talks as if brandishing a petition. Yet last time they were handed a stock of political capital by the Greek public, in January\u2019s general election, they quickly squandered it. Both Tsipras and Varoufakis have forged their political reputations by rejecting consensus and overturning the received wisdom. But international diplomacy means understanding that everyone at the table, whatever your grievances against them, has their own mandate and their own domestic audience to placate.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Instead of opening up ways for the troika to save face, Tsipras and Varoufakis have used every means available \u2013 from provocative tweets to spiky speeches in Syntagma Square \u2013 to heighten the divisions between Greece and its eurozone partners, accusing them of trying to blackmail and humiliate the Greek people into submission.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Observer Editorial. \u201cThe Observer view on Greece\u2019s referendum \u201c5 July 2015;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/commentisfree\/2015\/jul\/05\/greece-let-down-by-partners-and-leaders\">http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/commentisfree\/2015\/jul\/05\/greece-let-down-by-partners-and-leaders<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">In the midst of this circus, before the Referendum &#8211; the USA and the IMF (in the person of Christine Lagarde) exerted further pressure on the Germans to bend. Already calls had been made by many economists, that Germany had been granted a waiver on the demands at the end of the First Word war (the Versailles treaty). These had been firmly ignored by the German imperialists. Now the IMF threw a spanner into the erst-while United Front of the imperialists:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe International Monetary Fund has electrified the referendum debate in Greece after it conceded that the crisis-ridden country needs up to \u20ac60bn (\u00a342bn) of extra funds over the next three years and large-scale debt relief to create \u201ca breathing space\u201d and stabilise the economy.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">With days to go before Sunday\u2019s knife-edge referendum that the country\u2019s creditors have cast as a vote on whether it wants to keep the euro, the IMF revealed a deep split with Europe as it warned that Greece\u2019s debts were \u201cunsustainable\u201d.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Fund officials said they would not be prepared to put a proposal for a third Greek bailout to the Washington-based organisation\u2019s board unless it included both a commitment to economic reform and debt relief.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">According to the IMF, Greece should have a 20-year grace period before making any debt repayments and final payments should not take place until 2055. It would need \u20ac10bn to get through the next few months and a further \u20ac50bn after that.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras welcomed the IMF\u2019s intervention saying in a TV interview that what the IMF said was never put to him during negotiations.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Philipp Inman, Larry Elliot, Alberto Nardelli; IMF says Greece needs extra \u20ac60bn in funds and debt relief\u201d; The Guardian 2 July 2015; at<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/2015\/jul\/02\/imf-greece-needs-extra-50bn-euro\">http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/2015\/jul\/02\/imf-greece-needs-extra-50bn-euro<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The Referendum was held on 5th July 2015. The result was a defiant \u201cNO!\u201d to the European imperialists:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe final result in the referendum, published by the interior ministry, was 61.3% &#8220;No&#8221;, against 38.7% who voted &#8220;Yes.&#8221;<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece&#8217;s governing Syriza party had campaigned for a &#8220;No&#8221;, saying the bailout terms were humiliating.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Their opponents warned that this could see Greece ejected from the eurozone, and a summit of eurozone heads of state has now been called for Tuesday.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras said late on Sunday that Greeks had voted for a &#8220;Europe of solidarity and democracy&#8221;.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;As of tomorrow, Greece will go back to the negotiating table and our primary priority is to reinstate the financial stability of the country,&#8221; he said in a televised address.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">&#8220;This time, the debt will be on the negotiating table,&#8221; he added, saying that an International Monetary Fund assessment published this week &#8220;confirms Greek views that restructuring the debt is necessary.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Mark Lowen; \u201cGreece debt crisis: Greek voters reject bailout offer\u201d; 6th July; BBC<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-33403665\">http:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-33403665<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">).<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Strangely \u2013 Tsipras appeared not too happy. It became clear that he had been expecting a \u2018Yes\u2019 vote, which would enable him to cave in to the EU demands. He had relied on the often remarked on \u201cwish of the Greek peoples to see themselves as European\u201d and thus not to risk leaving the EU. But the Greek people had seen the callous manipulations of the EU leaders.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">On the same day the results were announced, Yanis Varoufakis resigned \u2013 saying that this would help the negotiations going forward, but that this resignation had been essentially, at the request of Tsipras.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Proponents of the logical outcome of the \u201cNo\u201d Vote \u2013 such as Yanis Varoufakis \u2013 were simply told to drop alternative plans. Varoufakis had been drawing up \u201cPlan B\u201d \u2013 whereby if the Troika did not retreat to any key extent \u2013 Greece would resurrect the pre-Euro currency of the Drachma.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Astonishingly, given this pledge by the Greek people to stand fast, in the final run of negotiations with the EU, Tsipras \u2013 then completely <strong>capitulated to Eurozone, primarily German imperialists.<\/strong> Unsurprisingly, in the renewed negotiations &#8211; the European leaders and most sections of banking capital \u2013 had simply turned their backs on the Greek populations views and demanded even harsher terms:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe Greek government capitulated on Thursday to demands from its creditors for severe austerity measures in return for a modest debt write-off, raising hopes that a rescue deal could be signed at an emergency meeting of EU leaders on Sunday\u2026.Athens has put forward a 13-page document detailing reforms and public spending cuts worth \u20ac13bn with the aim of securing a third bailout from creditors that would raise \u20ac53.5bn and allow it to stay inside the currency union.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">A cabinet meeting signed off the reform package after ministers agreed that the dire state of the economy and the debilitating closure of the country\u2019s banks meant it had no option but to agree to almost all the creditors terms.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/profile\/phillipinman\">Phillip Inman<\/a><\/span>, <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/profile\/graemewearden\">Graeme Wearden<\/a><\/span> and <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/profile\/helenasmith\">Helena Smith<\/a><\/span>: \u201d; 9 July 2015 Greece debt crisis: Athens accepts harsh austerity as bailout deal nears \u201cGreek cabinet backs a 13-page package of reforms and spending cuts worth \u20ac13bn to secure third bailout and modest debt writeoff <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/2015\/jul\/09\/greece-debt-crisis-athens-accepts-harsh-austerity-as-bailout-deal-nears\">http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/2015\/jul\/09\/greece-debt-crisis-athens-accepts-harsh-austerity-as-bailout-deal-nears<\/a><\/span>)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">As even the Guardian concluded: \u201cGenerally, Tsipras appears to have finally capitulated in the face of threats that Greece would be ejected from the eurozone:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cGreece and the rest of the eurozone have finally reached an agreement that could lead to a third bailout and keep the country in the eurozone.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/live\/2015\/jul\/12\/greek-debt-crisis-eu-leaders-meeting-cancelled-no-deal-live#block-55a382dde4b05111b7559d81\">Greek PM Alexis Tsipras conceded to a further swathe of austerity measures and economic reforms<\/a><\/span> after more than 16 hours of negotiations in Brussels. He has agreed to immediately pass laws to further reform the tax and pension system, liberalise the labour market, and open up closed professions. Sunday trading laws will be relaxed, and even milk producers and bakers will be deregulated.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The Financial Times has dubbed it:<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u2018The most intrusive economic supervision programme ever mounted in the EU\u2019.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece was forced to accept these measures after Germany piled intense pressure, as a price for a new deal. EU officials told us that Tsipras was subjected to <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/live\/2015\/jul\/12\/greek-debt-crisis-eu-leaders-meeting-cancelled-no-deal-live#block-55a2aca5e4b07fc6a121fc4b\">\u201cmental waterboarding\u201d in closed-door meetings with Angela Merkel, Donald Tusk and Francois Hollande.<\/a><\/span><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The plan must now be approved by the Athens parliament by Wednesday, and then voted through various national parliaments. If agreement is reached, talks can then begin towards a a new three-year bailout worth up to \u20ac86bn (\u00a361bn), accompanied by further monitoring by Greece\u2019s creditors.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The deal appears to end Greece\u2019s five-month battle with its creditors, which has gripped the eurozone, dominated the political agenda and alarmed the markets.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/live\/2015\/jul\/12\/greek-debt-crisis-eu-leaders-meeting-cancelled-no-deal-live#block-55a36d79e4b05111b7559d2c\">Emerging from the summit, Tsipras admitted it had been tough<\/a><\/span> &#8211; but insisted he had won concessions on debt relief (sometime in the future) as well as the medium-term funding plan.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">He also managed to persuade the eurozone that a new investment fund, that will manage and sell off \u20ac50bn Greek assets, would be based in Athens not Luxembourg.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">But generally, Tsipras appears to have finally capitulated in the face of threats that Greece would be ejected from the eurozone.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/profile\/graemewearden\">Graeme Wearden<\/a><\/span> and <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/profile\/helen-davidson\">Helen Davidson<\/a><\/span>. \u201cGreek debt crisis: deal reached after marathon all-night summit &#8211; as it happened\u201d. The Guardian 13 July 2015;<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/live\/2015\/jul\/12\/greek-debt-crisis-eu-leaders-meeting-cancelled-no-deal-live\">http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/live\/2015\/jul\/12\/greek-debt-crisis-eu-leaders-meeting-cancelled-no-deal-live<\/a><\/span>)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Yanis Varoufakis summed the story up to that point as a &#8220;coup&#8221;:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe recent Euro Summit is indeed nothing short of the culmination of a coup. In 1967 it was the tanks that foreign powers used to end Greek democracy. In my interview with Philip Adams, on ABC Radio National\u2019s LNL, I claimed that in 2015 another coup was staged by foreign powers using, instead of tanks, Greece\u2019s banks. Perhaps the main economic difference is that, whereas in 1967 Greece\u2019s public property was not targeted, in 2015 the powers behind the coup demanded the handing over of all remaining public assets, so that they would be put into the servicing of our un-payble, unsustainable debt.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Varoufakis, Y. \u201cOn the Euro Summit\u2019s Statement on Greece: First\u00a0thoughts\u201d; 14 July 2015. <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/yanisvaroufakis.eu\/2015\/07\/14\/on-the-euro-summits-statement-on-greece-first-thoughts\/\">http:\/\/yanisvaroufakis.eu\/2015\/07\/14\/on-the-euro-summits-statement-on-greece-first-thoughts\/<\/a><\/span>)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">While the Referendum gave a clear signal that the Greek people had rejected the spirit of compromise being forced by the Western Banks \u2013 the questions had been framed deliberately imprecisely. It did not ask the Greek people to consider the option of leaving the Eurozone as such. This allowed the Tsipras government to posture it did \u201cnot have a mandate\u201d to reject the harsh terms of the Troika and move Greece to leave the Eurozone.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Inevitably this will lead to a rupture of the Syriza United Front:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201c\u2026. Syriza, which is in coalition with the rightwing populist Independent party, is expected to meet huge opposition from within its own ranks and from trade unions and youth groups that viewed the referendum as a vote against any austerity.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Panagiotis Lafazanis<\/strong>, the energy minister and influential hard-leftist, who on Wednesday welcomed a deal for a new \u20ac2bn gas pipeline from Russia, has<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/live\/2015\/jul\/09\/greek-crisis-reform-plan-grexit-tsipras-draghi-live#block-559e2fd1e4b0b0df6a114671\">ruled out a new tough austerity package<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">. Lafazanis represents around 70 Syriza MPs who have previously taken a hard line against further austerity measures and could yet wreck any top-level agreement.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(Phillip Inman, Graeme Wearden and Helena Smith: Guardian Ibid; 9 July 2015)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The concession made by Greece in accepting the further round of \u201causterity\u201d measures is huge:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe new proposals include sweeping reforms to VAT to raise 1% of GDP and moving more items to the 23% top rate of tax, including restaurants \u2013 a key battleground before. Greece has also dropped its opposition to abolishing the lower VAT rate on its islands, starting with the most popular tourist attractions. Athens also appears to have made significant concessions on pensions, agreeing to phase out solidarity payments for the poorest pensioners by December 2019, a year earlier than planned. It would also raise the retirement age to 67 by 2022. And it has agreed to raise corporation tax to 28%, as the IMF wanted, not 29%, as previously targeted.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece is also proposing to cut military spending by \u20ac100m in 2015 and by \u20ac200m in 2016, and implement changes to reform and improve tax collection and fight tax evasion. It will also press on with privatisation of state assets including regional airports and ports. Some government MPs had vowed to reverse this.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">In return, Greece appears to be seeking a three-year loan deal worth \u20ac53.5bn\u2026\u2026.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Several EU leaders said the troika of creditors \u2013 the European commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank &#8211; must also make concessions to secure Greece\u2019s future inside the eurozone.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Donald Tusk<\/strong>, who chairs the EU summits, said European officials would make an effort to address Greece\u2019s key request for a debt write-off. \u2026<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">On Thursday, the German finance minister, Wolfgang Sch\u00e4uble said the possibility of some kind of debt relief would be discussed over coming days, although he cautioned it may not provide much help.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cThe room for manoeuvre through debt reprofiling or restructuring is very small,\u201d he said.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece has long argued its debt is too high to be paid back and that the country requires some form of debt relief. The IMF agrees, but key European states such as Germany have resisted the idea\u2026..<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">German ECB governing council member <strong>Jens Weidmann<\/strong> argued Greek banks should not get more emergency credit from the central bank unless a bailout deal is struck.\u2028 He said it was up to eurozone governments and Greek leaders themselves to rescue Greece.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The central bank \u201chas no mandate to safeguard the solvency of banks and governments,\u201d he said in a speech.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">The ECB capped emergency credit to Greek banks amid doubt over whether the country will win further rescue loans from other countries. The banks closed and limited cash withdrawals because they had no other way to replace deposits.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Weidmann said he welcomed the fact that central bank credit \u201cis no longer being used to finance capital flight caused by the Greek government.\u201d<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/2015\/jul\/09\/greece-debt-crisis-athens-accepts-harsh-austerity-as-bailout-deal-nears\">http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/business\/2015\/jul\/09\/greece-debt-crisis-athens-accepts-harsh-austerity-as-bailout-deal-nears<\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>11. CONCLUSION<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">At the time of writing the final scenes in the disintegrating Syriza \u201cUnited Front\u2019 parliament have yet to be played out.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">However the shrewdest elements of the non-Marxist-Leninist left recognize that the time is long due, for Greece to exit the European Union to regain its own measure of independence. Many on the left agree that this will be hard.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">The leading proponent of this has been <strong>Costas Lapavitas<\/strong> \u2013 a MP in the Greek Parliament but not a member of Syriza \u2013 and radical economist. His view has been put in several books and articles for example these cited here: ([1], Lapvitas, C. Interview with Sebastien Budgen: \u2018Greece: Phase Two\u201d; in Jacobin. At<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2015\/03\/lapavitsas-varoufakis-grexit-syriza\/\">https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2015\/03\/lapavitsas-varoufakis-grexit-syriza\/<\/a><\/span> <span style=\"color:#000000\">[2] Costas Lapavitsas: The Syriza strategy has come to an end\u2019. Interview with Press Project and Der Spiegel;<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.thepressproject.gr\/details_en.php?aid=74530\">http:\/\/www.thepressproject.gr\/details_en.php?aid=74530<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">. [3[ The crisis of the Eurozone\u201d, July 10, 2010 ; Greek Left Review. At<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/greekleftreview.wordpress.com\/2010\/07\/10\/the-crisis-of-the-eurozone\/\">https:\/\/greekleftreview.wordpress.com\/2010\/07\/10\/the-crisis-of-the-eurozone\/<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Although this view has certainly been challenged (Bach, Paula. \u201cExit the Euro? Polemic with Greek Economist Costas Lapavitsas.\u201d Left Voice News Project, at:<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/leftvoice.org\/Exit-the-Euro-Polemic-with-Greek-Economist-Costas-Lapavitsas\">http:\/\/leftvoice.org\/Exit-the-Euro-Polemic-with-Greek-Economist-Costas-Lapavitsas<\/a><\/span><span style=\"color:#000000\">).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">Marxist-Leninists argue that leaving the imperialist bloc of the EU \u2013 would be the correct policy for the working class, peasantry and poor sections of Greece.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">When asked on how the <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"https:\/\/plus.google.com\/114443710203719523642\">Anasintaxi Organization<\/a><\/span> sees the future events, they replied:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color:#000000\">\u201cBoth reformist parties (\u201cK\u201dKE and SYRIZA) have accepted the Greek capital\u2019s present strategic choice to maintain the country in the EU and the Eurozone\u2026 In order to contribute to the growth of the working class struggles and the rise of the revolutionary movement, the Movement for Reorganization of KKE (1918-1955) is striving, under very unfavorable conditions, to achieve the following:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>A)<\/strong> Together with the reorganization, the re-birth of KKE (1918-1955) and the ideological-political-organizational unity of the Greek communists on basis of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and the dissemination of the Marxist conception of socialism-communism;<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">it actively supports and participates in the struggle of the working class and all the toilers against the reduction of salaries and pensions, against the deterioration of their position in general and supports all demands that aim to defend their (economic, trade-union, social and political) class interests in opposition to the foreign and Greek capital and in particular, the EU monopolies which impose directly the current austerity measures.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>B)<\/strong> The formation of united, massive and truly independent trade unions whose aim will be the resistance to the extreme neo-liberal policy of austerity and the further development of the workers\u2019 and people\u2019s struggles combined with the struggle against nationalism-racism-fascism-Nazism (all very dangerous enemies of the working class and the people) as well as \u201canti-Germanism\u201d and \u201canti-Hellenism\u201d (the two sides of the bourgeois nationalism) incited, during this period, by the nationalist circles of the two countries. At the same time, these new trade unions will put forward the demand for the exit of the country from the imperialist EU not only because of the increasing dependence and the deterioration of the Greece-EU relations at the expense of our country but also because of the fact that the economic policy and the hard, anti-popular measures are directly imposed by Brussels.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>C)<\/strong> The cooperation between the consistent left-wing, anti-imperialist and anti-fascist forces that will aim at the formation of a massive, anti-fascist, popular, front that will fight against the dependence on imperialism, in general, and the exit of Greece from the EU, the Eurozone and NATO.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\">(\u0391\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c0\u03cc Anasintaxi Organization \u2018Some questions and answers about the current situation in Greece\u2019; Article to be published in \u201cUnity &amp; Struggle\u201d (Extended version of an interview given to the comrades of Iran); march 30; 2015. At <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/02\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html\">http:\/\/anasintaxi-en.blogspot.ca\/2015\/02\/some-questions-and-answers-about.html<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>APPENDIX: Select Chronology 1975 to 2015:<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Amended from BBC version at:<\/span> <span style=\"color:#0000ff\"><a style=\"color:#0000ff\" href=\"http:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-17373216\">http:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-17373216<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>1975<\/strong> &#8211; New constitution declares Greece a parliamentary republic with some executive powers vested in a president.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>1980<\/strong> &#8211; Conservative Constantine Karamanlis elected president.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>1981<\/strong> &#8211; Greece joins EU. Andreas Papandreou&#8217;s Socialist Party (Pasok) wins elections.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>1985<\/strong> &#8211; President Karamanlis resigns in protest at government plans to reduce powers of president. Christos Sartzetakis becomes head of state.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>1990<\/strong> &#8211; Centre-right New Democracy party forms government under party leader Constantine Mitsotakis<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>1993<\/strong> &#8211; Election returns Papandreou to power for PASOK.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2004<\/strong> March &#8211; Conservative New Democracy party led by Costas Karamanlis wins general election, ending over a decade of Pasok government.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2005<\/strong> April &#8211; Parliament ratifies EU constitution.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2005<\/strong> December &#8211; Amid protest strikes by transport workers, parliament approves changes to labour laws, including an end to jobs for life in the public sector. The plans sparked industrial action in June.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2006<\/strong> March &#8211; Public sector workers strike over pay and in protest at government plans to scrap job security laws and intensify privatisation.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2007<\/strong> September &#8211; Minister Karamanlis wins a narrow majority in the poll. He says he now has a mandate for more reforms but also pledges to make national unity a priority.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2008<\/strong> March &#8211; Parliament narrowly passes government&#8217;s controversial pension reform bill in face of general public sector strike and mass protests.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2008<\/strong> December &#8211; Students and young people take to city streets in nationwide protests and riots over the police killing of a 15-year-old boy in Athens. Major public-sector strikes coincide to increase pressure on the government over its economic policies.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Economic meltdown<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2002<\/strong> January &#8211; Euro replaces drachma.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2004<\/strong> December &#8211; European Commission issues formal warning after Greece found to have falsified budget deficit data in run-up to joining eurozone.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2009<\/strong> October &#8211; Opposition Pasok socialist party wins snap election called by PM Karamanlis. George Papandreou takes over as new prime minister.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong><span style=\"color:#000000\">Debt crisis<\/span><\/strong><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2009<\/strong> December &#8211; Greece&#8217;s credit rating is downgraded by one of world&#8217;s three leading rating agencies amid fears the government could default on its ballooning debt. PM Papandreou announces programme of tough public spending cuts.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2010<\/strong> January- March &#8211; Government announces two more rounds of tough austerity measures, and faces mass protests and strikes.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2010<\/strong> April\/May &#8211; Fears of a possible default on Greece&#8217;s debts prompt eurozone countries to approve a $145bn (110bn euros; \u00a391bn) rescue package for the country, in return for a round of even more stringent austerity measures. Trade unions call a general strike.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2011<\/strong> June &#8211; 24-hour general strike. Tens of thousands of protesters march on parliament to oppose government efforts to pass new austerity laws.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong><span style=\"color:#000000\">Crisis deepens<\/span><\/strong><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2011<\/strong> July &#8211; European Union leaders agree a major bailout for Greece over its debt crisis by channelling 109bn euros through the European Financial Stability Facility.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">All three main credit ratings agencies cut Greece&#8217;s rating to a level associated with a substantial risk of default.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2011<\/strong> October &#8211; Eurozone leaders agree a 50% debt write-off for Greece in return for further austerity measures. PM George Papandreou casts the deal into doubt by announcing a referendum on the rescue package.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2011<\/strong> November &#8211; Faced with a storm of criticism over his referendum plan, Mr Papandreou withdraws it and then announces his resignation.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Lucas Papademos, a former head of the Bank of Greece, becomes interim prime minister of a New Democracy\/Pasok coalition with the task of getting the country back on track in time for elections scheduled provisionally for the spring of 2012.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>New bailout plan<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2012<\/strong> February &#8211; Against a background of violent protests on the streets of Athens, the Greek parliament approves a new package of tough austerity measures agreed with the EU as the price of a 130bn euro bailout.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2012<\/strong> March &#8211; Greece reaches a &#8220;debt swap&#8221; deal with its private-sector lenders, enabling it to halve its massive debt load.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2012<\/strong> May &#8211; Early parliamentary elections see support for coalition parties New Democracy and Pasok slump, with a increase in support for anti-austerity parties of the far left and right. The three top-ranking parties fail to form a working coalition and President Papoulias calls fresh elections for 17 June. The far-right Golden Dawn party based its 2012 election campaign on hostility towards immigrants<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2012<\/strong> June &#8211; Further parliamentary elections boost New Democracy, albeit leaving it without a majority. Leader Antonis Samaras assembles a coalition with third-placed Pasok and smaller groups to pursue the austerity programme.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>Anti-austerity protests<\/strong><\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2012<\/strong> September &#8211; Trade unions stage 24-hour general strike against government austerity measures. Police fire tear gas to disperse anarchist rally outside parliament.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2012<\/strong> October &#8211; Parliament passes a 13.5bn-euro austerity plan aimed at securing the next round of EU and IMF bailout loans; the package &#8211; the fourth in three years &#8211; includes tax rises and pension cuts.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2013<\/strong> January &#8211; Unemployment rises to 26.8% &#8211; the highest rate in the EU.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2013<\/strong> April &#8211; Youth unemployment climbs to almost 60%.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Public broadcaster closed<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2013<\/strong> June &#8211; The government announces without warning that it is suspending the state broadcaster ERT in a bid to save money. The decision gives rise to mass protests and a 24-hour strike.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2013<\/strong> August &#8211; New state broadcaster EDT is launched.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2013<\/strong> September &#8211; Government launches crackdown on far-right Golden Dawn party. Party leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos and five other Golden Dawn MPs are arrested on charges including assault, money laundering and belonging to a criminal organisation.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2013<\/strong> December &#8211; Parliament passes 2014 budget, which is predicated on a return to growth after six years of recession. Prime Minister Samaras hails this as the first decisive step towards exiting the bailout.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2014<\/strong> February &#8211; Greek unemployment reaches a record high of 28%.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2014<\/strong> March &#8211; Parliament narrowly approves a big reform package that will open more retail sectors to competition, part of a deal between Greece and its international lenders.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2014<\/strong> April &#8211; Eurozone finance ministers say they&#8217;ll release more than 8bn euros of further bailout funds to Greece.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\">Greece raises nearly four billion dollars from world financial markets in its first sale of long-term government bonds for four years, in a move seen as an important step in the country&#8217;s economic recovery.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong><span style=\"color:#000000\">Left in power<\/span><\/strong><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2014<\/strong> May &#8211; Anti-austerity, radical leftist Syriza coalition wins European election with 26.6% of the vote.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2014<\/strong> December &#8211; Parliament&#8217;s failure to elect a new president sparks a political crisis and prompts early elections.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2015<\/strong> January &#8211; Alexis Tsipras of Syriza becomes prime minister after winning parliamentary elections, and forms a coalition with the nationalist Independent Greeks party.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2015<\/strong> February &#8211; The government negotiates a four-month extension to Greece&#8217;s bailout in return for dropping key anti-austerity measures and undertaking a eurozone-approved reform programme.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2015<\/strong> June &#8211; European Central Bank ends emergency funding. Greece closes banks, imposes capital controls and schedules referendum on European Union bailout terms for 5 July.Government reinstates former state broadcaster ERT as promised in Syriza manifesto.<\/span><br \/>\n<span style=\"color:#000000\"><strong>2015<\/strong> July &#8211; Greece becomes first developed country to miss a payment to the International Monetary Fund, having already delayed it<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>August 2015 Hari Kumar 1. An Introduction to Greece 2. The Truman Doctrine \u2013 Greece becomes dependent upon the USA after the Second World War..<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":37642,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"nf_dc_page":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[18,21,92],"tags":[229,335,197,347,351],"class_list":["post-20355","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-history","category-international","category-theory","tag-economic-exploitation","tag-greece","tag-imperialism","tag-workers-struggle","tag-world-history"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/redphoenix.news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/greece1.jpg?fit=600%2C450&ssl=1","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20355","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20355"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20355\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/37642"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20355"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=20355"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redphoenix.news\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20355"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}